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 Preface
As a Filipino- Chinese- Portuguese American PhD student in history at UCLA 
at the dawn of the twenty- first century, I started graduate school wanting to 
study Filipino American legal history. After taking an Asian American jurispru-
dence course at the law school, I realized Filipinos had more legal connections to 
Puerto Ricans and Chamorros than other Asians who came to the United States 
due to the War of 1898, the subsequent Treaty of Paris, and the 1901 Insular 
Cases. From that moment, I knew I wanted to study and write about the expe-
riences of U.S. colonials, whom I define as groups under the direct authority of 
the United States, across time and space. Overall, my intellectual goal is to make 
visible and center the histories of unincorporated territories and their peoples 
within larger U.S. narratives and American perspectives.
While not a manageable dissertation project, my advisor and chair, Henry 
Yu, encouraged me to think of my desire to study the impact of unincorporated 
territorial status on colonized groups as a life- long career goal. I have been priv-
ileged and fortunate enough to have the ability to follow this advice and engage 
in research projects about Filipinos and Puerto Ricans in Hawai‘i for my disser-
tation and first book, American Sāmoans for this second book, and U.S. Virgin 
Islanders for a nascent third book project. In the long term, I hope my research, 
writing, and teaching can help us think comparatively about historical and con-
temporary connections among all U.S. colonials for greater understanding and 
potential future coalition building.
My research for Balancing the Tides started in 2008 during my time as a Car-
olina Postdoctoral Faculty Diversity program fellow in the History Department 
at UNC- Chapel Hill. The success of my first trip was greatly facilitated by the 
initial contacts provided by Roderick Labrador, who got me in touch with Ja-
cinta Galea‘i, and Stephen Thom, who connected me with the amazing Oreta 
Togafau (now Oreta Crichton). I am also forever grateful to my mother, Lucille, 
who accompanied me during the first week of this trip and bravely approached 
any Filipino she came across. Jacinta and Oreta provided my first taste of the 
generous Sāmoan spirit, fa‘a Sāmoa, one loaning me her car during the week-
days and the other inviting me to stay in her home for this trip and every other 
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consecutive visit. The librarians at the Feleti Barstow Public Library, especially 
Cheryl Morales and Justin Maga, were extremely kind and helpful. Likisone 
Asotau also gave me an excellent tour of the Chicken of the Sea factory for a 
firsthand, close- up look at the tuna canning process.
While I was able to publish a preliminary article in 2010 on the closing of 
the Chicken of the Sea factory, the next several years were full of teaching in 
my tenure- track position at the University of Wyoming and publishing my first 
book in 2014. I was finally able to return to my research in American Sāmoa that 
same year. Support from the Wyoming Institute for Humanities Research, the 
University of Wyoming International Travel Grant, the University of Wyoming 
College of Arts and Sciences Basic Research Grant, as well as research monies 
from my current institution, Claremont Graduate University, funded my trips 
to American Sāmoa from 2014 to 2016.
I am so blessed that every year I have traveled to American Sāmoa, Oreta and 
her family have hosted me in their home. I am humbled and proud to be part of 
their ‘āiga, appreciative of all their professional and personal support through 
the years. Oreta also helped me set up meetings with several government officials 
and community members in 2014, who in turn recommended more people to 
contact and so forth until I interviewed over one hundred people related to my 
research topics for this project through this snowball approach. I am grateful 
for the time and support of every single individual who spoke with me, whether 
their name is mentioned in this work or kept confidential by request. Those who 
went above and beyond the normal scope of assistance during my research trips 
or while I was off- island include Clarence Crichton, Saumaniafaese Uikirifi, 
Nate Ilaoa, Keniseli Lafaele, Hillary Togafau, David Herdrich, Alice Lawrence, 
Patty Page, Joseph Paulin, Jeremy Raynal, and Fofō Sunia.
In addition to individual interviews, primary source documents, archival 
materials, scientific reports, and historiographical texts were used to write this 
story of American Sāmoa. While working in this region has been a personal 
joy and honor, as a historian this orally based culture has sometimes presented 
challenges in locating and obtaining consistent written sources and data. Some 
histories in this work have been reconstructed through the tellings of multiple 
people and confirmed as best as possible with available documentary evidence. 
As scholar Fikret Berkes has stated, “The written page will never be an adequate 
format for the teaching of indigenous knowledge” (2012, 38). This work is not 
and cannot be an exhaustive look at all historical ocean policies in American 
Sāmoa. Nevertheless, I have tried diligently to provide as accurate a narrative 
as possible for the case studies I present. While many issues discussed in this 
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book are connected to several contemporary and current events, out of a need 
for an end point in research, all statements are based on the policies in existence 
through August 2018. I apologize in advance for any errors or gaps in informa-
tion that may have inadvertently resulted from this research process.
I am deeply appreciative for amazing colleagues at the several institutions 
I have been a part of since 2008. In particular, I would like to thank Maile 
Arvin, Janet Brodie, Keith Camacho, Faye Caronan Chen, Nicole Choi, Hol-
ger Droessler, Lori Anne Ferrell, Joshua Goode, Jennifer Hayashida, Isadora 
Helfgott, Jennifer Ho, Char Miller, Lin Poyer, Phil Roberts, Carolina San Juan, 
Kiri Sailiata, Ronald Schultz, Lisa Uperesa, and Kathy Yep for their feedback, 
support, and assistance through the years. I would also like to thank my research 
assistants, Kaitlyn Bylard, Jonathan Hanna, Lara Kolinchak, Mike Pesses, and 
Gary Stein for all their hard work and creativity in finding sources for my work 
and helping me with manuscript cleanup. In particular, Michael Pesses did an 
amazing job with the maps and charts. Special thanks also goes out to my cousin, 
Joanna Sokua, who provided her artistic abilities for some last- minute illustra-
tions on fishing styles. I am grateful to my colleagues at Claremont Graduate 
University for always being excited about my research on unincorporated ter-
ritories and encouraging me to teach what I study, bringing along our students 
for the ride. I truly appreciate all the comments and help from those at UH 
Press, especially my editor, Masako Ikeda, editorial assistant Debbie Tang, the 
managing editor and staff at UH and Longleaf, as well as my two manuscript 
readers. And finally to my pack, Mike and Matli, you are the rocks that I draw 
strength from FOR EVS.
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Frequently Used Sāmoan Ter ms
‘Āiga family, descent group
Aumaga untitled men
Fa‘amolemole please
Fa‘a Sāmoa the Sāmoan way
Fono Sāmoan legislature
Mātai chief
Palangi foreigner
Pule power, political authority
Tapu taboo
Vā social relations
Vā fealoa‘ i social respect
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List of Abbreviations
ASG American Sāmoa Government
ASLLE American Sāmoa Longline Limited Entry program
CFMP Community- Based Fisheries Management Program
CBMRM community- based marine resource management
DOC Department of Commerce
DMP Draft Management Plan
DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement
DMWR Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
LVPA Large Vessel Prohibited Area
ONMS Office of National Marine Sanctuaries
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service
NMS National Marine Sanctuary
SFR U.S. Federal Sport Fish Restoration Program
TEK traditional ecological knowledge
VMPA Village Marine Protected Area
WPacFIN Western Pacific Fisheries Information Network
Wespac Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council
WWII World War II

1Introduction
Where is American Sāmoa? And why does this region have the word “Amer-
ican” in it? This set of ve islands and two atolls in the South Pacic is the 
most southern territory of the United States in the last time zone of the globe. 
American Sāmoa is 2,566 miles southwest of Hawai‘i and 4,719 miles southwest 
of the continental U.S. West Coast. The total landmass of this region is almost 
seventy- seven square miles, with a population of 55,519 according to the 2010 
census. Through a set of treaties between the U.S. Navy and local chiefs in 1900 
and 1904, this area became an unincorporated territory of the United States 
and has maintained that status through today. Over the years, this location has 
served as a U.S. Navy port, particularly important during World War II, a major 
site for tuna canning, and the location of the largest National Marine Sanctuary 
in the United States.
This book examines the unique experiences of American Sāmoans in con-
trast to other U.S. colonials, or people under direct U.S. authority, who became 
part of the U.S. empire at the turn of the twentieth century.1 The United States 
engaged in colonialism (or direct government control over another region), as 
opposed to imperialism (which involves extended eorts to inuence another 
region’s governance, but usually does not entail direct control), in places like 
Hawai‘i, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam.
Despite active protests by the majority of Native Hawaiians, their islands be-
came a U.S. territory in 1900, instantly converting the indigenous population 
into U.S. citizens against their will.2 Aer the U.S.- Philippine War in 1902, 
the U.S. federal government dictated the Philippines’ government and economy 
until independence was granted in 1946.3 Puerto Rico was an unincorporated 
territory under U.S. leadership from 1898 until becoming a Commonwealth in 
1950.4 Chamorros have lived in an unincorporated territory of the United States 
since 1898 (except for Japanese occupation during World War II).5 In these U.S. 
colonies, federal leadership controlled all decision making in the beginning, 
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gradually providing local representation in government positions after a signifi-
cant period of assimilation to American values, ideals, structures, and processes. 
While stories of U.S. colonialism in Hawai‘i, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico 
are familiar to many, the history and contemporary effects of U.S. rule in Amer-
ican Sāmoa, as well as Guam, are quite invisible.
The common story of the U.S. government’s takeover and control of island 
colonies was not the case in American Sāmoa. Instead of native customs being 
erased by missionaries, as in Hawai‘i, and intense Americanization initiatives 
such as those in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, American Sāmoa dif-
fered from other colonized regions because the U.S. government has historically 
accommodated indigenous practices in this area. From the beginning of their 
official relationship with the United States in 1900, American Sāmoans main-
tained indigenous control over their local governance. While the United States 
held authority over larger structural affairs, such as international trade, global 
diplomacy, and the military, the traditional Sāmoan fa‘amātai (chiefly system of 
leadership and decision making) managed daily life.
The U.S. federal government consistently used island colonies for monocrop 
export industries (that profited U.S. corporations) and strategic military sites. 
In Hawai‘i, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, sugar became those regions’ major 
agricultural export. American Sāmoa became a site for the monocrop of tuna 
canning, which will be discussed in chapter 2. These island regions, as well as 
Guam, also became sites for major military bases. However, unlike the experi-
ence of other U.S. colonials who have generally come under full federal control, 
American Sāmoans have always had a degree of independent action. According 
to a 2012 U.S. Department of Commerce report,
Although the Department of the Interior has administrative oversight of 
the Territory of American Samoa, there is only a limited amount of di-
rect Federal involvement there. The Federal government owns no land on 
American Samoa except for an uninhabited atoll 150 miles from Tutuila. . . .  
There are no military installations in the Territory, nor any energy facilities 
serving an area outside the Territory. The primary Federal agencies with 
interests in American Samoa are resource protection oriented. With the 
exception of the U.S. Coast Guard, all relevant Federal authorities con-
cerned with Federal resource protection laws have their offices located over 
2000 miles away in Honolulu, or over 4000 miles away in Seattle or San 
Francisco. Due to this lack of a continual presence, enforcement of Federal 
resource protection laws is irregular at the Federal level.6
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The federal government openly acknowledges its minimal economic, bureau-
cratic, military, and legislative involvement in this unincorporated territory. 
Consequently, the maintenance of local indigenous rule since 1900 significantly 
differentiated colonization in American Sāmoa from other island territories of 
the U.S. empire.
This work examines U.S. federal marine policies and programs in American 
Sāmoa to highlight historic U.S. colonialism in the region. According to post-
colonial ecology scholars Elizabeth DeLoughrey and George Handley, “Euro-
pean Enlightenment knowledge, natural history, conservation policy, and the 
language of nature — the very systems of logic that we draw from today to speak 
of conservation and sustainability — are derived from a long history of the co-
lonial exploitation of nature.”7 Imperialism, colonialism, and empire building 
are at the root of land occupation, as well as resource categorization and use. 
Subsequently created, as well as supposedly scientific, hierarchies and priorities 
place indigenous groups like Pacific Islanders at the bottom of social, economic, 
political, and cultural structures throughout environmental and empire history. 
Such Western- based ideals about the appropriate use of the environment and 
proper modern lifestyle patterns have drastically altered the lives of indigenous 
groups. The following chapters highlight the shifts in marine practices in Amer-
ican Sāmoa away from self- sufficient subsistence living to a cash- based, export 
economy and the precedence of Western- based scientific and ecology ideals in 
environmental practices since World War II.
The following case studies also show how U.S. federal ocean- use policies con-
nect contemporary scientific and ecological prerogatives to continued U.S. con-
trol and authority over the region and its people. As Sasha Davis discussed, the 
desire to possess and control Pacific Island regions stems from the U.S. empire’s 
ultimate goals to protect globalization and free market trade in the Asia- Pacific 
region.8 The ability of U.S. vessels to move and exchange easily with markets 
throughout the Pacific Rim remains a key motivation to retain island colonies 
and continue to regulate ocean use in the region. Mansel Blackford also argued 
for “the tremendous importance of government policy in shaping the fishery 
and the fishery’s global scope. . . . Regulation and development went hand in 
hand.”9 The expansion of U.S. federal marine regulations during the twenty- first 
century results in continued U.S. authority over American Sāmoans, as well as 
a strong influence on the global fishing industry.
However, like work by sociologists Cluny Macpherson and La‘avasa Macpher-
son, this study views island colonies as “a site where global forces confront local 
ones, and Sāmoans are assumed to be active agents in the transformation of their 
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society.”10 The following case studies also demonstrate the human priorities of 
economics, local control, and indigenous rights by American Sāmoans. While 
Westerners have prioritized wilderness and conservation, indigenous groups are 
more concerned about “arable land and potable water, public health, the threats 
of militarism and national debt, and reflect social planning for cultural, eco-
nomic, and national sovereignty”11 Often times, native issues are distinct and 
separate from colonizers’ interests.
In fact, ideals, goals, and standards in a colonized territory and for its local 
population do not always coincide with, support the needs of, or have the same 
impact or resonance in the continental United States. Stateside environmen-
tal efforts and economic regulations, such as national marine sanctuaries and 
minimum wage standards, seem positive and moral from a lower- 48 perspective. 
However, these same rules have adversely influenced ground- level employment, 
local industries, and native access to ancient fishing grounds in American Sāmoa. 
As historian Karl Jacoby has stated about Native Americans, U.S. “conservation 
was but one piece of a larger process of colonization and state building in which 
Indian peoples were transformed (in theory, at least) from independent actors to 
dependent wards bound by governmental controls.”12 Western- based initiatives 
have also imposed nonnative standards, practices, and ways of knowing on this 
indigenous group.
Native issues versus federal issues in colonized American Sāmoa are complex 
and layered, sometimes tense and fraught. Examining the intersections of en-
vironment and empire widen understandings of fundamental questions of dif-
ference, power, and privilege that postcolonial ecology studies emphasize. This 
work discusses the complications involved in the unique shared governance in 
American Sāmoa, the impact of government policies on this indigenous group 
and the United States, as well as the ways in which native American Sāmoans 
have expressed their views about government regulations of marine practices and 
ocean- related management policies in the post – World War II era.
Brief Historical Background
Researchers believe the first Sāmoans, known as the Lapita people, originated 
from Melanesia. This group migrated from New Caledonia to Fiji, then Tonga 
and Sāmoa more than 3,500 years ago. Over two thousand years ago, Sāmoan 
political and social systems “were fully developed and operating” at independent 
village, clan, and regional levels.13 These people then started to explore regions 
in more eastern areas of the Pacific, influencing cultures as far as the Hawaiian 
Introduction 5 
Islands. According to A History of American Samoa, during this period “there 
was much exchange and intermarriage between Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga.”14
More than 1,300 years ago, Tonga occupied the Sāmoan islands for over 300 
years until Sāmoans from places like Manu‘a in the east and Upolu in the west 
revolted against this empire.15 Aer that overthrow, a series of Sāmoan chiefs 
competed for control over various islands in the archipelago. More than four 
hundred years ago, struggles over royal titles heightened and divided communi-
ties across the islands into the nineteenth century.16 During this period, strong 
rivalries among ‘āiga (descent groups) throughout this region resulted in violent 
clashes among Sāmoans.
In 1722, the rst Westerners made contact with the Sāmoan islands, led by 
Jacob Roggeveen, a Dutch expedition leader for the West India Company. How-
ever, Western settlement did not occur until Congregationalist members of the 
London Missionary Society arrived in 1830. Just ten years prior, some of the 
Figure I.01. Oceania. (Created for author by Michael Pesses.)
6 introduction 
first informal missionaries came from Tahiti and Tonga.17 Methodists in 1835, 
Roman Catholics in 1845, and Mormons in 1865 followed these two groups of 
initial proselytizers.18 From the 1850s on, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, 
and the United States were also interested in acquiring the last available regions 
of the world for Westerners to expand their empires at this time: the islands of 
the South Pacific.19 Germans started to develop strong interests in the harvest-
ing, processing, and exporting of copra from Upolu in the 1870s. The Kingdom 
of Hawai‘i also tried to form a confederation with Sāmoa in 1887, but those 
efforts ended after the Bayonet Constitution was forced on King Kalākaua later 
that same year.20
In 1899, three Western countries agreed to partition the area through the 
Berlin Treaty without consulting Sāmoans or any other native groups. Germany 
took control of the western Sāmoan islands, Great Britain gained authority over 
Tonga, the Solomons, and areas of West Africa, and the United States obtained 
authority over the eastern Sāmoan islands.21 One year later, the U.S. Navy nego-
tiated a Deed of Cession with Tutuila chiefs. On April 17, 1900, the U.S. Navy 
and twenty mātai (chiefs) of the island signed a document granting the U.S. 
government sovereign rights over the lands and waters of Tutuila, Aunu‘u Island, 
and the surrounding area, specifically “all other Islands, rocks, reefs, foreshores, 
and waters lying between the thirteenth degree and the fifteenth degree of south 
latitude and between the one hundred and seventy first degree and the one hun-
dred sixty seventh degree of west longitude from the Meridian of Greenwich.”22
This agreement also stated that “the Government of the United States of 
America shall respect and protect the individual rights of all people dwelling in 
Tutuila to their lands and other property. . . . The Chiefs of the towns will be en-
titled to retain their individual control of the separate towns, if that control is in 
accordance with the laws of the United States of America. . . . But the enactment 
of legislation and the General Control shall remain firm with the United States 
of America.”23 This verbiage maintained the right of the indigenous population 
to govern local society and manage land according to their traditional practices, 
as long as these conventions did not conflict with U.S. regulations.24 However, 
the United States held ultimate political and legal rule over the area.
On July 16, 1904, Tuimanua, the king of the Manu‘a Islands, and his five 
chiefs signed a similar agreement for the northeastern portion of this archipel-
ago, including “the whole of eastern portion of the Samoan Islands lying east 
of longitude 171 west of Greenwich and known as Tau, Olosega, Ofu, and Rose 
Island, and all other, the waters and property adjacent thereto.”25 This treaty 
stated that “the rights of the chiefs in each village and of all people concerning 
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their property according to their customs shall be recognized.”26 Once again, 
the United States gained overall control with the stipulation that customary 
Sāmoan systems remained protected.
Together, these Deeds of Cession created tiered governance in the region 
that allowed the continuation of local indigenous practices and accepted general 
native subordination to U.S. governance. This shared political- legal authority, 
heavily steeped in Western methods of geographic calculation and nonnative 
notions of individual property rights, remains in eect today in this unincorpo-
rated territory of the United States.27
Why was the United States interested in shared authority in these islands and 
why did Sāmoans agree to hand over the sovereignty of their islands? In addi-
tion to participating in global empire building at the time, the U.S. government 
viewed Pago Pago Harbor as a key location for a coaling station between Asia 
and the Americas.28 Some, like researcher Joseph Kennedy, believed that the 
Figure I.02. Sāmoan islands. (Created for author by Michael Pesses.)
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U.S. Navy did not want to take on responsibility for full control of the islands, 
therefore willingly agreed to joint authority over the region.29 The United States 
was already fighting a bloody war for control in the Philippines.30 With strong 
resistance to U.S. rule in that archipelago, as well as other Western powers in the 
region willing and ready to take their place, the U.S. Navy was open to a degree 
of shared governance with indigenous leaders in Sāmoa to gain their loyalty and 
cooperation. Joint authority also meant the U.S. Navy could keep other foreign 
investors out of the region while maintaining a South Pacific pathway to Asian 
markets. This arrangement allowed the United States to have overall authority 
that could remain limited indefinitely, but could also be expanded when needed 
at a moment’s notice.
In fact, scholar Christina Duffy Burnett has claimed that “American impe-
rialism has also consisted of efforts to impose limits on expansion: to draw lines 
around what counts as properly "national" territory,” providing ways to reduce 
“the number of contexts in which the government must take up the respon-
sibilities that come with such power.”31 Shared authority in American Sāmoa, 
unincorporated territorial status for Guam, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, informal protectorate status for Cuba, and purely ex-
tractive rights in the Guano Islands all demonstrate such an approach to U.S. 
expansionism. By avoiding full- fledged responsibility towards these locations, 
the U.S. government can reap all the benefits of exploiting these regions without 
the cost or burdens of providing citizen- level support and rights to the people 
living in these places.
Since Western powers had been vying for power in the region since the 
mid- 1800s, and were likely to persist in the area, Sāmoan chiefs might have seen 
the United States as the best option among the determined empire builders from 
the west. Chiefs on Tutuila and Aunu‘u were traditionally treated as vassals by 
the high chiefs of Upolu and Savai‘i. ‘Āiga from the eastern islands might have 
viewed the United States as a good protector from the tensions and conflicts 
with the western islands in the nineteenth century.32 In 1872, High Chief Mauga 
gave the U.S. exclusive rights to use Pago Pago Harbor, and in 1873, Tutuila 
chiefs petitioned for the annexation of American Sāmoa by America. While 
the U.S. Congress never passed annexation, the U.S. Senate did ratify a treaty 
in 1878 giving the United States the right to establish a naval station at Pago 
Pago.33 These negotiations set the foundation for future U.S. presence and con-
trol on Tutuila.
Kennedy also discussed how Sāmoans wanted to keep local governance but 
have U.S. protection without much sacrifice of their independent action in the 
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years following the Deeds of Cession.34 Regardless of the ultimate reasons for 
this political arrangement, the shared custody of power over American Sāmoa 
has led to some conflicts, disagreements, and disconnects between U.S. federal 
policies, guidelines, expectations, and regulations and indigenous Sāmoan in-
terests, desires, culture, and values.35 This work will explore the intricacies of 
combined governance through the lens of marine practices, labor issues, and 
ocean resources in the region since the mid- twentieth century.
Allowing traditional Sāmoan leadership and local control was acceptable to 
the U.S. federal government during the first half of the twentieth century be-
cause until World War II, this region was not considered an important area of 
U.S. jurisdiction. This territory lost its turn- of- the- century strategic military 
value due to a shift from coal to steam- powered naval vessels, as well as other 
American bases established in Hawai‘i and the Philippines. After serving as a 
significant supply and mustering station for the Pacific theater of World War 
II, this Pacific archipelago once again fell to the back burner of federal govern-
ment concern.
With the closing of the U.S. naval base at Pago Pago in 1951, American Sā-
moans started migrating in large numbers to Hawai‘i, the continental United 
States, and Guam to pursue cash- based wage labor jobs to support their fami-
lies.36 As Fa‘anofo Lisaclaire Uperesa and others have shown, a strong historic 
and current belief exists that material success “is possible only through migra-
tion abroad and taking advantage of opportunities provided by the United 
States.”37 Outmigration continues today, with an average of 7,804 people leaving 
the region for work each year from 2006 to 2016, about 14 percent of the total 
population.38 Such movement is used as opportunities to improve both the eco-
nomic circumstances of migrants and their families at home who often receive 
financial support from those abroad. These remittances have provided an uncal-
culated but significant contribution to supporting ‘āiga and village economies 
in American Sāmoa.39
In 1963, a Reader’s Digest article highlighted the poverty level conditions in 
this periphery of U.S. empire. Author Clarence Hall admonished the U.S. gov-
ernment for leaving this area to languish in deprived circumstances, describ-
ing how “government buildings were peeling and rotting on their foundations, 
beautiful Pago Pago Bay was marred and befouled by hideous over- water out-
houses, rutty and teeth- jarring roads unrepaired for years. . . . Public schools are 
unequipped shacks.”40 In response, President John F. Kennedy authorized in-
frastructure improvement projects and social services that lasted through 1967. 
These projects included the development of radiotelephone services, extensive 
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road repairs, educational television, the construction of a new conference build-
ing, hospital, and hotel, as well as the opening of a second tuna cannery. This 
temporary push to improve conditions in American Sāmoa ushered in the next 
major set of Western- based structural changes in the region.
From that point forward, the U.S. government encouraged the tuna canning 
industry in the region, discussed in chapter 2, and later started to pour federal 
grants and monies into the local economy. High tax and tariff breaks, as well as 
variable minimum wage and lax labor standards, encouraged the development 
of this commerce as a major source for the Gross Domestic Product, besides 
federal grants, in the territory. Since 2007, about 57 percent of territorial income 
has come from the tuna canning business, with an average of 30 percent coming 
from government funding.41
Despite such federal government influences in the region, as scholar Kirisitina 
Sailiata has written, the long- term continuation of indigenous practices can be 
seen as a unique form of American Sāmoan resistance to colonization.42 Indig-
enous demands for more representation under federal rule have occurred in 
American Sāmoa since the Mau in 1920, which involved native protests against 
their poor treatment by the U.S. Navy.43 Since that movement, Sāmoans have 
pushed for increased indigenous self- governance at various times, but have not 
sought complete separation from the United States. This native group estab-
lished a territorial constitution in 1960, a full- time legislature in 1971, and the 
first elected governor in 1977. Until the 1980s, American Sāmoans exercised con-
trol over local environmental management. Local leaders also determined wage 
policies until 2007.
The full- time Sāmoan legislature (Fono), emulates both Western and indige-
nous political structures. One component of the Fono involves eighteen popu-
larly elected officials in the House of Representatives. The second section of the 
Fono is the Senate, which consists of fifteen members appointed by the “coun-
cil of chiefs, in accordance with Samoan custom.”44 The allocations for both 
branches are based on traditional Sāmoan counties. While the names of each 
component of the legislature and the election of House representatives reflect 
U.S.- based governance models, the members of the Senate and district lines fol-
low customary native Sāmoan pule (political authority).
The American Sāmoa Government (ASG) has struggled to keep the region’s 
economy afloat since the establishment of the Fono in 1971. Every elected gov-
ernor has faced administrative deficits. Several corporate efforts to establish 
businesses in the region were initiated but failed to stay operational long- term. 
These short- lived industries included a small assembly plant for Bulova watches, 
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a Meadow Gold dairy manufacturing plant, a First National City Bank branch, 
and the Dory commercial fishing boat program that will be discussed in chapter 
1. Proposals to start a third tuna cannery and an oil refinery were also brought 
forth but rejected by the ASG.45 By 1975, manufacturing and production plants 
shut down due to the general worldwide recession.46 Other impediments to the 
establishment of alternative industries in the 1970s included U.S. tariff agree-
ments with developing countries and changes in territorial customs inspec-
tions.47 By 1979, the five- year territorial economic development plan decided 
to focus ASG Department of Commerce efforts on the fishing industry and 
agriculture.
While American Sāmoa has always received some amount of federal fund-
ing since the Deeds of Cession, from 1999 through today the U.S. government 
has provided over $200 million annually in grants and subsidies to bolster this 
region’s economy. In exchange, this funding requires American Sāmoan grant-
ees to create economic, social, and environmental programs based on Western 
standards and nonnative forms of knowledge and decision making, as will be 
discussed in chapter 4.
Once the U.S. government started to invest large amounts of money into 
the region, the contours of the American Sāmoan – U.S. colonial relationship 
shifted. This native group became more dependent on U.S.- imported cash, food, 
and goods instead of subsistence fishing and farming. The United States also 
started to impose more regulations and management over the ecology and econ-
omy of the region. A disconnect between American ideals and indigenous ways 
of life developed. Sometimes the needs of a communal society with strong in-
digenous social and political hierarchies, as well as major economic dependence 
on the commercial fishing industry, conflict with federal initiatives for envi-
ronmental and labor protection. Into the twenty- first century, the U.S. federal 
government has increased its role in developing policies that have not coincided 
with indigenous desires or needs, leading some American Sāmoans to become 
more anxious about their precarious position in relation to U.S. policies, a direct 
result of being U.S. colonials.
Shift in Marine Practices in American Sāmoa
Massive U.S. military presence in the Pacific during World War II quickly in-
troduced and integrated American products and ways of living in American 
Sāmoa and other Pacific Islands.48 After the war ended, U.S. troops and ma-
terials were quickly removed from these areas. However, American Sāmoans 
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continued to “demand modern conveniences introduced by the military. . . . Ev-
eryone wanted a telephone line. Corned beef, bread, and butter became staples. 
Palagi [foreigner]- styled houses were replacing Sāmoan houses at an increasing 
rate.”49 In addition to newly developed desires for Western commodities, Amer-
ican Sāmoans wanted more wage- based jobs to pay for imported goods, better 
education, and improved health care. The colonial influence of a U.S.- style econ-
omy, culture, and lifestyle increased rapidly during this period.
Prior to U.S. rule in the region, American Sāmoans typically ate a self- 
 sufficient diet based on seafood gathered from the ocean such as octopus, fish, 
shrimp, and lobster. Native groups also cultivated produce like bananas, man-
goes, taro, papayas, and breadfruit on local plantations. According to Va‘amua 
Henry Sesepasara, the Governor’s Advisor on Fisheries and the ASG Depart-
ment of Marine and Wildlife Resources (DMWR) director in 2018, “we eat 
what we catch. We don’t play with our food. We eat almost anything we catch 
in the water. If it crawls, moves, swims in water, we eat it.”50 American Sāmoans 
interviewed for this project often identified the 1980s as the period when a shift 
occurred away from nutritional self- sufficiency to local commercial fishing and 
export- based eating.
According to Nate Ilaoa, the American Sāmoa coordinator for the Western 
Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council (Wespac), these days “if a family 
talks about buying fish, usually they pick up a can of mackerel or tuna.”51 How-
ever, as far back as 1926, researcher Alfred Judd noted that “today the natives are 
not fishing as they could.”52 Observer Frank Drees also described many cases 
of canned salmon and sardines at a funeral in Vaitogi in the mid- 1930s.53 From 
a more contemporary perspective, the 2010 U.S. Census showed that only 6.7 
percent of the American Sāmoa population engaged in subsistence activities and 
3.2 percent of the population worked in farming, fishing, and forestry occupa-
tions.54 A 2016 report also found that 47 percent of American Sāmoans did not 
fish, 20 percent never swam, and 65 percent purchased seafood from stores or 
restaurants.55
Greater access to and reliance on cheaper and convenient canned or processed 
foods in grocery stores, as well as the influx of cash- based government jobs since 
1999, enticed many American Sāmoans away from the more laborious and less 
glamorous tasks involved in manual fishing and crop cultivation. The increased 
use of Western technologies, like cable television, the internet, and related social 
media, as well as cell phones have also come to dominate the interest and at-
tention of American Sāmoan youth.56 These changes in consumption practices, 
away from frequent and regular marine practices and land cultivation towards 
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a strong focus on and value for imported, off- island goods, directly reflects an-
other impact of being U.S. colonials — incorporation into the culture of Amer-
ican consumer society.57 According to Wespac Fishery analyst Marlowe Sabater, 
the Sāmoan islands has a great seafaring tradition, a reputation as navigator is-
lands. American Sāmoans have lost that connection since becoming a territory.58
As a cash- based economy today, fishing is no longer a widespread tradition. 
While both the local American Sāmoa Government and U.S. federal groups 
have developed educational programs to encourage youth, as well as adults, to 
take up fishing and other ocean uses, some of which are discussed in chapter 4, 
most people in American Sāmoa do not believe angling will become a popular or 
dominant mode of living again. Fishers interviewed in 2016 stated that they have 
taught their children how to fish.59 Many of these children enjoy the practice and 
some are even better fishers than their parents. But families without an active 
angler often do not pick up this practice.
Despite this decline in regular marine use by large portions of the popula-
tion, as a set of islands in the middle of the Pacific, the ocean has always been an 
important and valuable commodity in American Sāmoa. Pacific Islanders schol-
ars such as Epeli Hau‘ofa and Alice Te Punga Somerville have written about 
the orientation of islander life to the water more than land.60 The ocean is the 
source and center of physical and spiritual sustenance, as well as social, politi-
cal, economic, and cultural exchanges. Water connects Pacific Islander people 
and places.
Consequently, control of ocean resources is fraught with multiple opinions 
and agendas. From fishing rights to conservation policies, different levels of U.S. 
and American Sāmoa leadership, as well as general society, have varied ideas 
about appropriate allocation and use of this supply. According to the National 
Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa website, “the American Samoa sanctuary 
is the most remote, is the only true tropical reef, and is thought to support the 
greatest diversity of marine life” in the entire national sanctuary system.”61 Con-
sequently, some groups appreciate these regional waters for their scientific value. 
Others use the ocean as a source of income and profit. Some treat the ocean as 
sacred and deeply connected to cultural practices and customs, while others see 
the water as something to fear or something that does not factor into their daily 
lives. All impacted groups in American Sāmoa understand the importance of 
access to and the continued health of marine resources surrounding the terri-
tory. However, as the following chapters show, not everyone agrees on the type 
of regulations, policies, and projects needed for ocean stewardship.
Another major set of events that contributed to changes in commercial and 
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recreational fishing practices, marine administration, and ocean knowledge gath-
ering in American Sāmoa involved the creation of Wespac in 1976, the transition 
of the ASG Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources from a division of 
the American Sāmoa Governor’s Office to a separate entity in 1985, and the for-
mation of the National Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa in 1986. The fol-
lowing chapters examine how the establishment of these umbrella management 
organizations, as well as actions or inaction by the U.S. Congress, have created 
a modern administrative colonial state in American Sāmoa that has formalized, 
standardized, and bureaucratized ocean- related policies in the region according 
to Western ideas of conservation, environmentalism, science, protection, and 
ethics. In general, marine resource supervision works to protect the long- term 
health of the Pacific Ocean. However, different definitions of healthy ocean use 
exist, especially in American Sāmoa. These ideas range from wide swaths of no- 
take zones and complete preservation to temporary fishing policies that regularly 
evaluate the most effective and profitable methods to engage with local ocean 
resources. Issues of native rights to access ancestral waters also come into play.
Other Sāmoan Contexts
While much has been written about independent Sāmoa, a limited number of 
books, dissertations, and articles have been written about the history of U.S. 
involvement in American Sāmoa and the impact of U.S. colonialism on this 
indigenous group. While there was a naval history written on American Sāmoa 
in 1960, a coffee- table book published on the history of American Sāmoa in 
2000, a general history of U.S. – American Sāmoan relations from 1900 to 1950 
printed in 2009, and a high school level general history textbook printed in 
2009, Sailiata’s PhD dissertation is the only in- depth study of U.S. – American 
Sāmoa relations throughout the twentieth century.62 To date, most academic 
studies of American Sāmoa have focused on the impact of Sāmoan culture on 
economic and social development, such as migration, language, education, and 
fisheries. Robert Franco wrote about Sāmoan perceptions of work in 1991 from 
an anthropological perspective.63 Sa‘iliemanu Lilomaiava- Doktor has written a 
dissertation and articles about Sāmoan population movement.64 Fa‘anofo Lisa-
claire Uperesa has examined identity, migration, economics, and colonialism 
among American Sāmoan football players.65 Holger Droessler wrote a disser-
tation in 2015 on U.S. – American Sāmoan relations from 1889 to 1919. Others 
have written dissertations on disaster recovery after the 2009 tsunami, as well as 
books and articles about marine ecology in American Sāmoa.66
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Building on these works, this study supports the idea that indigenous knowl-
edge, concepts, and ideologies should be integrated into analyses to better un-
derstand the perspectives and approaches of Pacific Island communities. The 
concept of vā (social space relations) can provide greater insight to American 
Sāmoan motivations, actions, and positionalities to the variety of marine pol-
icy situations discussed in this work. According to American Sāmoan historian 
Fofō Sunia, vā is “one of the most important components of the makeup of the 
Sāmoan culture, so important that it is considered ‘sacred’ in most situations. 
‘Vā’ is the distance between two bodies. The ‘vā’ must always remain orderly, 
respectful and well kept. The ‘vā’ must always be peaceful and harmonious.”67 
All relations in Sāmoan culture are governed by this concept.
Scholar Albert Wendt described vā as “the space between, the betweenness, 
not empty space, not space that separates, but space that relates.”68 Lilomaiava- 
Doktor also explained how vā “connotes mutual respect in sociopolitical ar-
rangements that nurture the relationships between people, places, and social 
environments.”69 The nurturing of vā (tausi le vā) involves alofa (love), fa‘aaloalo 
(respect), and tautua (service).70 Such moral guidelines outline culturally ap-
propriate behaviors for both individuals and the extended family (‘āiga) in all 
aspects of life ranging from social, economic, spiritual, cultural, and political 
components. Overall, such practices emphasize “cultural tools of conflict reso-
lution in Island societies, where collective well- being is paramount.”71 Scholars 
have agreed that vā is a central concept to understanding social relationships in 
Sāmoan culture.72
However, vā requires time and effort. According to ‘Aumua Mata‘itusi Si-
manu in an interview by Lilomaiava- Doktor:
The whole Samoan way of life is premised on relationships and how we 
maintain this vā with others, including our superiors and workmates at 
work or any situation. It is always a good practice to consult and discuss 
your plans. . . . When people who have been caring for the land are notified, 
everyone is happy and will make sure the plan is executed and implemented 
to successful completion. . . . your cultural knowledge of what is appropri-
ate in fa‘aaloalo [respect] knowing the vā fealoa‘ i [social respect], following 
protocols of communications will earn you respect.73
As will be shown in the following chapters, when proper protocols are followed 
and vā fealoa‘i is created, programs and initiatives are supported.
When such cultural expectations of “participation, obligation, and reciproca-
tion” are not followed, policies and guidelines are resisted or outright protested 
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against.74 Sunia also commented how “if some disturbance arises between two 
families, you will hear the advice or admonition from others — ‘teu le vā,’ mean-
ing improve or be mindful of the harmony that should exist between you two.”75 
Sincere responses must be provided to repair damaged relationships or reestablish 
harmony. Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese Ta‘isi also explained how “conflict assumes 
when the tau‘oi or boundaries within are transgressed or misunderstood. . . . 
disharmonies are resolved through the co- existence of remorse and forgiveness 
on the one hand, and the privileging of alofa (meaning love and compassion) and 
‘āiga (or family) on the other.”76 Conscientious acknowledgement and deliber-
ate monitoring of proper actions and understandings within Sāmoan culture 
become central to social relations in the region. To correct an offense, a combi-
nation of regret, sympathy, care, and kinship should be involved.
On a daily basis, American Sāmoans navigate indigenous concepts of moral, 
ethical, and respectful behaviors, as well as territorial and U.S. federal govern-
ment regulations, policies, and expectations at the same time. Sometimes, de-
cisions are made according to vā, and other times, Western ideals. American 
Sāmoans have not hesitated to express dissatisfaction when colonial policies do 
not mesh with their expectations or desires on appropriate conduct. This group 
has also embraced certain Western policies when useful or beneficial.
The priority of the family over any individual is key to vā. Historian Damon 
Salesa explained how “the central role of family in Pacific lives means that indi-
viduals are not the sole or even primary economic unit.”77 Consequently, “many 
Pacific people, when forced to choose between economic business success and 
family reputation or status, seem to put family first in order to enhance their 
‘social and cultural capital.’ ”78 Understanding this fundamental approach to life, 
the incorporation of Sāmoan culture can lead to more appropriate and effective 
government policies and interactions with the local population. Researcher Mi-
randa Cahn explained how rules not “congruent with indigenous ways... may 
jeopardize the success and sustainability” of programs.79 According to scholar 
Susan Maiava, Sāmoan “self- esteem is related to family position and status, and 
to be a member of a well- respected family, socially well located, is a universal 
goal.”80 Ultimately, “improving and enhancing the ‘aiga culturally, socially and 
economically is the aim of fa‘a Sāmoa (the Sāmoan way of life).”81 Positive feel-
ings and continued support stem from actions, policies, and programs that sus-
tain and value ‘āiga.
Lilomaiava- Doktor defines fa‘a Sāmoa, or the Sāmoan way of knowing, as 
“an intellectual tool for apprehending the world, how Sāmoans interact with 
each other, the church, outsiders, and the environment.”82 While a whole range 
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of relations, actions, activities, and attitudes are involved in this practice, that 
also includes communal sharing, generosity, reciprocity, as well as maintaining 
harmony and balance, a general understanding exists among American Sāmoans 
over the essence and importance of such an approach to living.
The concept of bioregionalism is one way to meld concepts of vā, including 
fa‘a Sāmoa, and postcolonial ecology. Byron Caminero- Santangelo analyzed 
Mitchell Thomashow’s idea of bioregionalism, which entails
a commitment to understand local ecology and human relationships” 
(“Toward” 125), as well as a sense of belonging based on such understand-
ing. The bioregion itself is an ecopolitical unit integrating ecological and 
cultural relationships and determined by such factors as geography, ecosys-
tem, indigenous culture, local knowledge, and environmental history. If 
capitalism in its various phases has made space out of place, stripping away 
prior signification (deterritorializing) and reshaping in order to facilitate 
control and exploitation, then the process of imagining or reimagining a 
“place” entailed by bioregionalism can be one means of countering threats 
of exploitation, environmental degradation, and disempowerment.83
Bioregionalism takes both human and ecological issues into account while also 
acknowledging the legacies of colonialism and indigenous knowledge in these 
regions. Thinking about the multiplicity of actors, motivations, goals, and per-
spectives in tandem can lead to new ways of understanding the history of ma-
rine practices in American Sāmoa and reimagining this space as central to U.S. 
economic, political, and environmental policies, as well as control over indige-
nous groups.
As Caminero- Santangelo has also stated, “This form of imaginative engage-
ment encourages understanding of and commitment to one’s place and com-
munity, as well as the places and communities of others, and it challenges the 
meanings imposed in the process of deterritorialization. . . . it encourages careful 
attention both to ecology and to human relationships as a means for care and 
stewardship.”84 A focus on bioregionalism involves a deep analysis of both local 
and global relations, various sides of any issue, as well as diverse ways to think 
about ecology policy from a community and an environmental perspective.
This work studies the bioregion of American Sāmoa marine spaces to provide 
clear information on the development of specific post – World War II fishery re-
lated policies and their impacts on American Sāmoans, U.S. citizens, American 
Sāmoa, and the United States. U.S. colonial status results in multiple agency 
jurisdictions over local waters. This variety of entities has diverse opinions 
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and approaches for each issue, as well as particular, complicated, and extensive 
Western- based bureaucratic administration and enforcement procedures.
Both vā and bioregionalism can help in the analysis of marine practices in 
American Sāmoa and point to future ways to develop and maintain appropriate 
and effective policies and guidelines moving forward for “resource use, steward-
ship, and sovereignty.”85 Balance is a concept and goal expressed when discussing 
both ideas. And as Jacoby has urged, such attempts are “first steps toward an 
environmental policy that protects not only nature but also the human com-
munities with which it is intimately entangled.”86 An ecology and indigenous 
rights- based approach can lead to alternative possibilities and relationships.
Wendt, Hau‘ofa, and Sailiata have each argued that strategic negotiations 
within U.S. federal formations are needed for the future. This analysis of federal 
ocean- use policies (and related issues like wage rates) assesses past policymaking 
so American Sāmoans, U.S. citizens, and the U.S. federal government can have 
solid historical knowledge to help decide on how to move forward with future 
marine practices and other areas of shared authority in well- informed and cre-
ative new ways.
Chapter Breakdown
Information for this book stems from over one hundred interviews with individ-
uals connected to marine programs or policies in American Sāmoa at all levels, 
including U.S. federal government agencies, territorial government officials and 
staff, local businesspeople and workers, as well as community leaders, students, 
teachers, fishers, and other members of the general public with an interests in 
these issues. The selected bibliography provides a sampling of those interviewed. 
Other sources integrated into this work include historic and contemporary doc-
uments such as government reports and local newspapers. In particular, online 
portals such as Talanei.com (discussed in chapter 1), Sāmoa News (discussed in 
chapter 2), and regulations.gov (discussed in chapter 3) provide windows into 
voices of those vested in American Sāmoan issues on the internet. As will be dis-
cussed in the conclusion, contemporary Sāmoan communities across the globe 
are highly connected through the web and social media. Even if it is impossible 
to verify the location or residence of online commentators, as Macpherson and 
Macpherson have explained, relatives abroad are still important parts of the local 
village. The opinions of all ‘āiga members count, regardless of where a person 
is living throughout the diaspora.87 The hope is that this variety of sources will 
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provide a diverse picture of the marine bioregion of the unincorporated territory 
of American Sāmoa.
Each chapter of this book highlights a type of ocean- use policy or marine- 
related practice in American Sāmoa regulated by either the territorial or federal 
government. Historic and current U.S. colonial control — as well as the impor-
tance of vā and fa‘a Sāmoa — are highlighted in each case study to better under-
stand this bioregion. Chapter 1 examines the development and experiences of 
two major local commercial fishing groups (small- scale indigenous alia fishers 
and large- vessel local longliners), as well as the impact of federal regulations on 
fishing access in nearby waters. The contours of commercial fishing in American 
Sāmoa are consequences of past and contemporary U.S. authority and initiatives 
in the region. Some local fishers find U.S. programs and regulations useful and 
beneficial for their businesses while others believe recent changes in policies vi-
olated vā fealoa‘i. Varied Sāmoan perspectives demonstrate the diversification of 
native society in the face of globalization, the complications involved in shared 
indigenous and federal governance over the waters surrounding this area, as well 
as the reliance of fishers on colonial structures to protect their indigenous rights 
to engage in a cash- based economy.
Chapter 2 considers the American Sāmoa tuna canneries that, until 2009, pro-
vided one- third of all canned tuna to the United States. The imposition of U.S. 
labor standards in this unincorporated territory by the U.S. Congress in 2006 
ignored the historic ground- level reality of the canning industry in this Pacific 
region that has benefited from the variable application of federal employment 
and trade regulations. Tuna businesses set up shop in American Sāmoa due to 
the cheap labor and tax exemptions provided by the U.S. federal government. A 
pool of wageworkers for canneries developed during the shift from self- sufficient 
subsistence fishing and agriculture systems to a cash economy focused on import 
purchasing. Manual laborers have accepted menial pay and resisted unionization 
throughout the history of the canning industry in the region, partially because 
their employers have followed vā fealoa‘i. By providing free foodstuffs during 
holidays and accommodating absences for major family events like funerals, 
such attention to proper and respectful social relations has appeased workers 
enough to keep them working in these difficult and low- wage jobs.
Chapter 3 analyzes the creation and expansion of the National Marine Sanc-
tuary of American Sāmoa. While local indigenous leaders took advantage of 
their U.S. colonial status and initiated the establishment of this nationally pro-
tected area in 1986, the process to extend federal jurisdiction to five additional 
areas over 13,580.75 more square miles of water in 2012 did not involve enough vā 
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fealoa‘i. Consequent vocal resistance to the augmentation of the sanctuary led 
to much negativity and long- term skepticism for government ecology initiatives. 
Per the Deeds of Cession, areas of American Sāmoa that Americans currently 
deem as unspoiled or environmentally important to preserve have been or con-
tinue to be owned by indigenous groups. However, native presence and rights 
have started to take a back seat in contemporary ecological and scientific rhetoric 
for preserving a pristine nature environment. Such erasures can hide the longer 
colonial history and continued occupation, control, and alteration of the Pacific 
region by outsiders.
Chapter 4 highlights two local marine- based projects created by the Ameri-
can Sāmoa Government Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources: Village 
Marine Protected Areas and the on- the- ground data collection of shore- based 
and offshore fishing activities in local waters. Successful programs have acknowl-
edged and integrated Sāmoan cultural practices and expectations like vā into 
the development, implementation, and maintenance of ocean- related initiatives. 
However, the federal monies that fund these projects also impose nonnative 
forms of knowledge making and ocean supervision on the community, demon-
strating historic and contemporary colonial influences on local marine policies, 
programs, and procedures in American Sāmoa.
While scientists and environmentalist venerate parts of the Pacific as some of 
the last virgin environments in the world that need protection and regulation 
by the U.S. government, places like American Sāmoa and Hawai‘i have long 
been populated by native groups that have successfully and productively tended 
to the ecology of their homelands through their own indigenous practices and 
knowledges for centuries before Western control.88 Experiences that highlight 
the historic insights and current roles that native groups can actively play in 
useful and effective marine policy development are often ignored in discussions 
of ecological conservation and preservation.
These Western- based scientific and green conversations also mask America’s 
“excessive consumption, pollution, and waste as well neocolonial forms of glob-
alization, militarism, and development.”89 Discussions of overfishing to protect 
the profitable tuna industry discussed in chapter 1, minimum wage addressed in 
chapter 2, and marine sanctuaries and marine monuments analyzed in chapter 
3 position the U.S. federal government as the best guardian for the future and 
long- term health and security of the Pacific region. However, the needs and ac-
tions of the United States and other Western nation- states have caused most 
global environmental destruction and economic disparities.90 Environmental 
consequences from industrialized nations’ overconsumption and pollution, such 
 Introduction 21 
as rising sea levels and changing weather patterns from greenhouse gases, burden 
Pacific Islanders with the need to create environmental and ocean policies for 
the long- term survival of their marine regions. Neoliberal capitalism that pushes 
for free market trade, tax and manufacturing advantages, and the highest possi-
ble profits also positions Pacific Islander laborers at the bottom of the economic 
and social hierarchies of production. Such ecological and economic structures 
continue to subjugate Pacific Islander U.S. colonials, as well as Caribbean U.S. 
colonials, to Western needs and priorities.
Additionally, Mansel Blackford highlighted “the growing importance since 
World War II, and especially since the 1960s, of consumerism in environmental-
ism. Many Americans have come to view clean air, clean water, and so on almost 
as birthrights like consumer goods. More than that, Americans have come to see 
nature itself as a consumer product to be put to good use, as in national parks 
for sightseeing.”91 U.S. environmental principles and practices are grounded in 
neoliberal capitalist desires for positive experiences for one’s own entertainment 
and fulfillment. Ideal activities from this perspective often involve adventure, 
recreation, pleasure, and awe- inspiring experiences. This seemingly universal de-
sire to enjoy the environment fundamentally differs from the reliance of many 
Pacific Islanders on ecology for everyday living and functions. Sometimes Amer-
ican Sāmoans are even scared of the environment, which can pose dangers such 
as drowning and devastation from tsunamis. For some, the ocean needs to be 
feared and respected, better kept at a distance for safety.
Despite the diversity of interests included in each of these chapters, all of 
these issues center on the fact that as U.S. colonials, American Sāmoans are 
ultimately subjected to U.S. federal regulations. American Sāmoans are born 
as U.S. nationals, or wards of the United States. They have the right to freely 
travel within U.S. jurisdiction, as well as become U.S. citizens within two years 
of declaration. American Sāmoans are raised with both American and Sāmoan 
cultural and social customs, as well as regulated by U.S. and American Sāmoa 
economic and political structures. Native and nonnative standards and expecta-
tions interweave in policymaking as well as ground- level decisions and practices.
This combination of both indigenous and U.S. colonial status complicates 
authority over topics like marine practices. Both the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) and the American Sāmoa Department of 
Marine and Wildlife Resources have jurisdiction in local waters. Sometimes 
their policies coincide and other times their priorities conflict.92 Chapters 1 and 
4 demonstrate the pros and cons of shared authority over ocean- use policies 
while chapters 2 and 3 detail key moments when federal goals dominated policy 
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development in American Sāmoa. In all of these cases, native groups have not 
hesitated to voice their discontent and frustration with government policies that 
appear to encroach upon their indigenous rights to or expectations for properly 
enacted local management, relations, and control.
American Sāmoa – specific policies also have an invisible but major impact on 
national and global policies. Decisions to expand fishing vessel permits in U.S. 
Pacific waters in 2016 and backlash from the expansion of the National Marine 
Sanctuary of American Sāmoa in 2012 have significantly altered the contours of 
both the international tuna fishing industry and NOAA community engage-
ment. American daily consumption of canned tuna, campaigns for minimum 
wage, and efforts to increase environmental protections are enabled or hindered 
by ecological and economic regulations imposed on this unincorporated terri-
tory of the United States. Like postcolonial ecology studies’ encouragement to 
“uphold a sense of alterity while still engaging a global imaginary,” this work 
presents multiple indigenous and governmental perspectives to gain a fuller pic-
ture of life and living in the unincorporated U.S. territory of American Sāmoa as 
U.S. colonials, as well as the many reverberations of such status beyond its waters 
throughout the Pacific, the United States, and global marine and indigenous 
environments — in essence, the bioregion of American Sāmoa fisheries.93
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 Ch a pter 1
Native Commercial Fishing and Indigenous Debates  
over Regulations in the U.S. Pacic
Multiple entities have a stake in the waters around American Sāmoa. At the 
federal level, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
an arm of the U.S. Department of Commerce, has overall jurisdiction for waters 
surrounding American Sāmoa, specically under the oce of NOAA Fisheries. 
NOAA Fisheries, also known as the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
controls the ocean from three to two hundred miles oshore, known as Amer-
ican Sāmoa’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The NMFS also manages the 
use of the high seas through international treaties and agreements. The goal 
of NOAA Fisheries is “stewardship of the nation’s ocean resources and their 
habitat. . . . productive and sustainable sheries, safe sources of seafood, the re-
covery and conservation of protected resources, and healthy ecosystems — all 
backed by sound science and an ecosystem- based approach to management.”1
The NMFS aims to protect ocean resources for human consumption and long- 
term preservation grounded in scientic research. The Western Pacic Regional 
Fishery Management Council (Wespac) is the local arm of NOAA Fisheries in 
American Sāmoa and the wider U.S. Pacic.2 While Wespac can make policy 
recommendations, only the NMFS can create laws. However, regulations can-
not be changed without being reviewed by the Council.
In American Sāmoa, the local government’s Department of Marine and 
Wildlife Services (DMWR) creates its own regulations for ocean use from the 
shore to three miles out. As an unincorporated territory of the United States, 
Federal Public Law 93-435 designated the American Sāmoa Government (ASG) 
as the administrator of all submerged lands from the mean high tide line out to 
the limit of the territorial sea, including mineral rights.3 This Western- based 
shared structure of ocean control due to U.S. colonial status has resulted in sev-
eral debates and complications over shing policies.
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With the boom of commercial angling in the Pacific since the 1980s, fish-
ing regulations have increased in the waters around American Sāmoa. Some say 
open admission for all types of fishers will result in overfishing. Others believe 
there are plenty of fish in the ocean for everyone. This chapter examines the two 
major types of indigenous commercial fishing that developed in the second half 
of the twentieth century and are intimately involved in debates over angling 
policies: small- scale alia fishing boats and mid- sized ships, known as large- vessel 
longliners. Overall, the U.S. federal government encouraged a transition from 
subsistence fishing and other traditional livelihoods to a cash- based export econ-
omy and Western- style fishing techniques in this region. Since 1976, the NMFS, 
not the local indigenous population, has controlled the management of who gets 
permission to use most of the ocean spaces surrounding the unincorporated U.S. 
territory of American Sāmoa.
Often, the general public is unaware of the processes that fish in their local 
restaurants and supermarkets go through to end up on their dining tables. This 
chapter provides details on the chain of events, people, and regulations involved 
in the fishing industry to highlight the connection between global food con-
sumption demands and the historic, as well as current, colonial implications of 
this commercial venture in the U.S. Pacific. While NOAA agencies position 
themselves as the best guardians to prevent overfishing, Western seafood con-
sumption is also a main contributor to the problem. From January to September 
2017, approximately 152 million tons of fish were caught for human consump-
tion.4 In the twenty- first century, Asia, Europe, and the United States have been 
major consumers of seafood. In this context, American Sāmoan fishers work 
hard to make a living and provide for their families through Western- style com-
mercial fishing for the cash- based market economy introduced and supported by 
the U.S. federal government.
As subjects of the United States, these indigenous anglers call upon colonial 
management structures to protect their livelihoods while also vocally protesting 
federal infringements on their native rights to fish in their local, ancestral waters. 
Even though NOAA Fisheries tries to accommodate native desires while main-
taining overall control, the diversity of positionalities among American Sāmoan 
fishers has placed one group against the other. Violations of vā fealoa‘i (respect-
fully maintaining proper social relations) have also created tensions between alia 
fishers and federal government representatives. Policies developed in this region 
impact nonnative fishers in the U.S. Pacific as well, adding yet another layer of 
influence on this total bioregion (all ecological and cultural relationships) of 
international fishing and fish consumption.
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Historical Forms of Fishing
Fishing has always been a part of Sāmoan culture. Texts by Augustin Krämer, Te 
Rangi Hiroa (also known as Peter Buck), and Lowell Holmes, as well as research 
by Karen Armstrong, David Herdrich, and Arielle Levine, have all outlined tra-
ditional practices based on the communal village system.5 According to Arm-
strong, Herdrich, and Levine, “there were common fishing techniques — glean-
ing, diving, rod and line, netting and trapping (including communal fish drives), 
and boat fishing — throughout the Samoan islands but there were also slight 
differences in practices according to particular village rules and techniques re-
lated to the habits of the marine resources.”6 Regardless of the angling tools used, 
fishing was central to life in the Sāmoan islands.
In a global context, anthropologist Brian Fagan stated, “How little the meth-
ods and technology have changed over thousands of years. The net, the spear, the 
hook and line, and the trap were the fishing tools of prehistory; they are still the 
tools today. What mattered were experience, careful observation, knowledge of 
the environment, and familiarity with the potential catch. This was the closely 
held expertise that passed from generation to generation, rarely to others.”7 De-
veloped knowledge of the local waterscape and behaviors of birds were passed on 
from generation to generation within fishing families across the world as well as 
in American Sāmoa.
For example, Afoa Lutu, a former alia fisherman and an American Sāmoa 
Fono senator, talked about using visual cues to find traditional fishing spots. 
He started fishing in the late 1980s and explained how fish was plentiful at the 
time. He stated how American Sāmoan fishers are navigators who “learn to use 
the moon and stars around South bank. There’s nothing around it. We used 
stars before modern instruments were available. Mountains and other points 
for navigation” as well.8 Detailed knowledge about the contours of the physical 
environment has always been key to fishing success.
Others interviewed also mentioned the use of a flock of birds over banks to 
indicate the location of fish, another traditional Sāmoan fishing skill.9 Some 
fondly remembered group bonito boat fishing that involved following sea birds 
in va‘aalos (offshore canoes) to hunt for sea life, including sharks. According to 
scholars Craig Severance and Robert Franco, “for a long time before Western 
contact, and up until the 1950s in Tutuila, and even into the 1960s and 1970s in 
Manu‘a, American Samoan fishermen pursued atu [bonito] in offshore water 
using specialized canoes and gear as an expression of the strength and skill of 
the crew and tautai” (the recognized village fishing expert).10 For centuries, this 
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type of ocean activity was engrained in native masculinity, indigenous social and 
political hierarchies, as well as community functions in Sāmoan villages.
Prior to the introduction of motorized boats in 1972, Sāmoans paddled out 
in paopaos (small outrigger canoes) to fish, usually going out three to four miles 
and maxing out at about five miles from shore. According to Va‘amua Henry 
Sesepasara, the Governor’s Advisor on Fisheries and DMWR director, about 
90 percent of the catch from these manually powered traditional vessels went to 
cultural use.11 Cultural use includes providing fish for weddings, funerals, the 
bestowment of chiefly titles, church fundraisers, and other community gather-
ings. Involvement in these activities were part of vā fealoa‘ i and fa‘a Sāmoa (the 
Sāmoan way of life) discussed in the introduction.
In American Sāmoa, the annual highlight of fishing involved the once- a- year 
catches of atule (bigeye scad) and palolo (sea worms). Atule were “often caught 
by using a communal effort — lauloa — of driving the fish towards a trap with 
branches” while palolo were traditionally “caught in small funnel- shaped bas-
kets.”12 These seasonal runs required group participation and represented the 
social blessings, prosperity, as well as the unity and identity of a village: in other 
words proper vā (social relations).
The type of fish gathered has also remained constant over the years. Accord-
ing to P. Craig, A. Green, and F. Tuilagi in 2008, “the current composition of 
fish harvested was also similar to that previously found in a nearby archeolog-
ical excavation dated 1,000 – 3,000 years ago. These findings indicate that the 
harvest has been sustainable over the millennia.”13 Fagan also explained how 
“subsistence fishing, what one might informally call fishing for one’s dinner, is 
almost as old as humanity.”14 Angling for familiar species has been a cornerstone 
for long- term and persistent marine lifeways in Sāmoa and across the globe.
While the kind of fish has been steady over the years, the style of fishing 
started to shift in the mid- twentieth century. According to Arielle Levine and 
Stewart Allen, “by the 1950s, many of the small boats in American Sāmoa were 
equipped with outboard engines, modern steel hooks were used rather than pearl 
shell, and monofilament fishing lines had replaced hand woven sennit lines."15 
Outboard engines enabled fishers “to travel farther offshore in shorter time pe-
riods. With this technological boost came additional costs in the form of fuel 
and engine maintenance. Fishermen offset these costs by selling portions of their 
catch for a profit. These changes initiated a divergence from traditional fishing 
activities to more of a commercial enterprise.”16 By 1961, only approximately ten 
traditional- style canoes regularly fished around the main island of Tutuila.
In addition to diversified fishing techniques, the American Sāmoa Govern-
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ment requested the predecessor to NOAA, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, 
to conduct a study on ways to increase local fishery production in the region 
in 1961. This survey, known as the Marr Report, resulted in multiple projects 
that introduced Western fishing styles, as well as spurred the growth of local 
commercial fishing. New types of bottom- fishing and deep sea fishing, as well 
as new techniques such as fish exporting, long- lining, and fish farming were all 
tried and supported by the U.S. federal government from 1961 to 1987 to expand 
for- profit fishing in the region.17
Types of Commercial Fishing in American Sāmoa
“Fisheries” is a term that can describe multiple aspects of ocean use. In one sense, 
a fishery can be a regional concept, meaning the actual latitude and longitude 
of fishing grounds or the distance of a section of water from land (fishing from 
shore, just offshore, or in international waters). A fishery can also refer to a type 
of angling, whether trolling, bottom- fishing, long- lining, or purse seining, all 
discussed in this chapter. A fishery can be a classification of fish: reef, bottom- 
feeder, or migratory. Fisheries can also be the level of water that fish are caught 
at, such as the top level of water, the center column of water (known as pelagic), 
and the ocean floor. All of these definitions come into play in the deliberations 
and discussions over marine practices in American Sāmoa.
With fishing already a part of indigenous life in American Sāmoa, the U.S. 
federal government’s encouragement of commercial fishing for local and global 
markets through the use of Western techniques and technology could provide 
a profitable and easy transition for some indigenous fishers into the cash- based 
market economy, especially with the growth and dominance of tuna canneries 
on Tutuila after World War II (also supported by the U.S. federal government).18 
Two types of Western- style local commercial fishing predominate in the waters 
surrounding American Sāmoa: bottom- fishing and pelagic fishing. While some 
fishers associate bottom- fishing with subsistence fishing and long- lining with 
commercial fishing, bottom- fishing can also be used for commercial fishing.19 
Bottom- fishing generally yields commercial fresh fish and pelagic fishing mostly 
produces flash- frozen fish for canning.
Bottom- fishing involves the use of weighted lines with a hook to catch fish 
that feed close to the ocean floor. Bottomfish in American Sāmoa typically 
include snapper, jobfish, bream, grouper, and amberjack. Historically, bottom- 
fishing was profitable during three different periods in American Sāmoa: 1982 
to 1988 (garnering up to 50 percent of the commercial market share during that 
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period), 1994 to 1997, and 2000 to 2002.20 However, this kind of catch in the 
region has never been sustainable long- term due to “limited nearshore bottom-
sh habitat.”21 Fisheries scientist David Itano found that “the promotion of do-
mestic bottom shing in American Samoa has been so successful that some of 
the local bottom sh grounds have become signicantly depleted.”22 Over time, 
the availability of fresh sh from nearby Independent Sāmoa, as well as more 
protable yields from pelagic longline shing for canneries, also contributed to 
the reduction of bottom- shing eorts in American Sāmoa.
In this unincorporated territory of the United States, pelagic shing usually 
occurs through trolling or long- lining methods. Trolling was the main pelagic 
shing method in American Sāmoa until long- lining started in 1995. Trolling 
Figure 1.01. Major shing and boat styles in American Sāmoa. 
 (Created for author by Michael Pesses and illustrated for author by Joanna Sokua.)
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involves one or more lines with lures or bait being dragged from behind a boat 
to simulate a school of small fish to attract bigger fish. Yellowfin and skipjack 
tuna have made up most of the trolling landings in the region. According to 
Levine and Allen, “In 1986, when trolling was the only pelagic fishing method, 
53 trolling boats landed 137,100 pounds of skipjack tuna and 54,622 pounds of 
yellowfin tuna. In 1996 when longlining was just getting started, these two spe-
cies comprised 75% of the trolling landings. . . . By 2001, when longlining be-
came the dominant fishing method in American Sāmoa, the number of trolling 
boats and their total catch dropped dramatically. Only 18 boats were engaging 
in trolling.”23 This fishing method dominated the industry in the region for 
over fifteen years until the newer, more intense, and more effective process of 
long- lining developed. Today in American Sāmoa, fishers mostly engage in troll-
ing for personal use.
Starting in 1996 and continuing through today, long- lining has been the 
leading form of local commercial fishing in this unincorporated U.S. territory. 
Since the introduction of this Western technique, “the fleet grew rapidly with 
the addition of new alias up to about 38 feet in length and, more significantly, 
with the addition of other larger monohull vessels that fished much longer trips. 
The primary target species for longline vessels is albacore tuna for delivery to 
the canneries” along with yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna, wahoo, blue marlin, ma-
himahi, and some other incidentally caught species.24 Both alias and large- vessel 
longliners use long- lining in American Sāmoa.
Long- lining has been popular among local fishers “because they catch more 
fish with less effort and gas consumption.”25 This particular fishing method in-
volves “a mainline longer than 1 nautical mile suspended horizontally in the 
water column, anchored, floating, or attached to a vessel, and from which branch 
or dropper lines with hooks are attached.”26 While many sizes of ships use this 
fishing technique, “longline fishing using alia vessels is generally a small scale 
operation, typically setting approximately 350 hooks per set and hauling the gear 
with hand- operated reels.”27 In contrast, a larger longliner boat will have 1,600 
to 2,000 hooks and mechanized reels.
According to Levine and Allen, five longline vessels began fishing in Amer-
ican Samoa in 1995. The researchers found that “2001 was marked by a peak 
in the number of longline vessels fishing in American Samoa, and an abrupt 
shift towards tuna as the dominant species caught. The number of larger boats 
had swelled to 32 and the number of alias grew to 35, and the average num-
ber of hooks per set climbed to 1200 (for alias and large boats combined). 
The large monohulls now accounted for 88% of the catch.”28 The year 2002 
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was the peak of sh landings in American Sāmoa at 15,482,079 pounds worth 
$13,924,701.29 While the most lucrative year for shing in American Sāmoa was 
2007, with 14,366,471 pounds landed at $14,205,971, other high- revenue years 
over $10 million included 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2010.30
In a global historical context, American Sāmoa did not get involved in the 
commercial shing industry until other sheries had become depleted. Accord-
ing to Fagan, “since the Industrial Revolution the strategy of intensied shing 
to feed more people has mushroomed into a major international industry” and 
by the eighteenth century, signs of overshing were developing.31 The develop-
ment of new shing technologies also increased the reduction of sh stocks and 
the destruction of marine environments in the Atlantic and the North Pacic. 
“With the adoption of steam power in the 1830s and 1840s and then, a century 
Figure 1.02. (Created for author by Michael Pesses.)
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ago, the diesel- powered trawler, fishermen could stay far offshore for much 
longer periods, icing their catch as they worked. . . . With the development of 
modern- day trawls and purse seines, encircling nets first used in the 1850s, fish-
ing became . . . an efficient way of exploiting the ocean on an industrial scale.”32 
More ships were sailing farther into the ocean to catch more fish to feed the 
ever- rising market demand for seafood consumption.
Fagan also highlighted how “after World War II fishing became a fully indus-
trial business, with Japan leading the way.”33 Wartime technology developments 
such as radar and sonar were now being used to locate fish.34 Mansel Blackford 
also described how “Hydraulic power blocks, which came into use in the 1950s, 
assisted in pulling some nets on board the vessels. No longer did all the work in 
lifting nets have to be done by hand.”35 Such mechanization resulted in a massive 
increase in fishing intensity and effectiveness. According to Blackford, “between 
1970 and 1995, the number of commercial fishing vessels increased from 451,000 
to 885,000, and their aggregate size from 11.6 million to 23 million gross regis-
tered tons.”36 Such increases in angling placed global fisheries on an unsustain-
able path of resource extraction.
At the same time that commercial fishing was increasing in the Pacific, the 
world was becoming more concerned with environmental issues, such as pollu-
tion and overfishing. Western nations started to develop regulations to address 
various forms of ecological degradation. Spurred by Rachel Carson’s book Silent 
Spring, published in 1962, an environmental movement developed in the United 
States. The National Environmental Policy Act, which created a federal policy 
to “encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environ-
ment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the 
Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality,” was passed in 
1969.37 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was formed in 1970. 
This administration’s charge includes “a variety of federal research, monitoring, 
standard- setting and enforcement activities to ensure environmental protection. 
Since its inception, EPA has been working for a cleaner, healthier environment 
for the American people.”38 Ironically, most of the environmental destruction 
targeted by this administrative unit was actually caused by historic U.S. resource 
needs, policies, and consumption.
In the fishing realm, between 1976 and 1977, the United States, Canada, the 
Soviet Union, and North Korea all declared Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). 
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For two hundred nautical miles from their territorial seas, each nation claimed 
sovereign rights over the natural resources within those waters, as well as the 
ability to regulate activity in those areas. Today, EEZs, “which include most 
continental shelves, contain an estimated 75 – 90 percent of the world’s com-
mercial fish.”39 However, these initial moves to control vast swaths of ocean 
often involved nationalist protectionist motivations rather than ecologically 
minded goals.
For example, the United States’ EEZ was created at a time when the “U.S. 
economy in 1976 – 77 was just emerging from a deep recession, and the FCMA 
[Fisheries Conservation and Management Act] won noncontroversial congres-
sional approval mainly as a jobs bill.”40 Politicians supported this legislation to 
manage fish and other species in the EEZ, because such regulations would create 
a variety of jobs through various aspects of the fishing industry, from fishers 
and processors to distributors and industry support services, like gas, bait, and 
repairs. In fact, the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, also known 
as the Magnuson- Stevens Act, did not prioritize the conservation of fishery re-
sources until the passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act in 1996.
This amendment aimed to sustain “participation of fishery dependent com-
munities and minimize economic impacts to those communities and minimize 
by catch and its mortality. . . . identify overfished species and take action to 
rebuild those stocks. . . . establishes a fishing capacity reduction program [and] 
mandates research on fishery management/conservation and the economics/
social characteristics of the fisheries.”41 Until this shift in approach for the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFW), as will be discussed later in this chapter, de-
cisions made by the Regional Fishery Councils often benefited larger, for- profit 
fishing industry businesses. American Sāmoa’s local commercial fishing indus-
try developed within this wider international and historic context of long- term 
overfishing and new efforts to regulate and control future angling.
In the 1980s, confrontations between American fishers and Pacific coast 
Latin American countries also developed. Boat seizures, the firing of weapons, 
and fines for regulation violations escalated in the Exclusive Economic Zones 
of Ecuador, Chile, and Peru.42 Such tensions encouraged U.S. tuna fishers to 
relocate to the western Pacific, where two- hundred- mile EEZs were harder to 
enforce over long distances for Pacific Island nations. The United States also 
had its own Exclusive Economic Zone waters around their Pacific territories, 
like American Sāmoa.
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Alia Efforts
With fishing in eastern Pacific waters restricted from the United States, and 
Americans having access to the EEZs in their colonized parts of the Pacific, 
angling efforts within U.S. waters became more important for the U.S. fishing 
industry. The first official attempt to commercialize fishing in the unincorpo-
rated territory of American Sāmoa occurred with the Dory Project in the 1970s. 
According to Blackford, American fishers used dories since the first commer-
cial fishing efforts in Alaska in 1888. These anglers “dropped long, baited lines 
to the sea bottom and soaked them there for several hours to attract halibut. 
They pulled up the lines hand- over- hand or through hand- cranked rollers, took 
the fish off the hooks, and rowed or sailed back to their schooners, where they 
cleaned and iced the halibut before returning to port. Hours were long, and 
work was physically demanding.”43
Close to one hundred years later in American Sāmoa, the territorial govern-
ment encouraged this same style of commercial bottom- fishing among native 
people to help supply Tutuila’s tuna canneries. In 1972, the American Sāmoa 
Office of Economic Opportunity started the Dory Project, which provided “easy 
credit and loans to fishermen to develop offshore fisheries. The project developed 
a boat- building facility that produced 23 vessels over a 3- year period. These dories 
were made available to local residents interested in commercial fishing on the 
understanding that the cost of materials and construction costs would be paid 
back to the government at a low rate of interest generated by fish sales.”44
This initiative ultimately failed due to the inability of fishers to keep up with 
the costs of constant boat repairs. Itano stated that “a wide range of mechanical 
problems beset several dory owners and many of the dories were out of service 
for extended periods of time. . . . After the first few years, the lack of routine 
maintenance on many of the dories took a heavy toll on dories that eventually 
became unserviceable and some were out of service due to repossession for failure 
to pay the vessel loans.”45 Wespac American Sāmoa Advisory Council member 
William Sword also explained how dory boats were small and mostly good for 
bottom- fishing.46 These vessels could not handle rough seas and the fishing gear 
involved hard labor because of manually operated cranks. Only twenty- three 
boats were purchased in total and all were defunct by 1980.47
According to Levine and Allen, “in the 1980s, dories were replaced by alia cat-
amarans, larger, more powerful boats that could stay multiple days at sea. Alias 
were usually 28 to 32 feet long and powered by an outboard engine.”48 This partic-
ular design came from independent Sāmoa. Navigation on these double- hulled 
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aluminum boats with fiberglass or wood superstructures “was visual, using 
landmarks. Fishing gear was stored on deck, including a hand- crank reel which 
could hold between two and ten miles of monofilament mainline.”49 Despite 
new vessel and fishing gear technology, American Sāmoan fishers still relied on 
observation and past experiences with angling in the area. As Fagan explained, 
the art of “knowing when and where to look” has always been an important skill 
for small- scale fishing success throughout time and across the globe.50
A variety of definitions exist for small- scale fisheries. According to marine 
science scholar Theodore Koboski, “while vessel size was typically an indicator 
of a small- scale fishery, differences in the types of technological complexity, cap-
ital investment, and market structure within small- scale fisheries” should also 
be taken into account.51 Alias have been central to the commercial small- scale 
fishery in American Sāmoa that supplies both the canneries in Tutuila and fresh 
fish for local consumption. Equipment on alias remain relatively modest, with 
costs for maintenance and market fluctuations often having negative impacts on 
continued participation in commercial fishing.
In the beginning of alia fishing in American Sāmoa, trolling and bottom- 
fishing were the preferred catch methods, with spearfishing, netting, and verti-
cal long- lining used occasionally. In 1995, “some alia captains began using hor-
izontal longline gear.”52 This change in fishing technique, though still mostly 
manual, significantly increased catch rates for these indigenous small- scale fish-
ers. According to a Wespac report, alia long- lining “trips were 1 day long (about 
8 hours). Setting the equipment generally began in the early morning and haul-
ing was generally in the midday to mid- afternoon. The catch was stored in boxes 
built into the hull of the boat or in portable coolers or freezer chests.”53 In 2005, 
the alia fleet on Tutuila usually consisted of three- man crews who fished eleven 
hours per trip and caught about 173 pounds of fish on average. The Manu‘a- based 
fleet typically had two- man crews, fished about five hours, and landed around 
eighty- one pounds of fish.54
According to Koboski, “The typical alia vessel held just about one ton of 
albacore tuna (the target species of the alia fleet), and fish were stored on the 
boat in each hull of the catamaran. Once the vessel was back at port, the fish 
were transferred to freezers, usually located at the fisherman’s place of residence. 
One fisherman reported having as many as seven deep freezers to store his catch. 
Once the freezers reached capacity, the fishermen would transport their catch 
to the canneries on the island, where it was sold.”55 The entire process involves 
less technology compared to large- vessel long- lining vessels and purse seiners.
At the time of this research, Alvin “Eo” Mokoma was the most active alia 
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fisher in American Sāmoa. He started long- lining from alia boats in 1995.56 Mo-
koma worked his way up to owning four boats, all of which he ran until the 
2009 tsunami. Two of his boats were destroyed during this catastrophe. In the 
summer of 2016, he used one of his remaining boats for commercial long- lining 
and the other for bottom- fishing for personal use. Mokoma discussed how “if I 
make a penny from my small alia, then I’m happy.” He, like many others inter-
viewed, acknowledged that being “a fisherman is not easy. You have to look for 
fish, it’s not an easy job.”57 To be effective, a fisher has to love fishing, crave the 
ocean, and know go where the fish go.
Ma‘a Maea, who was the secretary of the Pago Alia Fishing Association in 
2015, was another alia fisherman interviewed. He enjoyed long- lining because 
this method was “very exciting, a nice way to catch a wild animal or fish. It’s like 
doing a trick. All set up, ties, right performance, technique, art to bring fish. 
It’s a modern form of art.”58 Setting out the lines and the bait involved a certain 
level of skill and knowledge for success. In addition to the personal challenge 
of angling, Maea discussed the social and cultural significance of fishing in Sā-
moan life. Seafood has been a key aspect of major events such as weddings, title 
bestowments, funerals, and feasts. He believed it was his “duty as fisherman to 
provide these resources. It is a distinct honor for fishermen, family look up to 
you to play this role.”59 Maea was proud of the responsibility he fulfilled to feed 
his extended family and his community, as well as maintain ancient cultural 
traditions and proper vā.
Christinna Lutu- Sanchez, longline boat owner and daughter of Afoa Lutu, 
explained how her family started commercial fishing with alias. “At one time 
we had eight alias fishing. It was great, fishing was really good. . . . Everyone was 
longlining.”60 After long- lining began among alias in 1995, commercial fish land-
ings and revenue increased. The first five longline vessels that fished that year 
landed an estimated fifty- eight thousand pounds of albacore.61 In 1997, thirty- 
three vessels held permits for longline fishing, and twenty- one of those were ac-
tively fishing in the region primarily catching 681,000 pounds of albacore tuna.62
With alias dominating long- lining from 1995 to 1997, the arrival of the first, 
much larger monohull longline vessel in 1997 expanded the growth of com-
mercial fishing in American Sāmoa. Intensified extraction from the American 
Sāmoan fishery began just as U.S. Fish and Wildlife was starting to work on 
fish conservation in general. Since commercial angling in this Pacific region was 
relatively new, USFW was not concerned with fish stock depletion. Initially, the 
Service did not create any regulations to manage commercial fishing practices 
in the area.
36  chapter 1 
Large- Vessel Longliners
Large- vessel longliners, at eighty- nine feet long, usually have a crew of seven and 
a full array of electronic navigation and communications equipment. The hy-
draulic powered reel can hold twenty to thirty miles of monofilament mainline 
and 1,600 to 2,000 hooks suspended from sixty floats. The crew sets and hauls 
the gear each day the vessel is actively fishing. Each ship usually makes three- to 
four- week trips, sometimes as far away as Tonga, and each ship can hold up to 
forty- four tons of frozen albacore that can be brought back and sold to the can-
neries in American Sāmoa after each trip.63
According to Levine and Allen, “in 1999, two other large monohulled long-
line vessels, similar to the first, arrived in American Sāmoa and began long-
line fishing. Then in 2000 and 2001, large monohulled longline boats began 
arriving from places such as San Diego, Korea, Taiwan, Hawai‘i, New Zealand, 
and Australia. In 2002, about thirty- six large vessels were operating from Pago 
Pago. The rapid fleet expansion caused the fishing effort to increase from about 
1 million hooks per year at the end of 2000 to 5.6 million hooks by the end of 
2001.”64 The year 2001 became the peak in the number of longline vessels fishing 
in American Sāmoa. The number of larger boats increased to thirty- two and 
the number of alias climbed to thirty- five.65 Both alias and large monohull ships 
were profiting and prospering at that time. But this peak also represented the 
point at which large- vessel longliners started to dominate commercial fishing in 
the area. In 2001, there was a major shift toward tuna as the main species landed. 
The large monohulls made up 88 percent of the catch of 7,125,000 pounds of 
albacore, 417,000 pounds of yellowfin tuna, and 165,000 pounds of bigeye tuna. 
That year, the annual net revenue averaged about $177,000 per vessel.66 By 2003, 
seafood provided 15.5 percent of animal protein in global diets, with American 
Sāmoa fishers providing a significant contribution to the canned tuna market.67
In 2005, fifty- four fishing vessels were active in American Sāmoa waters. Fifty- 
one of these boats were based in Tutuila and three docked in the Manu‘a Islands. 
Many of these vessels used more than one type of fishing method. Forty- one of 
the Tutuila boats (including twenty- seven vessels, which were over fifty feet in 
length) engaged in some long- lining. Of the fifty- four total boats, thirteen went 
trolling and bottom- fishing, and four used other types of fishing. According to 
a NOAA report, “essentially, all of the longlining was based out of Tutuila and 
the majority of their catch was sold to the canneries on island.”68 Supplying local 
tuna factories motivated the development of this style of fishing.
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In 2016, Krista Corry ran one of the first large- vessel longliners in Ameri-
can Sāmoa. Her father, Vince Haleck, started fishing in 1997. Corry took over 
management of the family business in 2010, but her father still owned the boats. 
Their company, Tuna Ventures Inc., owned three longliners in 2016: the Fetu-
olemoana carried up to twenty- four tons, the Sivaimoana held twenty- two tons, 
and the Manaolemoana stored between twenty- eight and thirty tons of fish. 
According to Corry, her longliner boats went out for thirty to forty- five days, 
about 150 miles out, and caught about one thousand fish at a time. Her ships set 
more than three thousand hooks a day. The crew was like a family, watching out 
for each other. On her ships, crewmembers came from Western Sāmoa, Tonga, 
American Sāmoa, and Indonesia. When she started to run the family business, 
the fishing industry was in a downturn. She discussed how “the fishing industry 
is very difficult. We try our best to do with what we have. . . . We are figuring out 
ways to survive, not only for our company but for the guys’ families. . . . We’re 
doing our best to hang on.”69 Lutu- Sanchez also explained how “it’s been a really 
rough last several years.”70 She lamented the “misconception that boat owners 
are millionaires. If there is no fish, there is no money.”71 Overall, fishing is hard 
work for everyone involved, regardless of boat size and the amount of available 
technology.
While longlining can be lucrative, this type of fishing is also a complicated 
and expensive endeavor. Like any boat, repairs are constant. Refrigeration is key 
to the process. An engineer is always needed onboard. With two generators, 
two compressors, a six- cylinder engine, and an electric- powered reel, anything 
could break and stop the fishing process at any moment. Corry recounted one 
fishing trip when the hydraulic system that draws up fishing line broke. The 
crew had already put out the line so they had to manually pull up twenty- six 
miles of monofilament. She explained how “every time the boys got tired, the 
captain yelled ‘What boat are we from?’ And the crew would respond ‘Mana!’ 
Mana means power.”72 Pride in their boat and their job motivated crewmembers 
to push through the painful and difficult task. So while these larger monohu-
lled boats generate bigger catch amounts than alias, these vessels still involve a 
relatively small and locally based crew. Lutu- Sanchez also explained how “this is 
our home.”73 American Sāmoan longliner companies and their workers are part 
of the local economy and society, taking their rest, getting their supplies, and 
conducting their repairs in American Sāmoa. Some owners also live and raise 
their families in this region, their ancestral home.
To protect their interests, local longline owners formed an association called 
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Tautai- O- Sāmoa Longline & Fishing Association. The group’s president, Lutu- 
Sanchez, explained how this organization “represents close to 40 longliners — 
 including U.S.- flagged longliners and foreign vessels — and all operate out of 
American Samoa. The only difference is that the U.S.- flagged fleet fish in the 
U.S./American Samoa EEZ and the other fish in other Pacific islands EEZs, 
such as the Cook Islands.”74 As significant suppliers for the tuna canneries in 
American Sāmoa, this coalition of U.S. and Pacific boat owners from multiple 
regions have common interests in the regulation of marine practices for fishing 
in the region.
Regulating Fishing in the U.S. South Pacific
In the United States, there are eight Fishery Management Councils that have 
been in charge of different regions of U.S. jurisdiction since their establishment 
through the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976. The general 
mandates for these councils, under the purview of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, are to create “measures to control foreign fishing in US waters, to allow 
overfished stocks to recover, and to monitor, conserve and manage fishery re-
sources in a manner that maximizes long- term benefits to the nation.”75 Coun-
cils regulated outside fishing and prioritized the preservation of fisheries for 
future use.
However, scholars like Blackford have found that “the goal of most inter-
national and national fishery laws . . . has been to make fishing profitable and 
sustainable. The laws and the commissions set up to administer them have very 
much been in the mainstream American Progressive tradition of putting nature 
to efficient use. The goal was not to preserve oceanic nature in a pristine state, 
except in the establishment of a relatively few preserves.”76 Continued access to 
resources has always been central to the U.S. conservation movement since the 
late nineteenth century, as will be discussed in chapter 3.
Marine policy scholar Thomas Okey also stated there is an “overwhelming 
dominance of extractive interests” in these councils that have led to unrealistic 
fishing quotas which do not protect fish species or reduce overfishing.77 This 
tension between the stated goals of the councils and actual actions through the 
years has occurred in all colonized regions of the U.S. Pacific, including Ameri-
can Sāmoa. In fact, continuous fish stock depletion under this overall adminis-
tration ultimately led Congress to pass legislation in 2006 to mandate an end to 
overfishing in U.S. waters by 2011.78
The Western Pacific Council covers Hawai‘i, American Sāmoa, Guam, and 
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the Northern Mariana Islands, as well as “fisheries in the Pacific Ocean seaward 
of such states and of the commonwealth, territories and possessions.”79 The 
council system includes council members, council staff, advisory bodies, and 
the public that can participate in the decision- making process. There are thir-
teen voting members and three nonvoting members. Eight members are private 
citizens with some familiarity with commercial and/or noncommercial fisher-
ies and/or marine conservation appointed by the secretary of commerce from a 
list of suggestions provided by the governors of the regions served by the coun-
cil. The five other members are government representatives from each Pacific 
region covered by the council. Three nonvoting members assist with decision 
making from the perspectives of the U.S. Coast Guard (for enforcement and 
safety issues), the U.S. Department of State (for information on international 
implications), and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (for advice on flora and 
fauna impacts).
According to the official guide to the council, “Council members must bal-
ance competing interests while trying to make decisions for the overall benefit 
of the nation.”80 Council staff coordinates meetings and provides information 
to all constituents. Advisory bodies provide feedback on topics being addressed 
by the council. The three main bodies include the Scientific and Statistical 
Committee, Advisory Panels (composed of subpanels of marine- concerned in-
dividuals from each covered Pacific region), and Regional Ecosystem Advisory 
Committees that focus on marine ecosystem impacts.
The Council meets three times a year where issues are brought up and dis-
cussed. The public is allowed to comment on any agenda item. But as Blackford 
pointed out, “as a practical matter, this system favored well- established fishers 
and seafood processors, who had the time and funds to attend meetings. Coun-
cil Meetings typically lasted for several days, but sometimes for a week or lon-
ger” often held in Hawai‘i, but sometimes in Guam and American Sāmoa.81 A 
small- scale fisher in the Pacific region would likely not be able to afford to attend 
a Council meeting held outside their home region. Once an issue has been in-
vestigated and commented on by advisory bodies, and public comment has been 
taken, the Council deliberates and may vote on a topic. Decisions, which must 
comply with multiple federal acts and other applicable laws, are then forwarded 
to the secretary of commerce for a second review, more public comment, and 
final approval. Once finalized and approved, the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice implements the new regulations.
Since its creation, Wespac has approved longline closures in the Common-
wealth of the Northern Marianas, specified annual catch limits in all regions 
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under its jurisdiction, established management measures for noncommercial 
and recreational fishing within National Monuments in the Pacific, and prohib-
ited commercial fishing within Pacific National Monuments.82 However, purse 
seiner activity, the largest and most extractive form of commercial fishing, has 
not been specifically regulated in this region.
Okey explained this disconnect as “the general pattern in the US . . . councils 
dominated by industry (user group) representatives make the decisions about ex-
ploitation of public (marine fishery) resources. This has been referred to as ‘cap-
ture’ of the regulatory or management process by industry.”83 Consequently, “a 
natural tendency of capital- minded fisheries sectors is to maximize short- term 
profit at the expense of sustainability (and social and ecological considerations) 
thereby degrading the public value of the exploited resources.”84 Maximum catch 
for their own ships or companies, as opposed to maintaining or protecting fish-
ery resources, took priority in many Council members’ decisions. Blackford also 
highlighted how “catch quotas that were much too high to be sustained, against 
the advice of its own marine scientists” also dominated Council policies until 
the twenty- first century.85 Both scholars found that indigenous issues are often 
ignored or subsumed to large commercial fishing interests in the Council process.
In contrast to these typical stories, NMFS regulations have prioritized fishers 
based out of American Sāmoa since 2002. Due to the peak of angling vessels 
from all over the globe in this area during this time period, on March 1, 2002, 
NOAA Fisheries created a Large Vessel Prohibited Area (LVPA) that physically 
separated smaller commercial American Sāmoa indigenous alia efforts from 
large- vessel long- lining endeavors. At the time, close to forty alias actively fished 
in local waters. Boats larger than fifty feet were prohibited from fishing within 
fifty nautical miles of American Sāmoa “to protect the islands’ local, small- scale 
fishery.”86 However, any large- vessel pelagic ships that already operated in Amer-
ican Sāmoa on or before November 13, 1997, were also allowed to continue fish-
ing in the zone.
The LVPA accomplished the goal of safeguarding smaller artisanal native 
commercial fishing in nearby waters. Wespac chose to protect this aspect of fish-
eries in American Sāmoa because the Council recognized that this particular 
group of fishers provided “important socio- cultural and economic benefits to 
the American Samoa fishing community.”87 Wespac acknowledged the symbolic 
and financial importance that native marine practices had in the region, through 
the encouragement of American Sāmoan fishers themselves. However, these 
laws also further subjected American Sāmoans to U.S. authority and control.
To protect fish stocks in American Sāmoa waters and also encourage larger- 
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scale shing specically based in American Sāmoa, the NMFS created an Amer-
ican Sāmoa Longline Limited Entry (ASLLE) program that went into eect 
on August 1, 2005.88 This permit allowed a limited number of longline owners 
operating out of American Sāmoa to sh in the region’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone. This initiative “intended to establish management measures that would 
stabilize eort in the shery to avoid a ‘‘boom and bust’’ cycle of shery devel-
opment that could disrupt community participation and limit opportunity for 
substantial participation in the shery by indigenous islanders.”89 As a result of 
this policy, a maximum of sixty permits became available for ships from Amer-
ican Sāmoa using longline gear to catch pelagic or migratory sh between three 
and two hundred nautical miles from shore. These permits are available to four 
vessel sizes: Class A boats are forty feet or smaller, Class B (and B- 1) ships are 
between forty- one feet and y feet, Class C (and C- 1) vessels are y- one feet 
to seventy feet, and Class D (and D- 1) boats are longer than seventy feet.90 These 
permits have never been fully used up. In 2018, forty- six of the sixty permits were 
being used.91
Figure 1.03. Large Vessel Prohibited Area: 2002 and 2016.  
(Created for author by Michael Pesses.)
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Lutu- Sanchez explained how she helped spearhead both of these regulations 
to specifically protect smaller American Sāmoan fishing boats. At the time of 
creation, alia long- lining was at a peak. By limiting the number of longline ves-
sels that could fish in the American Sāmoa EEZ, alias had more access to migra-
tory fish in the area. Lutu- Sanchez also discussed how the ASLLE program was 
created because “we thought there would be up to 200 alias owned by American 
Sāmoans. We had high hopes and we really thought it was going to happen. We 
are not happy” that alias did not continue to succeed.92 During the creation of 
these regulations in 2002, both alia and large monohulled American Sāmoan 
fishers agreed with and supported federal government measures to control an-
gling in these waters.
However, after 2005, alia long- lining drastically reduced. That year the “total 
fishing effort was decreasing, and the era of the alias was ending. There were 
30 monohulled vessels and only 6 alias.”93 Several reasons contributed to this 
decline. First, longliners started to sell extra catch that was not purchased by 
the canneries to local stores and restaurants, directly competing with alias for 
income in the regional market. According to Wespac American Sāmoa represen-
tative Nate Ilaoa, “stores prefer longline fish because it is stored in frozen brine, 
so it’s higher quality” product.”94 Daily imports of fish from Independent Sāmoa 
also started to drive the price of fish down in American Sāmoa. Levine and Allen 
additionally found that “an increased reliance on imported store- bought food 
has discouraged development of locally based offshore fishing for the local mar-
ket” and “these factors, as well as an increase in fuel prices and vessel and engine 
breakdown and repair problems, combined to make small scale alia operations 
challenging and largely unprofitable in American Samoa.”95
In addition to cost and price factors, Koboski found a decrease in catch num-
bers and an increase in fishing risk to be other key reasons for the decline in com-
mercial alia angling. Alia fishers he interviewed stated that bigger boats “were 
catching all the tuna offshore before they could come in. They were suffocating 
the inshore area."96 Consequently, alia boats had to travel farther than their ves-
sels were built to handle to reach more fish, posing safety hazards in more distant 
and rough seas with equipment and structures built to stay closer to shore. The 
high cost of bait and required vessel safety equipment, as well as lower albacore 
catch rates stopped many commercial alia fishers from going out on a regular 
basis.97 Additionally, many alia crewmembers came from Independent Sāmoa. 
Increasing enforcement of immigration laws also made it harder to get willing 
and qualified fishers to work on boats.
To bolster fishing out of American Sāmoa and preempt overfishing of local 
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resources, Wespac recommended the prohibition of purse seiner vessels within 
seventy- five nautical miles of American Sāmoa in 2011. According to the Inter-
national Seafood Sustainability Foundation, “purse seine fishing vessels catch 
nearly 62% of the 4.2 million tons of tuna caught globally every year. Globally 
it is estimated that 1,664 purse seine vessels are authorized to fish for tuna”98 
These industrial- scale fishing vessels cast huge nets up to 6,500 feet in length 
and 650 feet in depth.99 Purse seiners also involve a lot of equipment compared 
to alias and longliners. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, “industrial tuna purse seiners are usually large vessels which 
length ranges between 45 and 85 meters, sometimes over. . . . Those seiners are 
facilitated with a large skiff, often with a few speed boats, and with a helicopter. 
Also equipped with brine freezing fish wells.”100 Purse seiners catch the most fish 
and use the most resources, such as fuel and the creation of greenhouse gases, to 
supply the tuna canning industry.
According to Levine and Allen, “while purse seiners did not fish frequently 
in American Samoa’s waters, the Council determined that the recent increase 
in the number of these vessels had the potential to disproportionately impact 
the local fishery.”101 Since no American Sāmoan has ever owned a purse seiner, 
the seventy- five- mile regulation would have continued the historical pattern of 
National Marine Fisheries Service regulations protecting smaller- scale native 
fishing efforts out of American Sāmoa. However, this law did not pass because 
the proposed measures were inconsistent with the Magnuson- Stevens Fishery 
Management and Conservation Act that “requires conservation and manage-
ment measures to be based on the best scientific information available, and re-
quires that fishery actions be founded on thorough analyses that allow NMFS to 
conclude that the selected alternative will accomplish necessary and appropriate 
conservation and management objectives.”102 Without clear scientific evidence 
to prove such a regulation would “prevent localized stock depletion, as well as 
reduce catch competition and gear conflicts,” NOAA Fisheries could not limit 
the activity of purse seiners in American Sāmoa EEZ waters.103 As scholars Jon 
Barnett and John Campbell explained, the lack of substantial and validated 
Western- style data in Pacific Island regions often prevents the development of 
policies and regulations to address immediate and long- term environmental is-
sues.104 Such reliance on precise technical data ignores historic and non- Western 
forms of indigenous knowledges and skills in local ecologies, as well as subsumes 
native fishing rights to western logics, categorizations, and oversight that is diffi-
cult to establish and maintain in these underfunded and understudied regions.
Since 2006, Wespac has specified annual catch limits to prevent the depletion 
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of targeted fish species. The goal of these ceilings is “to ensure long- term fishery 
sustainability by ending and preventing overfishing, and by rebuilding over-
fished stocks.”105 These Western- style regulations include maximum sustain-
able yield (the most catch that can be engaged in on a continual basis without 
destroying the fishery), annual catch limits, and accountability measures.
Some scholars question the usefulness of concepts such as maximum sustain-
able yields. According to Callum Roberts,
the greatest surplus yield, termed maximum sustainable yield, could be ob-
tained, according to the fishery models, by reducing a population to half of 
its unexploited size. Since then, the concept has exerted a hegemonic grip 
over fisheries science that is proving extremely difficult to loosen, despite se-
rious shortcomings. . . . The goal of sustaining yield over the long- term has 
proven elusive and is too often sacrificed for short- term gain. . . . estimates 
of target population sizes needed to achieve maximum sustainable yield 
being set too low, thus leading to a greater risk of population collapses.106
Despite half a specific fish population being maintained, many other species 
critical to a healthy and stable fishery are often caught in the process and not 
counted. In today’s highly regulated world of fishing, if a vessel does not have a 
quota for a particular species, the boat must discard all others caught, regardless 
of whether the catch could still be used for eating or for fish meal.107 Even if they 
are returned to the ocean, this bycatch of noncataloged species often die in the 
process, further depleting the fishery. Despite such realities of high amounts of 
sea life death from one fishing net, the calculation of 50 percent maximum sus-
tainable yield for one specific type of fish has become accepted and naturalized 
as sufficient to create and maintain fishery stability.
Such an approach has not worked. According to the 2018 State of the World 
Fisheries and Aquaculture report provided by the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization of the United Nations in 2015, “the world’s marine fisheries had 33.1 
percent of stocks classified as overfished.”108 In addition to this status, bycatch 
or “discarded fish are not recorded in fishery statistics. But they are just as dead 
as those landed.”109 Consequently, Western- style fishery statistics are fallible and 
have prevented the creation of true sustainability in global waters. Ultimately, 
the leaders making decisions on fishing rules are “bound to fail because they 
have vested interests that maximize short- term returns for themselves at the ex-
pense of long term sustainability for the general public.”110 The logic, motives, 
or actions of fishery decision makers who were connected to large- scale fishing 
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businesses usually did not coincide with government goals for conservation or 
sustainability.
An indigenous marine management perspective could provide one path to 
move away from segmented, narrow- minded, and unsuccessful Western ac-
counting methods to prevent overfishing. In American Sāmoa and many other 
global indigenous cultures, all parts of anything caught from the ocean are used. 
Sea life holds an equal status, if not sacred status, in the hierarchy of life and is 
treated respectfully. If seafood stocks seem low, temporary prohibitions on an-
gling are put into place by local leaders. As described by Tui Atua Tupua Tamas-
ese Ta‘isi, “All matter, human, water, animal, plant and biosphere are. . . . divine 
creations connected by genealogy. They share the same biological beginnings. . . . 
the respect or faaaloalo that must be shown by man to all things is a respect for 
the sacred essence, the sacred origins of their beginnings. This is the cornerstone 
of Samoan indigenous religious thought." 111 Such beliefs are central to the cre-
ation and maintenance of harmony between Sāmoans and the environment. Tui 
Atua also explained how “ancient Samoa protocols were developed to ensure 
that the environment was preserved. . . . During times of re- growth certain trees 
and plants were prohibited from being cut or picked.”112 Sāmoan culture has 
age- old policies and practices to protect and manage their ecology.
In fact, as Roberts described, “the idea of creating refuges from fishing has 
a long pedigree . . . Across the Pacific, from Papua New Guinea to Hawai‘i, is-
landers traditionally placed some areas of reef off limits to fishing. In most places 
these were “rested” for a time before being fished again to supply some feast, 
rather than given permanent protection. But the penalties applied for taking 
fish could be severe. In Hawai‘i, offenders were clubbed to death for violating 
such kapu areas.” 113 Once the marine environment seems to have recovered, 
fishing resumes. Barnett and Campbell also claimed that “small island states 
have alternative knowledge and specificity that could enhance or work better 
on the ground than blanket, generalized environmental policies.”114 With more 
equitable representation by noncommercial interests on the fishery councils, es-
pecially native groups (as recommended by Okey), more effective alternatives for 
ocean- use policy could develop.
A focus on “optimum yields, which considered social and economic commu-
nity issues, especially job creation and destruction,” over maximum sustainable 
yields, “which looked only at biological matters” is another alternative, more 
balanced way to rethink fishery management from a Western perspective.115 The 
current study and standard use of isolated quantitative numbers for a limited 
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number of species ignores the interconnectedness and dynamics of all entities 
within an ecosystem.
From a bioregional perspective, one must look at the overall impact and well- 
being of all key players when creating marine policies. According to Fagan, “Peo-
ple have caught fish for more than a million years, yet only in the past century 
and a half, with the growth of industrialized fisheries, has the quest become 
unsustainable. Now that insatiable demand from rising populations is coming 
into ever- greater conflict with decimated fisheries,” fishery councils are trying 
to figure out how to move forward.116 At the same time, “Fish having become 
the most traded commodity in the world, the fish business employs millions of 
people worldwide. Careful management and the creation of ocean reserves are 
thus vital to jobs and trade as well as to nutrition.”117 Multiple groups, including 
the seafood- consuming public, have a stake in the success of the global fishing 
industry and long- term sustainability. However, one must also remember that 
any federal marine regulation continues to subject American Sāmoans to U.S. 
control and authority. Until 2015, indigenous fishers did not oppose such colo-
nial marine management.
Policy Changes
In 2013, the longline fleet out of American Sāmoa was 100 percent monohulled 
and accounted for “about 80% of the fishing effort reported in 2012. There were 
only 22 active vessels, 12% less than 2012. A total of 177,627 fish were caught (all 
species combined), which was 38% less than in 2012.”118 Overall, boats were going 
out less frequently in the 2010s. Ships were setting more hooks in one day to try 
and catch more fish more quickly and shorten the amount of days for each trip, 
hoping to reduce costs in fuel, labor, and fishing permits. Despite such efforts, 
the total amount of catch also fell during this period. Increased competition 
from foreign fishing vessels not subject to ecologically minded U.S. fishing quo-
tas and size regulations, often purse seiners, also impacted the local fleet.119 Such 
shifts in the abundance and profitability of fishing in the waters surrounding 
American Sāmoa motivated discussions to change ocean- use policies in Ameri-
can Sāmoa, starting in 2014.
With the encouragement of local large- vessel longliner owners in American 
Sāmoa, Wespac proposed the opening of the Large Vessel Prohibited Area to 
mid- size U.S.- flagged boats starting at twelve nautical miles from shore. Two 
public meetings were held in American Sāmoa on May 3, 2014, and January 28, 
2015. The Council’s eventual proposal to reduce the restricted zone was the first 
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time this entity did not abide by the sentiments of their local Pacific representa-
tives. Such a move could be considered a violation of vā fealoa‘ i (social respect) 
because Council members Taimalelagi Dr. Claire Claire Poumele, director of 
the American Sāmoa Port Authority, and Dr. Ruth S. Matagi- Tofiga, director 
of the American Sāmoa Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources, voted 
against reducing the Large Vessel Prohibited Area in 2015.120 The other regional 
Council representative abstained from the vote.
Despite this lack of support, Wespac chair Ed Ebisui Jr. said that “reducing 
the LVPA from its current 50 nautical mile limit to 12 nautical miles would 
reduce operational costs of the longline vessels and allow the American Samoa 
longline fleet to continue to provide an important domestic source of albacore 
to local canneries, while still protecting important areas for other coastal re-
source users, including troll and recreational fisheries.”121 Wespac believed this 
change represented a fair compromise for both small- scale alia and longliner 
fishing needs. NOAA Pacific Islands Regional Administrator Michael Tosatto 
also stated that the Large Vessel Prohibited Area reduction “supported the peo-
ple who are fishing now.”122 Lutu- Sanchez explained how “the request to change 
the LVPA was to follow the fish. If we are fishing in the north and catch some 
fish, if they go south, we can still catch them there.123 Corry also stated that the 
twelve- mile protected area is the norm in other Pacific regions, except for Fiji 
and Tonga.124
The Council also pursued this adjustment in zone size because scientific as-
sessments of the South Pacific deemed local fish stocks healthy. The Scientific 
and Statistical Committee stated in October 2015 that “none of the bottomfish 
stocks in the U.S. Pacific Island territories are currently overfished or experi-
encing overfishing.”125 This group predicted that American Sāmoa would be 13 
percent below the allowable federal overfishing levels of 50 percent in 2017.126 
Based on these statistics, small- scale alia boats should have plenty of bottomfish 
to catch within the twelve- mile Large Vessel Prohibited Area reduction. But as 
already discussed, isolated statistics for a limited number of species can ignore 
the larger impact of fishing on the total ecosystem, including bycatch and social 
and economic impacts.
The Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act man-
dates that NOAA Fisheries policies “promote fishing efficiency and . . . not dis-
criminate among fisheries.”127 While protecting boat owners in American Sāmoa 
has always been a part of NMFS regulations, the designation of a fifty- mile 
Large Vessel Prohibited Area for the exclusive use of smaller American Sāmoa 
alia boats was difficult to justify with Western- based statistics in the 2010s. By 
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2015, there was only one commercial alia fisher actively long- lining for a living 
on a regular basis. There were about nineteen other alias boats with licenses, 
but these ships focused on bottom- fishing or trolling.128 These fishers went out 
more irregularly and their catch was mostly used for personal consumption and 
fa‘a Sāmoa obligations. These alia usually sold fish when they needed to pay for 
their monthly expenses.
American Sāmoa Governor Lolo Matalasi Moliga countered diminutive por-
trayals of a small alia fleet by “explaining that even if there is only one small vessel 
fishing with long- lines in the protected area, there are approximately 29 others 
that bottom- fish or troll within the fishery — having converted from long- line 
fishing.”129 The governor wanted to protect angling access for any small- scale 
local indigenous fisher who went out for profit or not. When the access of native 
peoples to their traditional functions seemed threated, members of the local 
population readily spoke out against U.S. colonial authority and policies.
In fact, the proposed modification of the Large Vessel Prohibited Area an-
gered several alia owners and American Sāmoa Government officials. At a 
Wespac Council meeting in October 2015, the president of the Pago Alia Fishing 
Association, Fuega Moliga, made a statement on behalf of this organization that 
works to protect the interests of small- scale artisanal fishers. He said “that’s one 
thing that’s getting on our nerves — people making decisions on us without us 
having input. . . . I hate to see President Obama declare the Pacific Ocean a sanc-
tuary . . . [he] doesn’t understand our needs, we solely depend on the ocean.”130 
In this situation, the conflict between local needs and federal policies becomes 
clear. Alia fishers hail from a historic tradition of angling the waters surrounding 
American Sāmoa to support their families and cultural practices. Rules that 
threaten such access are strongly opposed, especially if this group of fishers is not 
actively involved in the decision- making process, part of vā fealoa‘i. NOAA poli-
cies, on the other hand, examine global ecosystem issues from Western scientific, 
economic, and bureaucratic perspectives when developing fishing regulations.
Some individuals posted about Fuega’s comments online at Talanei.com, an 
online local news source in American Sāmoa connected to the local radio sta-
tion. Two of three commentators were unsympathetic to the Fishing Associa-
tion’s position, with one stating how “opening the 50 mile zone does not stop you 
from fishing there. Alias are free to fish anywhere in the entire 200 mile zone.”131 
One factor this commentator did not acknowledge is that alia boats have a max-
imum distance of about thirty miles at which they can safely fish from shore.132 
The other commentator said, “Stop crying and go fishing.”133 Both sentiments 
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alluded to the negligible amount of alia fishing in American Sāmoa. If more 
people were angling, then the case for maintaining the fifty- mile Large Vessel 
Prohibited Area would be stronger to federal lawmakers. While alia owners are 
focusing on a fundamental indigenous rights- based argument for maintaining 
traditional fishing grounds, not everyone in American Sāmoa supported their 
efforts to stop the reduction of the small- scale fishing zone for both commercial 
and personal use. The debates over zone changes became quite heated among 
American Sāmoans.
Wespac believed a change to the LVPA was appropriate for current circum-
stances of lower commercial catch rates for larger long- lining vessels and lack 
of overfishing in the region. Alia fishers, in contrast, focused on the infringe-
ment upon their ancestral rights and the lack of acknowledgment and regard 
for their positionality in policies that directly impacted their lives, an absence 
of vā fealoa‘i. Koboski also commented how “in American Samoa, where devo-
tion to the family and the community is so strong, the depletion of albacore as 
a resource is seen as an affront to future generations of Samoan fishermen. In 
the interviews, the conservation of the resource was repeatedly mentioned as an 
important component to the healthfulness of the fishery.”134 As discussed in the 
introduction, the centrality of family in fa‘a Sāmoa and the priority of raising 
and maintaining the status of one’s ‘āiga (family) are critical aspects of indige-
nous social, political, and economic life in the region.
While one person I interviewed claimed the public meetings in American 
Sāmoa were more informational, not open to alternative opinions, and even 
hostile to expressions of resistance or disapproval, the NMFS stated that “there 
appeared to be more support for the reduction of the LPVA at the 2015 meetings, 
given that the longline fishermen were for the most part local American Samo-
ans.”135 No mention was made in the draft regulatory amendment of any strong 
opposition to the exemption in the on- site public meetings.
On March 18, 2015, Westpac approved a temporary exemption to the LVPA, 
allowing longliner boats to fish from twelve nautical miles offshore. This change 
would be evaluated every year for effectiveness and impact. Within one week 
of this decision, the Fono passed a joint resolution to request that the Council 
“maintain the current 50 miles of the LVPA.”136 Governor Moliga also asked 
the American Sāmoa attorney general to look into legal options to maintain 
the original size of the restricted zone. In July 2015, the Fono took another step 
in opposing the amendment by passing a resolution against the reduction of 
the LVPA. The American Sāmoa legislature stated that the shift in regional 
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coverage “will not protect some of the most productive fishing grounds from 
fishing vessels larger than 50 feet.”137 In September that same year, Governor 
Moliga wrote a letter of protest to the U.S. secretary of commerce. He explained 
that decreasing the Large Vessel Prohibited Area “will create competition and 
gear conflict.”138
In response to these concerns, Corry stated that she has not heard of any 
large- vessel longliner coming into contact with local alias, especially since mono-
hulled lines are set much deeper. She stated that her ships “haven’t seen alias that 
far out, mostly four to five miles, not more than ten miles.”139 Lutu- Sanchez also 
claimed “there is no gear conflict” because these longliners are much farther 
out than alias usually travel.140 For these reasons, plus the fact that only one alia 
boat fished on a regular basis, longline owners believed the restricted zone was 
an underutilized area and resource.
In contrast, those who opposed the shrinking of the Large Vessel Prohibited 
Area worried that alia fish stocks would dwindle when larger boats with a big-
ger capacity started to angle in the same waters. Maea explained how a longliner 
could get “tons of fish catch by one line, five to seven miles long, they are going to 
catch tons of fish. Local alia are lucky to catch ten yellowfin” at a time.141 The scale 
of a catch was a major concern for alia boat owners, the Fono, and the American 
Sāmoa governor when discussing changes to the restricted zone. In contrast, local 
large- vessel longline owner Edgar Feliciano believed the reduction of the Prohib-
ited Area was not detrimental to alia fishing because bottom- fishing uses different 
methods and targets different species of fish.142 Corry concurred that “we target 
albacore” while alias focus on bottomfish.”143 These conflicting opinions have 
riddled indigenous debates over reducing the restricted zone.
Many large- vessel longline owners in American Sāmoa believed the conver-
sations surrounding the reduction of the Large Vessel Prohibited Area involved 
a lot of lobbying and misrepresentations that presented them in a negative light. 
Corry stated that “it’s all perception and misinformation. . . . I think there needs 
to be more public information and awareness” especially about the differences 
and similarities among local longliners, much larger purse seiner boats, and 
Chinese fishing boats.144 Large- vessel longliners are medium- sized U.S.- flagged 
boats, not the very large purse seiners often seen in Pago harbor or the foreign 
Asian boats also increasing in the area. Several large- vessel longliners are Amer-
ican Sāmoan businesses whose employers and employees live, work, and spend 
their money in the region with their families. Asserting her company’s native 
roots and the contributions of all longliner boats to the local economy, Lutu- 
Sanchez stated that “we all operate out of here, we all fuel our boats here, buy 
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bait locally, buy all supplies, food, lube oil, gear, and equipment here in Amer-
ican Samoa and do all repairs here in American Samoa.”145 American Sāmoan 
large- vessel longliners can, should, and have had native rights to fish in the Large 
Vessel Prohibited Area. Both indigenous alia and large- vessel longliner owners 
have steadfastly fought for their ability to maintain such traditional access to 
their ancestral waters under U.S. colonial rule.
While alia and large- vessel longliner owners generally agreed on U.S. fed-
eral policies in 2002, strong lines were drawn between these American Sāmoan 
fishers by 2015. As sociologists Cluny Macpherson and La‘avasa Macpherson 
found, in a globalized environment “Sāmoan society is becoming increasingly 
plural and less able, or willing, to agree on how to confront and manage these 
forces.”146 Fishers have adapted to changing economic and ecological circum-
stances through the centuries, most recently shifting to Western vessel and fish-
ing technologies, as well as angling for a market economy and global consump-
tion. Intensified fishing competition and growing angling regulations, as well 
as shrinking fish stocks have led to divisions among American Sāmoan fishers.
Furthermore, as postcolonial ecologist Byron Caminero- Santangelo dis-
cussed, there is no singular indigenous identity and culture is not fixed or static. 
In fact, “the local, the natural, and the indigenous must be seen as emerging and 
reemerging from specific, messy interrelationships with their supposed oppo-
sites.”147 Focusing on the total bioregion can help explain why some American 
Sāmoans reacted differently from others to the changes in fishing zone param-
eters. Most alia fishers primarily angle for personal, familial, and cultural rea-
sons. Commercial supply and profit is a huge benefit, but not a requirement for 
their livelihood as small- scale artisanal fishers. Large- vessel longliners focus on 
supplying fish for commercial markets and rely on sales of their catch to survive. 
While functioning at different output and production scales, both groups want 
to protect their native angling rights and provide for their families in the short 
and long term. As angling has become more arduous and less profitable in the 
twenty- first century, desires to protect one’s own form of fishing over others 
become more vocal and strong.
In the final ruling on the extension, the NMFS stated that they were “satisfied 
that three full Council meetings, the January 15, 2015, public meetings, and the 
30- day public comment period on the proposed rule provided the public with 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard.”148 NMFS also claimed that they 
“took particular care to ensure that the views of American Samoa stakeholders, 
including fishermen, fishing communities, and the American Samoa govern-
ment, were solicited and taken into account throughout the development of this 
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action.149 From the federal government perspective, vā fealoa‘i was created and 
maintained in this decision- making process.
During the final public comment period, which ran from August 25 to 
September 24, 2015, the NMFS “received comments from over 270 individ-
uals, commercial and recreational fishermen, businesses, Territorial govern-
ment offices (including the Governor of American Samoa and the American 
Samoa Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources), Federal agencies, and 
non- governmental organizations.”150 Several comments and most NMFS re-
sponses echoed the pro- reduction perspectives of large- vessel long- lining ships, 
such as the need to provide food, jobs, and support for the local American Sā-
moan economy, the equal right of these boats to fish in local waters, the un-
derutilization of the protected zone, as well as the cost savings and safety benefits 
of having larger vessels in the local area.
In opposition to the reduction, several commenters questioned the impact 
of large- vessel long- lining on coral reefs, endangered species, gear conflict with 
other anglers, water pollution, and fish catch competition with alias and recre-
ational fishers. In each case of opposition, the NMFS had a strong response that 
continued to justify and support the view of the LVPA reduction as a rational, 
logical, and reasonable policy. Satisfied that they fulfilled federal expectations 
for public comment and response, the NMFS passed this exemption on Janu-
ary 29, 2016.
As with the expansion of the National Marine Sanctuary, discussed in 
chapter 3, some members of the American Sāmoan community believed this 
Western- style, impersonal, English language, written- based, and bureaucratic 
federal government public comment system and process did not take Sāmoan 
vā fealoa‘ i into consideration. As discussed in chapter 4, the traditional Sāmoan 
village consensus- building process involves meeting the different constituents 
in each impacted village in separate meetings: the village council, women, and 
untitled men. After these groups are informed of a proposal, the council advises 
the high chief, who makes a decision for the whole community to follow. This 
slow and deliberate process can often take many months. Bypassing this process, 
public comments gathered and submitted to the NMFS mostly came from in-
dividuals or organizations. The NMFS made no attempt to go into community 
villages and work within the customary Sāmoan decision- making process and 
hierarchy.
On February 3, 2016, the final ruling in the LVPA reduction went into ef-
fect. This legislation stated that “this action allows fishing in an additional 
16,817 nm [nautical miles] of Federal waters, allowing large longline vessels to 
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distribute fishing effort over a larger area. This may reduce catch competition 
among the larger vessels and promote economic efficiency by reducing transit 
costs. This action is intended to improve the efficiency and economic viability 
of the American Samoa longline fleet, while ensuring that fishing by the long-
line and small vessel fleets remains sustainable on an ongoing basis.”151 Despite 
protests from the American Sāmoa Government and local alia owners, NOAA 
Fisheries pushed forward with this law, supporting the needs of the larger long-
line vessel owners.
Just over a month later, on March 4, 2016, the American Sāmoa Government 
filed a lawsuit to overturn the ruling based on guarantees provided in the Deeds 
of Cession, the Magnuson- Stevens Act, and other administrative procedure 
acts. The twenty- one- page complaint claimed that allowing “large long- liners 
to fish within the ceded areas that were designated as protected properties ig-
nores and violates the U.S. obligation under the Deeds of Cession to safeguard 
and respect the property rights of the native people of Samoa to their customs 
and practices including cultural fishing.”152 Overall, the suit claimed that the 
United States has a “fiduciary duty to protect the lands; preserve the traditions, 
customs, language and culture; Samoan way of life; and the waters surrounding 
the islands.”153 This legal approach argued that the federal government cannot 
make a decision that violates U.S. promises to the people of American Sāmoa, 
as outlined in the Deeds.
Two motions and a counter- motion, as well as two replies, were filed for this 
case between June 2016 and January 2017. A U.S. District Court hearing was 
held in Honolulu, Hawai‘i on February 13, 2017. On March 20, 2017, more than 
a year after the first filing of the suit, U.S. District Court Judge Leslie E. Ko-
bayashi supported the American Sāmoa Government, ruling that “in light of 
the long- standing significance of fishing to the fa‘a Samoa, Plaintiff has a quasi- 
sovereign interest in protecting the American Samoan’s cultural fishing rights 
to preserve their culture for the benefit of the American Samoan people as a 
whole.”154 Based on these fundamental indigenous rights to cultural preserva-
tion guaranteed by the Deeds of Cession, the 2016 LVPA rule was deemed “ar-
bitrary and capricious” as well as “invalid.”155
Governor Moliga praised the ruling, expressing how “I hope this case serves as 
a reminder to the federal government that we have rights and they should not be 
easily dismissed.”156 Attorney General Talauega Eleasalo Ale, who participated 
in the February hearing, also emphasized how “this decision is the first federal 
case law to articulate the meaning of the deeds as it relates to our direct deal-
ings with the federal government. . . . It establishes a critical pathway towards 
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clarifying our relationship with the federal government, as well as our status as 
a people and culture within the American family.”157 This ruling provides an 
important precedent for future questions over the rights of American Sāmoans 
within the U.S. colonial system and structure.
On May 10, 2017, NOAA filed a motion for reconsideration to question “the 
legal standing for American Samoa to bring this claim” and whether “the ap-
propriate remedy for the court” was applied to this case.158 NOAA legal counsel 
Frederick W. Tucher believed the court should have asked for supplemental brief-
ings to justify its ruling instead of overruling NOAA’s authority to create regula-
tions in these waters.159 NOAA Fisheries hopes the reconsideration will “remand 
it [the LVPA] back to NMFS to address customary fishing in accordance with 
the Deeds of Cession. . . . NMFS expects that it can complete a new rulemak-
ing to correct its error within fifteen months.”160 This continuation of litigation 
demonstrated the strong desire of NOAA to maintain its ultimate authority and 
policy- making control over the waters surrounding American Sāmoa.
According to Tosatto, in the year since the reduction went into effect, the 
smaller Large Vessel Prohibited Area “provided benefits to American Samoan 
longliners while producing no adverse impacts on catch rates for other American 
Samoan fishery participants”161 The NMFS also presented data showing how 
catch rates “were higher not only for longline vessels, but also for other pelagic 
troll vessels.”162 Additionally, “NMFS has not received any complaints or reports 
from pelagic trollers, bottomfish fishermen, alias, or recreational fishermen of 
gear conflict or catch competition with longliners.”163 In the context of these 
positive statistics, NOAA Fisheries believed it could justify the appropriateness 
of the 2016 Large Vessel Prohibited Area rule change and maintain their position 
as the wise and deserving decision makers over the waters in the South Pacific.
Tautai o Sāmoa also appealed to Judge Kobayashi on June 2, 2017, to recon-
sider her ruling. This large- vessel longliner association petitioned the U.S. Inte-
rior Department, the American Sāmoa Government, and the federal court “to 
restore our rights to fish in these waters that you [Kobayashi] have all agreed 
should be accessible to indigenous peoples of American Samoa.”164 In their let-
ter, the group asked why the court “would deny that we have the same rights as 
other American Samoans, and why are we discriminated against while favoring 
others?. . . . A truly impartial decision from you would be to allow anyone with 
American Samoa heritage to fish in American Samoa waters during this ordeal 
until it is decided who the supreme owner of these waters is, as it looks like this 
fight will continue until it reaches the U.S. Supreme Court.”165 While the March 
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2017 ruling provided a legal victory for general American Sāmoan indigenous 
rights in the U.S. colonial system, the LVPA rule continues to be beleaguered 
by the fact that different members of the indigenous group stand on opposite 
sides of this issue.
While Territory of American Samoa v. National Marine Fisheries Service effec-
tively secured native fishing rights and guaranteed the prioritization of indige-
nous protections in all U.S. actions in the region, a more nuanced understanding 
of who is native and what they want is needed. This specific federal ocean- use 
policy requires finding a balanced compromise among the needs of small- scale 
and medium- sized local fishing vessels in American Sāmoa while guaranteeing 
native rights to fish local waters for both groups, all part of maintaining vā (so-
cial relations) in Sāmoan society.
The battle over the restricted zone size has the potential to continue for many 
years. In March 2018, the case went into mediation. In June 2018, Wespac recom-
mended another four- year exemption and “annual monitoring of the American 
Samoa longline and troll catch rates, small vessel participation and local fisheries 
development initiatives.”166 The American Sāmoan government continued to 
oppose the exemption to the Large Vessel Prohibited Area.
Regardless of the ultimate resolution to this lawsuit, historic and current 
U.S. colonial status has directly impacted both indigenous American Sāmoans 
and NOAA policies. This native group, composed of multiple views and per-
spectives, boldly challenges the federal system on a regular basis to defend their 
rights to fish local waters. However, American Sāmoans are also looking to the 
federal government to address and resolve these issues within existing colo-
nial structures of Wespac and the U.S. judicial system. The U.S. government 
bureaucracy strongly believes in its guardian responsibilities to control and 
manage this region and its resources, discussed more in chapter 3. In the end, 
the major question is “how to continue fishing in a depleted ocean while also 
conserving it.”167
In American Sāmoa, “fishing has transformed over the years into a commer-
cial endeavor while still preserving traditional elements that contribute to the 
perpetuation of the local culture.”168 In addition to addressing native rights, 
some scholars view small- scale fisheries as one way to address issues of poverty, 
economic development, and food security.169
Internationally, small- scale fisheries account for over 50 percent of the world’s 
catch and employ 90 percent of people engaged in fisheries.170 Because artisanal 
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fishing can be a key to long- term food security, the issues facing these anglers 
should be taken seriously both at local and global levels.
The next chapter explores another invisible aspect of accessing the resource- 
rich fishing waters surrounding American Sāmoa and the complications of in-
digenous desires versus federal control in the unique combination of large- scale 
fisheries, commercial tuna canneries, continental U.S. politics and consumption, 
the local native economy, and the vā fealoa‘i of Sāmoan laborers in the context 
of fa‘a Sāmoa.
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 Ch a pter 2
Minimal Returns
Colonial Minimum Wage Issues  
and the Global Tuna Canning Industry
Until 2009, the StarKist Samoa cannery was the largest tuna factory in the 
world. Chicken of the Sea was the second- largest sh processor and exporter 
across the globe.1 Both of these canneries were located in American Sāmoa. 
Their products, whether packaged for high- end stores like Whole Foods, gro-
cery chains like Trader Joe’s, or big- box stores like Walmart, were labeled “Made 
in the USA” because American Sāmoa is an unincorporated territory of the 
United States. But as an unincorporated territory of the U.S., federal labor laws 
do not apply equally, such as minimum wage and maximum work hours. This 
allowable divergence in work standards due to colonized status, as well as tax and 
tari breaks, cheaper freight, lower insurance, and close access to shing waters, 
has made American Sāmoa an attractive liminal political- legal and economic 
space for the tuna industry since the rst cannery opened in 1953. Fish process-
ing in American Sāmoa is a generally invisible aspect of U.S. and global seafood 
consumption. While chapter 1 discussed the various methods used to obtain 
seafood for tuna factories and fresh local consumption, this chapter focuses on 
the politics and economics behind the massive enterprise of canning tuna for 
the world.
According to food journalist Andrew Smith, sh canning started in the 
United States on the east coast in 1818 and the rst can of tuna was produced 
in 1903.2 Canned tuna became popular during World War I as a cheap source 
of protein, and by the end of World War II the United States had the largest 
tuna eet in the world. Smith explained how “by the late 1940s, Americans ate 
more tuna than any other sh or seafood.”3 Tens of thousands of people worked 
either directly or indirectly for the tuna industry. Today, Americans consume 29 
percent of the canned tuna produced worldwide (almost all is imported to the 
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United States) and 84 percent of tuna comes from the western Pacific.4 Foreign 
domination of the industry in the twenty- first century stems from cheaper wages 
paid outside of the United States for both fishing and processing.
In 2007, as part of the push for minimum wage increases in the continental 
United States, Congress passed a federal law that required a fifty- cent wage in-
crease every year until American Sāmoa wages were at the same level as states 
of the union. When the first mandatory increase was implemented in 2007, the 
minimum wage for cannery workers in American Sāmoa was raised from $3.26 
to $3.76. That same year, the lowest legal wage in the fifty states was $5.85. By 
2009, the federal U.S. minimum wage was $7.25, where it remained in 2018. 
After three fifty- cent increases in a row to $4.76, Chicken of the Sea announced 
the closure of its American Sāmoa cannery in 2009 and StarKist reduced its 
labor force by eight hundred people. Employment in American Sāmoa fell by 19 
percent and cannery work decreased by 55 percent. This chapter examines the 
debates surrounding the minimum wage issue in the colonized space of Ameri-
can Sāmoa, as well as the historic and contemporary impacts that variable labor 
standards for this large- scale for- profit fishery have had on this Pacific Island 
region and United States politics and businesses.
Living in an American possession, U.S. colonials are subjects, not full- fledged 
members of the union with complete rights and privileges of citizenship.5 The 
economic needs of corporate fish canneries have historically been accommo-
dated over worker welfare throughout U.S. rule in this region. This chapter 
will examine U.S. government prioritization of the monocrop industry of tuna 
canning in American Sāmoa, resulting variations in Fair Labor Standards, and 
the current lack of accommodation for indigenous appeals for tailored policies. 
Like in chapter 1, the functions of commercial marine practices and related labor 
regulations in American Sāmoa have increasingly been shaped by nonnative eco-
nomic objectives that do not always coincide with indigenous goals, lifestyles, 
and traditions. Through tuna canning industry issues, American Sāmoans have 
been and continue to be colonially subjected, regulated, and controlled by the 
federal government. However, workers have remained loyal to this large- scale 
fishery due to on- the- ground social welfare employee benefits that acknowledge 
vā (social relations) obligations and incorporate forms of fa‘a Sāmoa (the Sāmoan 
way of life) in their treatment of laborers.
As discussed in chapter 1, wage labor in American Sāmoa was a product of a 
World War II cash- based economy introduced to the region by Americans and 
supported by the U.S. federal government in the postwar period through the 
establishment of the fishing industry in the area. The controversy over wage 
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increases for cannery workers in the twenty- first century demonstrates the con-
tinuation of multiple interests and ideas connected to labor and wages in both 
American Sāmoa and the United States. In addition to impassioned statements 
by American Sāmoa government representatives, businesspeople, and the gen-
eral public, politicians in the U.S. Congress actively participated in these discus-
sions for the interests of their own constituents or political parties, often from 
opposite perspectives. While historically accommodated, the fiscal needs of this 
monocrop marine- based industry in the unincorporated territory of American 
Sāmoa has started to take a secondary position to larger federal issues of fair 
wages, jobs for U.S. citizens, and national security. As liminal U.S. colonials, 
the ground- level economics of American Sāmoans have always been subject to 
global tuna industry needs. In the twenty- first century, this indigenous group is 
now also being subsumed to the political goals of the fifty states.
Since the 1900 Deed of Cession agreement between the eastern Sāmoan 
mātai chiefs and the U.S. Navy, American Sāmoans have maintained unique 
control over their local jurisdiction. However, the U.S. Congress has the ability 
to impose rules on or veto actions by territorial governments, known as plenary 
power.6 In 2007, Congress used this overarching authority to address the issue 
of wage discrepancies between U.S. territories and U.S. states.
However, the inclusion of American Sāmoa in 2007 legislation was not a 
clear- cut issue. Initially, only the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands was targeted for wage standardization due to recent news coverage of 
poor working conditions in garment factories in that region.7 But according to a 
Washington Times article, “that would have left American Samoa as the only ter-
ritory outside the federal minimum- wage rules. . . . Republicans said that smelled 
fishy, since Del Monte, the parent company of StarKist’s cannery, had head-
quarters in San Francisco, in the district Mrs. Pelosi [the Speaker of the House 
represented]. . . . In the ensuing days, Mrs. Pelosi insisted American Sāmoa be 
added, in order to equalize the law.”8 Despite these efforts to apply minimum 
wage standards throughout territories in the Pacific, American Sāmoa was not 
included in the 2007 Fair Minimum Wage Standard Law.
A few months later, Republican representative Mark Steven Kirk from Illi-
nois added minimum wage hikes for American Sāmoa as an amendment to the 
“U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Account-
ability Appropriations Act.” Once again, the larger party politics of the U.S. 
Congress, specifically Republicans’ attacks on Speaker of the House Nancy Pe-
losi, resulted in the inclusion of American Sāmoa in the minimum wage debate, 
not any request from American Sāmoans themselves. As a rider attached to a 
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much larger appropriations bill, increases in American Sāmoa minimum wage 
became law without any specific debate or discussion on the Congressional floor 
about its impact on this colonized region or its people.
In reaction to the partisan inclusion of American Sāmoa into this legislation, 
“democratic leaders promised to try to remove the amendment later in the legis-
lative process but [according to the same Times article] never followed through.”9 
This political back- and- forth over the inclusion of American Sāmoa in mini-
mum wage hikes highlights the precarious position U.S. colonials occupy under 
U.S. empire. While American Sāmoans generally have authority over local is-
sues, the federal government holds ultimate control over the region. Important 
issues such as wage policies for tuna workers can consequently become subject 
to the maneuverings of party politics in Washington, D.C., that do not take 
into account the ground- level effect of such legislation on the local American 
Sāmoan economy and people.
As an unincorporated territory, American Sāmoa has had one nonvoting 
representative in the U.S. Congress since 1981. This delegate has the right to 
speak in Congress, but does not get to vote on legislation. Therefore, these U.S. 
colonials do not have the right to elect any leader who wields ultimate control 
over their region, such as the U.S. president or members of Congress. This status 
in terms of political representation is also true for the other U.S. territories of 
Guam, the Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
In 2010, the American Sāmoa Congressional representative Eni Faleomavaega 
reacted to the 2007 appropriations amendment by stating that Representative 
Kirk “knows nothing about American Sāmoa and did not have the courtesy 
to contact my office.”10 Despite Faleomavaega’s request that Democrats remove 
American Sāmoa from the legislation, the bill passed with this region included. 
In 2015, American Sāmoa Congressional representative Aumua Amata Coleman 
Radewagen called the inclusion of her home region in the 2007 legislation “an 
over sight.”11 Overall, American Sāmoan government representatives did not 
support changes to local minimum wage regulations due to the threat such raises 
would pose to the fishing industry in the region. But their colonial voices were 
not listened to. Instead, both state- level pushes for minimum wage increases and 
partisan politics propelled this legislation through Congress.
Ironically, if there was no controversy over labor standards in the Northern 
Marianas, these Pacific regions might never have been included in state- level 
minimum wage legislation; especially since no federal labor laws had developed 
in these areas since 1956. As territories on the periphery of the U.S. empire, these 
islands are often far off the radar, if not invisible to American politicians. But 
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when a controversial subject develops in the continental U.S., like the campaign 
for a living wage or nuclear threats from North Korea, these colonial territories 
come under full scrutiny and become subject to legislative decisions of the U.S. 
Congress. As the case studies in this book demonstrate, Western standards and 
goals do not always coincide with or impact indigenous groups in the same way 
as American citizens in states of the union.
History of the Tuna Industry in American Sāmoa
Tuna canning in American Sāmoa started within a decade of the rise in inter-
national canned fish consumption. According to Mansel Blackford, by 1944, 
canned tuna and canned salmon provided much of the seafood consumed at the 
time.12 Callum Roberts also stated how the “development of canning technology 
and the discovery that tinned tuna preserves wonderfully well created a product 
for which there was a ready market” in the interwar years.13 By the early twenty- 
first century, “the seafood industry was a thoroughly industrialized, globalized 
operation. About three- quarters of all seafood products were destined for direct 
human consumption. . . . Of the seafood eaten by humans, 49 percent went to 
market fresh, but 51 percent was processed. About half of the processed seafood 
was frozen, with much of the remainder canned. A whopping 37 percent of this 
total production entered international trade.”14 Since 1953, American Sāmoa 
has contributed to this major source of world protein through massive marine 
monocropping and production.
The Rockefeller Company set up the first fish cannery on Tutuila in 1953. 
Van Camp Seafood, a division of Ralston- Purina during that period, purchased 
the facility in 1954, which eventually became Chicken of the Sea in 1976. Thai 
Union, the seventh- largest supplier of seafood to the U.S. market in 2006, pur-
chased Chicken of the Sea in 2000.15 After three federally mandated wage hikes 
in two years, this production line shut down in 2009. The Italian company 
TriMarine, the third- largest seafood provider for the United States in 2007, 
opened a cannery at this same location in April 2015, but closed operations in 
December 2016 after experiencing two government required pay increases in a 
year and a half.
The American Sāmoa Government (ASG) approved the opening of a second 
fish processing plant by H.J. Heinz Company in September 1962. The first ship-
ment of canned tuna from this StarKist factory left Pago Pago harbor on Octo-
ber 4, 1963. In 2003, the canning arm of this company spun off into Del Monte 
Foods Company. In 2008, the Korean company Dongwon bought StarKist, 
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which was the ninth- largest supplier for the U.S. market in 2006. Despite re-
ductions in labor force and work hours in the face of continual federal wage 
hikes, this facility continues to operate in 2018.
The shi from U.S.- owned sh processing companies to other countries 
showed how by the end of the twentieth century, “seafood companies have in-
creasingly operated across national boundaries by entering into joint ventures, 
as Japanese processors did with American shers, moves unintentionally encour-
aged by the U.S. declaration of a 200- mile economic exclusive zone.”16 With 
restrictions on who could sh where, discussed in chapter 1, dierent nations 
partnered with each other to gain better access to shing grounds. Also evi-
denced by the twenty- rst- century change of ownership for both Chicken of the 
Sea and StarKist in American Sāmoa, “processors acquired foreign subsidiaries 
to be close to their major overseas markets.”17 Aer purchasing StarKist Samoa, 
Dongwon also took control of the can- producing factory across the street, 
demonstrating “vertical integration, [where] company ocers join the various 
stages in their businesses, from raw materials to production through sales.”18
Such control over all phases of the manufacturing process was occurring in other 
industries at the same time, like the auto industry with joint ventures by Ford 
and Mazda in the 1980s.19 American Sāmoa was an ideal location for being close 
Figure 2.01. StarKist Samoa cannery. (Author photo.)
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to tuna fishing grounds as well as controlling both fishing and processing in 
American territory.
The U.S. federal government fostered the development of the tuna processing 
industry to expand the economy of American Sāmoa in the post – World War 
II era through variable labor standards, generous tax and tariff breaks, and sub-
sidies for supplies, transportation, and insurance. According to Richard Barnet 
and John Cavanagh, “poor countries with unorganized work forces are attrac-
tive production sites for global companies, whatever flag they fly. Higher profits, 
labor peace, access to natural resources of the region and to local markets are 
powerful incentives” for factory locations.20 Cheap labor combined with U.S. 
and territorial tax subsidies and exemptions, plentiful fish nearby, tuna treaties, 
as well as low insurance, fuel, labor, and freight costs to facilitate the profitability 
of tuna canneries in this colonized Pacific region.
Allen Stayman has studied how “the United States has embraced a pragmatic 
and flexible approach to building stable relations” in U.S. territories which in-
cluded “extended special trade, tax, wage, financial assistance, and other privi-
leges to support the growth of the Islands’ less- competitive market economies.”21 
In American Sāmoa, U.S. tax credits since 1976 have resulted in exemptions 
equivalent to that of U.S. corporate income taxes.22 Tariff relief made this unin-
corporated territory of the United States even more attractive. According to a De-
partment of Labor report in 2007, “shipments of canned tuna or other products 
from American Samoa into the United States are not subject to tariff rates. . . . 
because American Samoa is a territory of the U.S. and is not considered to be an 
exporter.”23 Conducting business in a region that was part of the United States 
but not a full- fledged member of the union provided economic benefits on both 
sides of this political- legal liminality for the tuna industry. For tax purposes, 
American Sāmoan products were considered domestic. But for national labor 
regulations, like minimum wage, this area did not have to maintain the same 
standards.
Since the beginning of cannery involvement in the region, the ASG has also 
collaborated with tuna industry leadership and Washington, D.C., officials to 
develop local tax breaks, tariff cuts, and other incentives to maintain factories 
in the area. For example, the territorial administration allows significant exemp-
tions from its own corporate tax laws that could result in up to 44 percent sav-
ings on corporate income.24 In 1962, the federally appointed governor of Ameri-
can Sāmoa, Idaho native H. Rex Lee, stated how “the Government of American 
Samoa is fully prepared to cooperate fully with any fishing fleet delivering fish to 
the Star- Kist plant in Pago Pago.”25 This commitment to the economic success 
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of U.S. fish companies, and as a by- product the American Sāmoa economy, has 
continued among local leaders in the region into the twenty- first century. In fact, 
a fear over the loss of this main industry in the region has and continues to shape 
the opinions and actions of these leaders.
Carrying the “Made in the USA” label provided even more enticement for 
canneries to function in American Sāmoa, particularly because the U.S. military 
only purchases tuna canned within U.S. jurisdiction. The Buy American Act 
of 1993 “attempts to protect domestic jobs by providing a required preference 
for American goods in direct government purchases.”26 The Berry Amendment 
to this legislation in 2014 “is a ‘super percentage’ status which requires the De-
partment of Defense, when purchasing certain goods, to purchase goods that 
are 100% American in origin.”27 Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management 
Council (Wespac) Fisheries program officer Mark Mitsuyasu believed the future 
success of canneries in American Sāmoa depends on how valuable the “Made 
in the USA” label remains for companies. “It was an advantage, it still is an 
advantage.”28 While labor may be cheaper in Southeast Asia or South America, 
gaining a monopoly on tuna supplies for the U.S. military makes production in 
this generally invisible colonial space a major benefit. In fact, according to Bar-
net and Cavanagh, “by 1991 more than half of all U.S. exports and imports were 
transfers of components and services within the same global corporation, most 
of them flying the American flag.”29 But as tuna canning in American Sāmoa 
shows, production under U.S. jurisdiction does not necessarily mean fair wage 
jobs for U.S. citizens. The liminal space of U.S. territories and possessions pro-
vides economic and political loopholes for businesses.
However, for fish canneries to stay in American Sāmoa long term, these cor-
porations “need to see predictable costs.”30 This idea of the economic bottom 
line for businesses was echoed by many interviewed.31 According to StarKist 
production manager Carlos Gonzalez, there are two important factors for fac-
tory profitability: 1) fish prices and 2) fuel prices.32 If either of these two aspects 
goes up, the profit for the company goes down. Dan Sullivan, vice president of 
production for TriMarine in 2015, also remarked that the price of fish, labor 
costs, and freight costs were all critical inducements for opening and maintain-
ing a factory location in the area.33
One disadvantage Sullivan identified for American Sāmoa as a cannery site 
involved the fact that the region was subject to a multitude of federal regula-
tions, such as those monitored by the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Health Advisors, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard. Complying with the numerous and costly rules for health and safety 
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standards overseen by each of these bureaucracies results in more expended ef-
fort and higher costs to a company’s bottom line.
In 2015, StarKist spokesperson Michelle Faist stated that “American Samoa 
has had three things in its favor — duty free access to the U.S. market that is now 
nearly irrelevant, a wage system reflective of the local economy rather than the 
mainland economy, and a reliable supply of direct- delivered fish... all of these 
factors have been negatively impacted in the last six months” due to minimum 
wage increases, fishing limits, and the Pacific Trade Treaty that eliminated tar-
iffs among member nations.34 Such tuna industry rhetoric about tenuous stabil-
ity in the fiscally colonized space of American Sāmoa has occurred since their 
opening in the 1950s.
According to Barnet and Cavanagh, “Corporations dream of escaping the 
laws of any nations that restrict the free movement of goods, info, and profits. 
But at the same time global companies everywhere look to their home govern-
ments to protect their existing markets and to provide muscle for penetrating 
new markets, to keep labor and environmental costs down, and to subsidize their 
operations in various ways.”35 This general dual desire of businesses to obtain 
legal and monetary advantages in both a free market and through home gov-
ernment regulations typifies the actions and motivations of the tuna industry as 
well. But “government treatment of their home- based corporations can result in 
competitive advantages or disadvantages” as seen with the benefits of tax and tar-
iff relief versus the burden of national health and environmental requirements 
in American Sāmoa.36 Tuna canneries, like the sugar industry in Hawai‘i and 
the oil refining industry in the U.S. Virgin Islands, have always tried to create 
an overall advantage from this variety of pros and cons for setting up shop in an 
unincorporated territory of the United States.37
History of Wage Rates in American Sāmoa
The fish processing industry has historically threatened to leave American 
Sāmoa if minimum wage became too high. In 1956, the U.S. Congress debated 
legislation to exempt American Sāmoa from the wage and hour provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In March 1956, Vaiinupo J. Ala‘ilima, King 
Malietoa’s great- great- grandson and an employee of the Army Corps of Engi-
neers, testified at a House Education and Welfare subcommittee in Washington, 
D.C., to plead against any policy that kept wages down to attract industries to 
American Sāmoa. He believed the application of the national minimum wage 
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standard of one dollar an hour would “protect our people from being exploited 
for cheap labor and likewise slow down the industrialization of our little coun-
try.38 However, the Van Camp Seafood Company insinuated throughout these 
Congressional hearings that it might need to leave the islands if required to pay 
one dollar an hour.39 As the only industry in American Sāmoa, which was al-
ready operating at a loss, Van Camp employed three hundred island women for 
their tuna packing plant.
The cannery’s acknowledgment of a potential shutdown in the face of in-
creased wages raised deep concerns for both American and Sāmoan leadership. 
Congressional leaders feared that the departure of this main source of income 
for the area would tank the local economy.40 Indigenous leaders also submitted 
a resolution urging an exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act for similar 
reasons.41
At a hearing for the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 
May of that same year William D. Moore, overseas operations manager for the 
Van Camp Seafood Company, stated that ‘‘a minimum wage of $1 per hour, as 
required under present laws, is unrealistic, unwarranted, and unquestionably 
will have a deleterious effect upon the economic and social structure of the 
islands.’’42 Van Camp did not think American Sāmoans should be compen-
sated at the same level as continental U.S. workers due to lower productivity, 
stereotypically explained by the high humidity of the tropical region.43 Con-
sequently, the company paid American Sāmoan cannery workers twenty- seven 
cents per hour. Linton Collins, legal counsel for Van Camp, also stated that 
‘‘the company has found that it takes from 3 to 5 Samoan workers to perform 
what 1 continental worker in the United States will do. It is, therefore, felt that 
this justifies a lower rate for Samoans.’’44 While Ala‘ilima wanted to protect the 
dignity and worth of native workers, the racist rhetoric of Van Camp leaders 
highlighted the prioritization of corporate profit goals and the lower valuation 
of U.S. colonial labor.
Because government officials were more concerned with losing this vital in-
dustry in the region than fair treatment of indigenous laborers, the U.S. Con-
gress chose to not raise wages. As Senator John F. Kennedy expressed in the 
final discussion of this legislation in July 1956, exclusion from the labor stan-
dards act would be “essential if the Samoan economy is to continue to oper-
ate.”45 Consequently, Van Camp successfully obtained an amendment to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act that exempted the tuna industry from paying workers in 
American Sāmoa the federal minimum wage. Such an exception from national 
work requirements highlights one major impact that colonial status has had on 
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American Sāmoans. Both the monetary and figurative values of their colonial 
labor were minimized for the benefit of the large- scale for- profit tuna industry.
Before the U.S. Congress imposed the required wage increase on American 
Sāmoa in 2007, pay rates were handled by a Special Industry Committee com-
posed of voting representatives from the canneries, the private sector, and the 
government. This committee formed as part of Van Camp’s 1956 request for an 
exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The American Sāmoa Special In-
dustry Committee met intermittently until 2007 to assess the economy “and to 
make recommendations for a sub- minimum wage in certain industries.”46 This 
group was supposed to take the specific ground- level reality of daily life in Amer-
ican Sāmoa into account when discussing possible pay rate increases, especially 
for cannery workers. Ultimately, this entity favored the profit- oriented inter-
ests of fish exports from the region over wage increases, similar to the capture 
of fishery council members discussed in chapter 1.47 Only once, in 1986 when 
employees testified to the Special Industry Committee for a pay raise, did tuna 
workers’ pay match U.S. minimum rates of $3.35 per hour.48 But the next year, 
due to the complaints lodged by the fish processing industry, wages decreased 
back to $2.82. From 1999 to 2007, tuna canning pay only increased once, from 
$3.17 to $3.26 an hour.49
In 2008, Delegate Faleomavaega felt the Special Industry Committee was 
biased and useless. In a U.S. Senate Committee hearing he stated how “the in-
dustry committee structure for American Samoa was intended to be an interim 
measure but it remained in effect until last year when it was abolished by the 
enactment of P.L. 110 – 28 [2007 wage increase legislation]. I supported its abol-
ishment because special industry committees were a sham and an insult to the 
intelligence of every hourly worker in American Samoa.”50 Congressman Faleo-
mavaega did not feel that this assessment group provided a fair evaluation of the 
economic possibilities for better treatment of fish workers in American Sāmoa. 
Instead, the needs of the tuna canneries were prioritized. In 2010, Democratic 
House representative George Miller from California also stated how “in decades 
past, the use of a special industry committee to periodically review and set the 
minimum wage in American Samoa proved ineffective, unfairly depressing wage 
levels below what was economically feasible.”51 Both politicians believed the fish 
industry could have paid higher rates over time, but the wage committee con-
sistently chose not to upset and potentially lose the business of tuna processing 
companies.52
While there was no Special Industry Committee in the Hawaiian Islands, 
the monopoly of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association during the first half 
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of the twentieth century also set the wages for the entire sugar industry in this 
colonized Pacific archipelago. Wages were standardized throughout the region 
and workers who broke their contracts, or caused trouble by trying to organize 
for higher pay, were blackballed from the industry.53
While federal officials in Washington, D.C., spoke negatively about the Spe-
cial Industry Committee, several years after the dissolution of this entity, some 
in American Sāmoa supported the reestablishment of a similar type of group. 
Territorial leaders and businesspeople interviewed in 2014 and 2015 spoke pos-
itively about this historic process that decided if a pay increase was necessary as 
well as sustainable in this unincorporated territory. Togiola Tulafono, the Amer-
ican Sāmoa governor from 2003 to 2013, stated that the industry committee was 
a good concept because it “constantly looked at the economy of American Sāmoa 
and wage increases were not something forced upon us.”54 Tulafono believed 
that if the government does not “fix structure of wages and people are fairly 
compensated” this approach can “sustain industries.”55 ASG human resources 
director Sonny Thompson also believed that an industry committee could help 
American Sāmoa “meet what we can afford.”56 He even recommended a pro-
rated increase. Private businessperson Patricia Letuli stated that the government 
should go “back to letting our own locals look at businesses and government, 
how we want to structure wage rate.”57 According to these leaders, a dedicated 
organization that takes local colonial circumstances and issues into account 
seemed to be the best solution to balance the different sides involved in pay rates.
Such rhetoric continued in 2017 with Representative Amata introducing 
legislation for the restoration of this group.58 The American Sāmoa governor 
and director of the American Samoa Department of Commerce supported this 
bill.59 As U.S. colonials, American Sāmoan leaders have historically negotiated 
a delicate balance between cooperation with fish corporations and the federal 
government, which each funded one of the two major aspects of the regional 
economy. The historic belief in, and action based on, the heavy dependence of 
the area on the tuna industry persists into the twenty- first century.
Current cannery leadership also uses the specter of increased wages as a 
reason to leave American Sāmoa. In May 2015, both canneries functioning at 
the time, StarKist and TriMarine, as well as the American Sāmoa Chamber 
of Commerce, vocalized their opposition to a 2015 wage increase. According 
to TriMarine’s chief operations officer Joe Hamby, “Tri Marine has invested 
significantly in Sāmoa Tuna Processors and increasing labor costs with a higher 
minimum wage would make the company’s already difficult job even tougher. 
We are just starting. Increasing costs will obviously have a very negative impact 
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on our young business. We simply can’t afford a wage hike.”60 In fact, a U.S. 
Department of Labor report explained that in order to replicate a similar effect 
of the American Sāmoa minimum wage increase schedule, “the U.S. minimum 
wage would need to be raised to more than $16.50 per hour.”61 This statement 
puts the enormous impact of wage increases on American Sāmoa into a conti-
nental U.S. perspective. Pay increases clearly displease the fish industry and has 
historically been accommodated by both the territorial and federal government. 
This pattern started to shift in the twenty- first century.
Various Local Perspectives
Online, a hot debate developed when the local newspaper Sāmoa News pub-
lished an article on minimum wage hikes. The imposition of Western standards 
in American Sāmoa garnered much passion and some conflicting opinions. 
In May 2015, there were fifty- seven posts by fifteen different people debating 
whether or not U.S. minimum wage standards should be applied in the region. 
The majority of the commentators believed fish canneries were exploiting work-
ers and being greedy. Tofaeono Hollywood stated how “it is about time for the 
American Samoa government officials to campaign to end exploitation of Samoa 
employees on an hourly rate of just $5.26 to increase to a humane rate as Main-
land U.S.”62 There were twenty- two other pro- minimum wage hike comments 
in addition to this one.
However, fourteen online posts worried that raising the minimum wage 
would result in the loss of this major industry and job creator. Troyboy expressed 
that “raising the minimum wage is not a job creating idea. It will be a job killer. 
It will only benefit those who are currently working. Some will probably start 
losing their jobs when employers counter with lay- offs. . . . We don’t even pay 
rent like the U.S. Our bills are not as high as the U.S and yet we want to make 
the same money Americans are making?”63 While not all of the people posting 
about business considerations were against fair wages, this particular group of 
commentators believed that maintaining low wages was part of rational corpo-
rate decision making and realistic economic policies for the ground- level situ-
ation in American Sāmoa. Such concepts were grounded in Western concepts 
about business.
Several posts also discussed the lower cost of living in American Sāmoa com-
pared to the continental United States. Troyboy’s statement about not paying 
rent refers to the fact that all land in the region is owned by American Sāmoans. 
According to Representative Amata, “in American Sāmoa, the cost of living is 
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drastically different. Due to how the lands are owned and managed in American 
Sāmoa there’s actually no such thing as rent or mortgage items that often com-
prise up to one half of a person’s monthly expenses. Because our people do not 
have an expense for housing, $4.76 an hour goes much further than it would here 
in the States.”64 While cash wages are needed to pay for electricity and imported 
items, families in American Sāmoa can survive without such conveniences and 
live off ‘āiga land. One U.S. dollar in American Sāmoa can be stretched further 
in an extended clan system that has access to communal sharing and sustainabil-
ity through plantation farming and sea life gathering than the average family 
household in the continental United States.
These indigenous factors were some of the reasons Representative Amata ex-
pressed how “the playing fields in the United States and American Sāmoa are 
too drastically different to place on the same wage scale. And to keep American 
Sāmoa tied to the current standard is dangerous and irresponsible.”65 Daily life 
in American Sāmoa is quite different from the continental United States. Im-
posing Western criteria on this region ignores the reality of native lifestyles in 
the area. Representative Amata’s comment also reiterated the constant fear of 
some in American Sāmoa that an incommensurate increase in wages could drive 
away the fish canneries.
Another commentator in the online Sāmoa News debate suggested the devel-
opment of a survey that would “ask all the people that work there [canneries] as 
well as all the minimum wage earners at the government and other private busi-
nesses. See what they have to say. Compare the results from each entity. After 
all, this is about them.”66 This post received two comments. Steve agreed that “a 
scientific study like you mentioned is the way to go. People on this blog probably 
do not represent the majority. Come to think of it I always earned above min-
imum wage even in High School and college.”67 In contrast to this positive re-
sponse, the controversial and heated nature of this issue came out when another 
commentator Niuveve responded by saying, “Not about stupid surveys- follow 
the law of the land. . . . I make choices for the people- feel better. Don’t go away 
mad — just go away.”68 This post highlighted the frustration some in American 
Sāmoa feel at the constant use of Western- style surveys, reports, consultants, and 
paperwork (particularly by the government) to address problems in the region. 
Scientific and sociological studies have frequently been conducted in the islands, 
taking up the time and resources of the local community. But direct action rarely 
developed from these efforts.
Scholar James C. Scott discussed how government observation and catego-
rization of native peoples ultimately helps political leaders wield control over a 
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community.69 In the case of American Sāmoa, information gathering and re-
search could placate the public by identifying problems and demonstrating a 
desire to investigate issues, as well as provide education and awareness to the 
people. However, this gathered knowledge has often not resulted in massive 
changes in government policy or direction. Some would prefer outside surveyors 
just leave and not return. Information gathering in American Sāmoa is discussed 
more in chapter 4.
Niuveve’s post also highlights how some in American Sāmoa prioritize in-
digenous cultural values and practices over Western knowledge making and 
logic. This commentator’s focus on “the law of the land” directly references con-
ventional Sāmoan political and social structures where people in the community 
take care of one another in times of need, part of vā and fa‘a Sāmoa. According 
to Karen Armstrong, David Herdrich, and Arielle Levine, “The basic units of 
Sāmoan social structure were (and are) the family and village. Unlike Western 
society, the family was the central unit rather than the individual, and unlike 
Western capitalist society, the emphasis was on reciprocity rather than indi-
vidual accumulation. . . . The generous distribution of food marked — and still 
marks — every occasion, and from the 19th century into the early 20th century, fish 
and marine produce were central items in the circulating baskets of food.”70 Due 
to strong ‘āiga ties in American Sāmoa, no one should go hungry or be homeless.
Researcher Felix Kessing also stated that “high virtues are to be polite, kind 
and generous to relatives, friends and dependents. . . . prestige comes through 
generous distribution, not accumulation, of wealth.”71 Such expectations of reci-
procity, or vā among community members are fundamental to Sāmoan culture 
and native views on providing appropriate support for their families. Under 
these same principles of fa‘a Sāmoa, employers should also treat Sāmoan work-
ers in a caring and compassionate way. So whether in the 1950s or the 2010s, pay 
rates that support one’s family in exchange for labor have always been a point of 
concern between indigenous peoples and tuna canneries in American Sāmoa.
While most people interviewed for this project recognized the need to find 
other industries to support the local economy, some believed tuna canning was 
the best industry for what they viewed as an isolated region in the Pacific. Ac-
cording to the ASG director of Human and Social Resources and former can-
nery employee Taeaoafua Dr. Meki Solomona, “Canneries are a viable economic 
asset that needs to be retained. . . . American Sāmoa does not have a lot to offer, 
but we have tons of fish. How to maximize that opportunity for our people[?]. . . . 
I’d rather keep what’s here and work on it than bring other” industries in.72 
Representative Amata further stated that “the tuna canning industry is all we 
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have. There’s no Coca Cola or IBM. We have no Silicon Valley there to pro-
vide massive revenue and employment opportunity to the territory. There aren’t 
numerous military and government facilities that provide sources of economic 
growth. We are not surrounded by fellow states that enable us to expand to other 
markets. All we have is the tuna industry and we are grateful.”73 While Ameri-
can Sāmoan politicians easily spoke out against the imposition of the Western 
Pacific Regional Fishery Council and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) on indigenous fishing rights in chapter 1, a deferential and dependent 
tone represents the dominant perspective of several American Sāmoan political 
leaders towards the corporate tuna industry.
If the economics of American Sāmoa were more similar to that of American 
states, minimum wage might be more sustainable or have less of a detrimental 
impact. But that is not the case in the unincorporated territory of American 
Sāmoa. These leaders believed concentrated efforts were needed to maintain the 
tuna industry in the islands. As discussed in chapter 1, fishing and subsistence 
from the local ocean were already parts of Sāmoan culture, making canning a 
logical business for this particular location.
Some in American Sāmoa believed the application of minimum wage in-
creases was a prime example of the region being unfairly treated like a full- fledged 
state of the union. In August 2015, the American Sāmoa Commerce Depart-
ment identified $5.67 as the minimum wage needed for a family of six to live in 
the territory.74 This amount was $1.58 less than the final amount targeted by the 
federal wage hike legislation, but also fifty- one cents lower than the territorial 
minimum wage in 2017.
In addition to different standards of living on island, Letuli stated continen-
tal “minimum wage is not fair to this island” because the rate was not compatible 
to other Pacific Islander nations.75 For example, minimum wage in neighboring 
Independent Sāmoa was the U.S. equivalent of fifty cents while nearby Fiji’s 
basic wage was about ninety- one U.S. cents an hour. There was no minimum 
wage in Tonga. Workers in American Sāmoa earned considerably more than 
laborers in comparable positions on adjacent island nations. In that context, 
some American Sāmoa leaders thought that the fairest thing to do, in terms 
of overall Pacific Islander labor relations, involved keeping jobs in the region 
instead of driving the fish industry away from American Sāmoa. Due to these 
circumstances, Solomona stated how “in Seattle 15 cents might make sense. No 
way that 10 to 15 cent raises is manageable in American Sāmoa. Please allow us 
to make those decisions to maintain these huge companies.”76 Solomona did 
not support matching continental U.S. rates because the leveling of pay did not 
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take the economic realities of the unincorporated territory of American Sāmoa 
into account.
Only one of five commentators to the Sāmoa News article about the impact of 
the 2015 wage hikes in American Sāmoa discussed how the pay increase was un-
necessary due to the lower cost of living in American Sāmoa. Joe Taeao claimed 
that “technically, this minimum wage increase is hogwash. Our minimum wage 
in American Samoa should factor in surrounding island nations. Since we im-
port most of our goods; with many produced in China; our issue is not inflation 
and increase in cost of living but more towards people wanting higher wages.”77 
While Taeao also pushed for diversification of industries in American Sāmoa, he 
did not believe a blanket application of the continental U.S. standard of living 
was appropriate in the region.
In contrast, the other four commentators on the site expressed that “those 
who own the canneries ARE NOT WILLING TO MEET THE DEMANDS 
OF THE MINIMUM WAGE HIKE. Their bottom- line is the number one 
concern and they will not give in to the notion of paying higher wages. They 
are in American Samoa to make money — period. . . . Since the 1950s this in-
dustry has taken over $60 billion worth of fish from our oceans and they have 
NEVER PAID LIVING WAGES to their workers”78 Pomasame and other 
commentators bemoaned the exploitation of native people and the greediness 
of the tuna industry.
Just like the Large- Vessel Prohibited Area debate discussed in chapter 1, 
American Sāmoans have a diversity of opinions about the minimum wage issue. 
Individuals, regardless of their position, willingly expressed their dissatisfaction 
with U.S. federal actions that did not take their ground- level indigenous and 
colonial reality into account. While some understood Western- style logics for 
business function and profitability, others emphasized the particularities of daily 
life in American Sāmoa from a native perspective.
Worker Experiences
While many acknowledge the economic benefits of the tuna industry, no one 
denies the arduous nature of work in the factories. Tuna canning is an extremely 
labor- intensive process. First, frozen fish are off- loaded from large purse seiner 
ships or longline vessels at the dock. Unloaders hunch over the fish onboard 
with machete- type instruments, chucking and sorting the frozen products into 
metal bins below according to size. Once separated, the fish go through an initial 
cleaning process, basically the manual removal of the head and the tail. These 
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fish are then wheeled by hand into a cold storage freezer until the canning line is 
ready for that particular species. Once the type of fish to be canned for the shift 
is determined (like albacore, wahoo, yellowfin, skipjack, or bigeye), the appropri-
ate bins are removed by workers from cold storage and thawed out, or precooked, 
by traveling through a semi- automated line of hot water baths or steam cham-
bers. The softened fish are then mechanically transported to the fish processing 
floor, an expansive warehouse room where rectangular tables are set up in long 
rows. Women standing on their feet for eight- hour shifts at a time remove fish 
scales and skin, as well as debone the fish, all by hand. The cleaned fish are then 
tossed by the laborers onto a conveyor belt that transports the fillets down the 
line to be canned, either as solid tuna or through the chopper into chunk tuna. 
In American Sāmoa, drivers forklift canisters from the container- making fac-
tory across the street. When put into the canning line, these metal cylinders first 
go through a heated sanitation step, then get mechanically filled with fish. Oil 
or water, depending on the type of tuna being processed, is subsequently added. 
Then a machine seals the lid onto the can. The canisters are heated to sanitize 
the containers one more time and finish cooking the fish. Then the products go 
through the automated labeler and are stacked onto pallets that are manually 
shrink wrapped for transport and loaded by workers into shipping containers 
bound for the United States and beyond. Cannery work is physically demand-
ing, repetitive, dangerous, smelly, and exhausting.
On average, with one hundred people on a line, a facility can produce three 
hundred to six hundred containers a minute, which amounts to about 540,000 
canisters per day, or almost six shipping containers a day.79 At the peak of tuna 
canning in 2005, the industry exported $446,382,000 in processed fish.80 This 
amount was 98 percent of all total exported goods from American Sāmoa. While 
the market share of global tuna supply from American Sāmoa has declined since 
the wage increases of 2007, this region’s economic dependence on this industry 
continues through 2016.81
The canning process for salmon is similar to tuna. However, the Alaskan 
salmon industry used the laborsaving device the “Iron Chink” to mechanically 
cut the tail and heads off fish. While early supporters of this technology believed 
the machine resulted in the replacement (hence cost savings) of ten to twenty 
workers, hand cleaning always results in the least amount of fish waste. A com-
bination of hand and mechanized cleaning developed from the 1920s, enabled by 
the homogenous size of fish from salmon runs.82 Despite such a technological in-
novation in seafood processing, canneries in American Sāmoa continued to use 
manual labor since wages were low, hand cleaning resulted in more fish product 
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to can, and tuna fish sizes were more variable. Regardless of these differences in 
tuna and salmon industry automation, cannery work was always laborious and 
involved some level of intense manual work.
The monocrop agriculture of sugar cane cultivation in the colonized space of 
Hawai‘i was also physically difficult, requiring hard manual labor all day in the 
dusty fields of volcanic soil, prickly cane stalks, and the hot sun. In the colonized 
Hawaiian Islands, heavy industrial exploitation of workers occurred through 
the post – World War II period, when laborers finally surmounted race- based 
divisions created by the sugar industry and unionized across race and ethnic-
ity.83 Such labor organizing for higher wages, the transition of Hawai‘i from a 
U.S. territory to a state of the union, and a growing sugar beet industry in the 
continental United States all contributed to the decline of the sugar industry in 
this Pacific archipelago.84
While the idea of higher wages initially seemed attractive to cannery work-
ers in American Sāmoa, the constant fear over losing their jobs eventually 
convinced laborers to not support further wage increases. According to Brett 
Butler, general manager for the StarKist Sāmoa cannery from 2005 to 2014, 85 
percent of StarKist Sāmoa’s workforce in the twenty- first century came from 
Independent Sāmoa.85 This distribution was similar for the other cannery in 
the territory. All foreign workers must be sponsored by an American Sāmoan, 
typically an extended family member who sometimes garnishes part of the indi-
vidual’s wages or expects additional free domestic assistance in the home, such 
as cooking and cleaning. Some of these laborers have very little education and 
few economic options. Hourly workers get paid every week at a much higher rate 
than wages in their home region. According to Solomona, “now a good number 
of those are from outside, they come here for opportunities. Minimum wage, 
American money... jobs for people who never gone to school to those with a 
Ph.D. in science... opportunity for everyone, not everyone seeks college degrees. 
If [they] flunk out of high school, they can work as long as they are 18 years old.”86 
As non- indigenous laborers with temporary status in the region, these workers 
have chosen not to make a fuss over raising the minimum wage in exchange for a 
steady job and a relatively good income over the years for this region of the world.
According to a Sāmoa News article, “in the 1970s, a union was formed at 
Samoa Packing, however, its existence was short- lived reportedly because of dif-
ficulties in collecting membership dues from members.” 87 Teamsters also tried 
to organize cannery workers in 1984, 1985, 1993, and 1994 but failed each time. 
Cannery leadership usually held meetings the day or night before workforce 
voting on unionization to remind laborers about the financial burden of union 
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fees. Since pay was already low, the thought of regularly giving away a portion of 
their small paycheck deterred many workers from joining year aer year.
However, as a result of these campaigns the sh industry usually increased 
social welfare benets at the factory. For example, aer unionization eorts 
in 1994, StarKist oered “paid vacation for employees calculated on years of 
services and hours at work and life insurance that provides for families of em-
ployees who die from work related accidents to receive up to $10,000. There is 
also a funeral benet entitling employees to receive $350.00, ten cases of wahoo 
and two large sh, when a member of their immediate family dies. In addition, 
StarKist Sāmoa operates a pension plan fully funded by the company which 
retiring employees benet from.”88 Scholars have examined the role industrial 
welfare programs play in maintaining worker loyalty and diusing labor pro-
tests or unionization without drastically improving wages or the work environ-
ment.89 Similarly in American Sāmoa, these gestures, both big and small, were 
oen greatly appreciated by workers as employer recognition of and assistance in 
maintaining vā and fa‘a Sāmoa. Subsidies that acknowledged cultural and family 
obligations to provide money, food, and time o for special occasions (such as 
funerals) eectively raised laborer satisfaction, deected organizing eorts, and 
reduced demands for pay increases.
Figure 2.02. StarKist employees returning to work. 
 (Photo by Samoa News/Ausage Fausia.)
 Colonial Minimum Wage Issues  77 
By 2014, workers surveyed by the federal government accounting office “gen-
erally opposed further minimum wage increases, expressing concerns that any 
increase would result in lost jobs or a complete closure of Star- Kist.”90 The reality 
of downsizing and the reduction of hours, as well as the constant threat of can-
nery transfer to a cheaper labor location persuaded workers to accept current, 
stable pay rates, a familiar scenario of economic intimidation historically used by 
corporations worldwide. In 2015, StarKist employee Line Tauatama stated that 
“we want the minimum wage to come but when we think of the one economy 
we have here that we might as well save what we’ve got right now to feed our 
families, put food on the table and do all such things. I will take whatever it’s 
gonna take.”91 A steady job to provide for one’s family has always been priority 
for workers over increasing wages in American Sāmoa. Employer acknowledg-
ment of vā fealoa‘ i (social respect) obligations and accommodations to meet the 
cultural expectations of fa‘a Sāmoa also made the dirty job good enough.
Recent Legislation
After the first three wage hikes from 2007 to 2009, the U.S. Congress agreed 
to delay further increases from 2009 to 2011 for both American Sāmoa and the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands due to the increased unem-
ployment that occurred since pay changes were implemented. By 2009, Amer-
ican Sāmoa employment was down 17 percent and jobs in the Marianas were 
down 24 percent.92 According to Representative Doc Hastings of Washington 
State, who led the Republican efforts for this legislation in the House, “the Dem-
ocrat Congress voted to pass a minimum- wage increase for these territories in 
2007, and therefore, it was only appropriate that they vote again to fix it. . . . In 
doing so, Democrats were admitting that they were wrong to impose this policy 
that cost real people their jobs.”93 Even though Hastings referenced the negative 
impact that wage hikes had on workers in these island territories, the overall 
tone of his comments focused more on exposing the failure of Democratic legis-
lation and Congressional party politics than the needs and issues facing peoples 
of the Pacific.
In 2011, the U.S. Congress passed the Insular Areas Act that modified the 
minimum wage increase in American Sāmoa from a yearly basis to a triennial 
basis and halted any pay hikes from 2012 to 2014.94 This act also stopped any 
wage increases between 2012 and 2014. Representative Miller from California 
stated that “precisely because American Samoa has a unique, isolated, and rela-
tively undiversified economy and because the path to the full federal minimum 
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wage for this territory is a necessarily long one, Congress must be flexible over 
time with the minimum wage schedule in response to changing economic con-
ditions. Congress must also maintain the clear requirement that the minimum 
wage in American Samoa be on a schedule to reach Mainland levels.”95 This 
American politician understood the specificities of American Sāmoa while also 
maintaining the desire to eventually raise wages in the region.
The Insular Areas Act also gave the Department of Energy the ability to 
monitor the stability of a toxic waste facility on Runit Island in the Marshall 
Islands, currently a sovereign nation subject to U.S. security and defense mea-
sures.96 The joining of military refuse and labor policies into one overall piece of 
legislation for liminal Pacific islands demonstrates how national security issues 
rank just as high, if not higher than labor topics for the U.S. federal govern-
ment in colonized spaces of the Pacific in the twenty- first century. Since 9/11, 
Congress tightened authority over native- controlled immigration policies in the 
Northern Marianas “to assure proper border control in the post – September 11 
security environment.”97 With the threat of North Korean nuclear testing near 
Guam in 2017, the historic and current strategic military and geopolitical posi-
tionality of these U.S.- controlled archipelagos also comes to light.
Delegate Faleomavaega stated that, “I take no happiness in the successful 
passage of this bill because I still stand for fair wages for American Samoa’s 
workers. . . . So between now and 2015, it will be up to the American Samoa 
government and our corporate partners, including StarKist and Tri- Marine, to 
find new ways of succeeding without further compromising the wages of our 
fish cleaners because I cannot promise that I will support any more delays after 
this.”98 Again, the tension between giving workers fair compensation and main-
taining the main nongovernment industry in the islands surfaced in Faleoma-
vaega’s comments. Local leaders are trying to find a balance between the needs 
on both sides of this issue in the colonially controlled and regulated space of 
American Sāmoa. Ultimately, these U.S. colonials have been and continue to be 
subject to the whims and desires of the U.S. Congress.
With the pay increase delays ending on September 30, 2015, Representative 
Amata introduced three different bills to address the minimum wage issue in 
American Sāmoa. One proposal would have allowed the American Sāmoa Gov-
ernment to make future decisions on pay hikes. The second proposal requested 
another delay to wage increases. The third bill stated any future pay increase 
decisions would be based on government reports that investigated the impact of 
raises on the region. Eventually legislation was amended and passed to reduce 
the annual American Sāmoan minimum wage increase from fifty cents to forty 
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cents. Georgia Senator Johnny Isakson pushed for this rate due to the larger 
political economic interests of his constituents.
After closing its operations in American Sāmoa in 2009, Chicken of the Sea 
moved the final step of its tuna processing procedure to Lyons, Georgia. At this 
location, Chicken of the Sea employed a much smaller number of skilled workers 
to operate high- tech canning machinery and still label their product as “Made 
in the USA.” Two hundred people in Georgia are paid fair wages to engage in 
the final stage of packaging fish. However, that same fish were initially cleaned 
and processed by low- wage workers in Southeast Asia, who are paid less than 
a dollar an hour, versus the total 2,147 former employees in American Sāmoa 
who previously took care of the entire process for below continental U.S. mini-
mum wage.99 Consequently, politicians from Georgia have a strong motivation 
to continue the increases in American Sāmoa wage rates, keep tuna canning out 
of this Pacific region, and secure their state’s foothold in the final stage of fish 
processing for Chicken of the Sea.
According to Delegate Amata, “this new interest from the Georgia delega-
tion translates to a tougher fight on any tuna canning issue in the future.”100 
This statement was reinforced when, after the forty- cent increase was passed, a 
spokesperson for Senator Isakson said “the artificially lower wages in American 
Samoa — well below the federal minimum wage level of $7.25 per hour — provide 
employers in the territory a competitive advantage over Georgia job creators.”101 
Even though the Georgia senator succeeded in increasing the American Sāmoa 
minimum wage for the first time since 2008 to $5.16 an hour, his representative 
still focused on the unfair benefit that the lower wage rates provided for colo-
nial laborers in this unincorporated Pacific region over continental workers. As 
seen in chapter 1, state politics related to U.S. citizen job protection within the 
fish industry came into play in Congressional actions in American Sāmoa. In 
the mid- 1970s, the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act was primar-
ily passed by Congress as a jobs bill. In the early twenty- first century, jobs for 
full- fledged U.S. citizens, not the needs and interests of U.S. colonial American 
Sāmoans, were a critical component to stateside debates over minimum wage 
hikes in this colonized Pacific region.
While Delegate Amata was glad that workers in American Sāmoa received a 
wage increase, she remained “concerned regarding the long- term stability of the 
canning industry on the island, as this increase, while welcomed for the people, 
will place an even greater strain on our local industry, which is already under 
attack from all sides.”102 In principle, Amata and others might back minimum 
wage increases. However, in practice most in the region understand that wage 
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hikes could ultimately push away the tuna industry and result in higher unem-
ployment in American Sāmoa.
According to the American Sāmoa governor’s executive assistant Iulogologo 
Joseph Pereira, “the Governor walks a fine line in trying to strike a balance be-
tween the survival of the canneries and the survival of our people. We can’t give 
up the fight because our people’s lives are at stake.”103 Higher pay for workers is 
a positive. But such increases come with larger economic consequences for the 
fish industry in the region. This economic versus ethical dilemma directly stems 
from the liminal colonial status of American Sāmoans in relation to the U.S. 
government.
The continued debate and discussion over minimum wage in American 
Sāmoa has been compounded by the general push to raise the minimum wage 
in states of the union.104 In general, Republicans have not supported this move, 
while Democrats have spearheaded efforts for a living wage. In 2010, North Car-
olina Republican representative Patrick T. McHenry expressed how “we said 
this increase would be harmful in 2007, and the Democrats did it anyway. . . . 
It proves our point that the federal government setting wage rates is destructive 
to job creation, whether it’s in American Samoa or western North Carolina.”105 
The failure of minimum wage increases to improve the lives of Pacific Islanders 
in U.S. territories bolstered Republican rhetoric against higher pay, especially 
when Delegate Amata stated that “while well intended, the Fair Minimum 
Wage Standards Act has placed the economic well- being of American Sāmoa 
in great jeopardy.” The increase “would surely be the proverbial nail in the cof-
fin for the local economy.”106 With U.S. colonial politicians themselves fighting 
against pay hikes, Republican efforts to block minimum wage increases on the 
continent were reinforced.
Overall, the application of national pay standards due to federal party politics 
since 2007 has had a generally detrimental effect on the local island economy. 
Since wage increases began in 2009, cannery employment has gone down by 
almost 50 percent. In reaction to the second forty- cent increase in two years, the 
Samoa Tuna Processors plant closed its canning operations on December 16, 
2016, only eighteen months after opening and resulting in the loss of seven hun-
dred jobs. In June 2017, Representative Amata proposed another bill in Congress 
to halt the next pay increase scheduled for the end of the year, keep minimum 
wage at $5.16, and revert back to the Special Industry Committee to make future 
wage hike decisions. Congress took no action on this bill and the next forty- cent 
wage increase occurred on September 30, 2018.
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Online discussions continued among a handful of commentators about pay-
ing workers fairly, the failure of the local government to make change, as well as 
the fear of losing the fish industry.107 Cannery workers still expressed a desire for 
higher wages, but also did not want to risk losing their jobs.108 Common themes 
of local needs being ignored by the federal government and the burdens of this 
demanding fish industry on native peoples ran through all of these perspectives. 
Colonial status and control have historically and contemporarily subjected 
American Sāmoans to this wage labor quandary.
American Sāmoa leaders have also been consistently frustrated with the lack 
of consideration from U.S. politicians for the particularities of this unincorpo-
rated Pacific territory. Governor’s assistant Pereira stated in 2015 that the “expec-
tations of our fears of economic gloom and doom have eventuated. We have been 
vociferous in our attempts to articulate over the years the consequences that will 
result if the competitive advantage of the two canneries was to be eroded.”109 Tri-
Marine’s Hamby also stated that “if the voices of the American Samoan people 
aren’t being heard by NMFS regulators and policy makers in Washington, DC 
the future of American Samoan’s tuna dependent economy looks bleak.”110 All 
of these voices express anxiety over the liminal status of American Sāmoans in 
relation to U.S. programs, a direct impact of being regulated and controlled as 
U.S. colonials. At what point, if any, will or should the economic stability of 
American Sāmoa, or the wishes of the American Sāmoan people, take precedent 
over federal minimum wage hikes?
In the post – World War II era, this unincorporated territory of the United 
States transitioned from subsistence livelihoods to a cash- based economy fo-
cused on the single export of tuna and headed down a road of accommodating 
the corporate fish industry to make ends meet. Tuna canneries have historically 
threated to leave in the face of pay increases. While two canneries have closed in 
the twenty- first century, one facility has been stable since the 1960s. In a global 
market where the canning of fish at the cheapest price and maintaining a major 
source of Gross Domestic Product matters more than paying humans a judicious 
wage, the demands and economic priorities of United States and world consum-
ers and businesses take precedent over the welfare of cannery workers.
It is true that the cost of living in American Sāmoa is not as high as the United 
States. The same wage standards are not necessarily logical from an empirical 
perspective. However, some increases are reasonable. Issues of dependency on a 
single- market economy and U.S. federal funding, as well as federal party politics 
and corporate interests heavily influence the development of these policies in 
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the liminal economically colonized space of American Sāmoa. Therefore, the 
minimum wage issue, like many other local versus federal matters discussed in 
this book, is complicated and difficult to work through. Multiple indigenous 
and American perspectives exist as part of this bioregion, or totality of ecological 
and cultural relationships.
These often invisible strains of colonial rule, such as differential pay rates for 
cannery workers, are important and central policies in the lives of American 
Sāmoans, as well as those living in the continental United States and beyond. As 
long as American Sāmoa remains a colonized region of America, these questions 
are not going to disappear. Instead, such tensions must be discussed and dealt 
with in an open and direct way moving forward. The next chapter discusses 
another example of the complicated intersections of federal policies and native 
expectations of vā fealoa‘ i through the creation and expansion of the National 
Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa. In all of these cases, historical and con-
temporary searches for appropriate and workable balances between and among 
indigenous and colonial relations occurs.
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 Ch a pter 3
The Devolution of Marine Sanctuary  
Development in American Sāmoa
In 1982, the American Sāmoa Government (ASG) initiated eorts to protect 
a bay on Tutuila as part of the U.S. national marine sanctuary system. When 
Fagatele Bay became a protected zone in 1986, the region was the smallest under-
water federal sanctuary in the entire program, one- fourth of a square mile over-
seen by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Of-
ce of National Marine Sanctuaries (ONMS). In 2012, the sanctuary expanded 
to six total areas covering 13,581 square miles. Now the largest but lesser known 
of the fourteen protected regions across U.S. jurisdiction, the National Marine 
Sanctuary of American Sāmoa is considered by the U.S. government to be the 
most remote underwater government preserve, the most diverse sanctuary in 
terms of marine life, and the only true tropical reef in the federal system. While 
the establishment of a national marine sanctuary in American Sāmoa was initi-
ated by the ASG in the 1980s, not all American Sāmoans supported sanctuary 
expansion in 2012.
Multiple interests exist in the twenty- rst century over ocean use within this 
national marine sanctuary (NMS). Some focus on the value of preserving these 
waters for scientic research and the long- term health of local and global ecosys-
tems. Others feel the use of and control over this vital marine area should have 
remained under the control of the local community. Themes of imposed U.S. 
ideas and expectations, as well as the need to acknowledge Sāmoan traditional 
culture both came into play with the development and controversies over the 
national marine sanctuary in American Sāmoa. But just like the Large Vessel 
Prohibited Area (LVPA) examined in chapter 1, minimum wage explored in 
chapter 2, and national grant funding that will be discussed in chapter 4, overall 
federal management in this region is a consequence of being U.S. colonials. Liv-
ing in an unincorporated territory of the United States means that these wards 
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have historically and are currently subject to and ultimately controlled by the 
rulings of bureaucratic institutions in Washington, D.C.
However, as U.S. colonials, American Sāmoans can also take unique advan-
tage of federal programs. This indigenous group successfully lobbied to protect 
their ocean resources through the marine sanctuary system and ended up shap-
ing U.S. environmental policy. But once these waters became part of this na-
tional agency, activities and people within this ecosystem became indenitely 
beholden to specic U.S. government mandates and requirements. As historian 
Mark David Spence has claimed about American Indians and the creation of 
national parks, “wilderness preservation went hand in hand with native dispos-
session.”1 The permanent nature of the National Marine Sanctuary of Ameri-
can Sāmoa reects a similar connection between U.S. conservation and loss of 
indigenous control over lands and waters.
This chapter highlights the impact that U.S. colonial native groups have had 
on the national marine sanctuary system, both through their active support and 
later their vocal protests of ecological initiatives. While the creation of feder-
ally protected waters initially aligned with indigenous customs and mores, such 
as vā fealoa‘ i (social respect), the later phase of expansion utilized a top- down 
approach that resulted in a storm of debates and lack of wide community sup-
port. Over time, national marine sanctuary development in American Sāmoa 
devolved from a collaborative decision- making process to a detached bureaucra-
tized and dispossessive procedure disdained by many in the local community.
Figure 3.02. Fagatele Bay. (Photo by Joseph Paulin.)
86  chapter 3 
Establishment of the Sanctuary
The establishment of the marine sanctuary area in American Sāmoa demon-
strated one way that U.S. colonials could use their dependent status with the 
United States to advance their own environmental management concerns. In 
March 1982, American Sāmoa governor Peter T. Coleman drafted a proposal 
for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to nom-
inate Fagatele Bay as a candidate for marine sanctuary designation. Coleman 
encouraged the creation of this protected area to safeguard and preserve the 
bay’s natural resources and pristine character, to expand public and scientific 
awareness and understanding of marine ecosystems in the Pacific, and to allow 
environmentally conscious subsistence and public recreational uses of the bay.2 
As Spence has explained, wilderness has historically been seen “as scenic play-
ground. . . . a symbol, and sacred remnant of God’s original handiwork,” and 
“outdoor enthusiasts viewed wilderness as an uninhabited Eden that should 
be set aside for the benefit and pleasure of vacationing Americans.”3 Coleman 
used such American ideas about nature and conservation that started in the late 
nineteenth century to present his case for a sanctuary in the most legible and 
acceptable rhetoric for the U.S. federal government system.
One major reason a territorial campaign developed to protect Fagatele Bay 
stemmed from the devastation of local reefs by attacks from the coral- eating 
crown- of- thorns starfish (Acanthaster planci) from 1978 to 1979.4 According to 
the National Ocean Service, land- based pollution and runoff of nutrients like 
nitrogen and phosphorus cause most crown- of- thorns outbreaks.5 During this 
time period, American Sāmoa engaged in a massive public works project to build 
roads on Tutuila.
By April 1982, scientific researchers found that “most of the former living 
coral colonies were dead. . . . [and] Coral coverage . . . has been reduced to 1.7 
percent from a previous estimate of 70 to 90 percent in 1979.”6 Such reef de-
struction resulted in the native push for a marine sanctuary. According to Bill 
Thomas, former research director of the Fagatele National Marine Sanctuary 
program, the American Sāmoa “sanctuary started as an in situ lab for crown of 
thorns recovery” and was supported by a lot of local leaders at the time.7 Fagatele 
served as a case study area to see how long coral would take to recoup from this 
predatory starfish.
The designation of this bay as a national marine sanctuary followed a typical 
federal bureaucratic process of mandated announcements, community meet-
ings, and planning reports. In April 1982, Fagatele Bay was placed on the List of 
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Recommended Areas to come under federal protection. In May, an Issue Paper 
was prepared and a public workshop was held in American Sāmoa to obtain 
community responses to the sanctuary proposal. From that workshop and other 
meetings with American Sāmoa ocials and federal agencies, Fagatele became 
an Active Candidate for sanctuary status in August 1982. A dra management 
plan and environmental impact statement was then created and distributed on 
October 27, 1983. A public hearing in American Sāmoa was held for the plan 
on January 18, 1984. Of the thirteen comments received, seven individuals sup-
ported the sanctuary proposal, as well as expressed concern over the enforcement 
of sanctuary regulations.8 In response, NOAA stated that assistance from the 
American Sāmoa Government and public education of rules would be sucient 
to handle violations in federally protected waters.
Another major set of comments from the public hearing centered on the 
proposed sanctuary boundary. Community members asked NOAA to “allow 
commercial shing in the outer portion of the bay. Over the years, this area 
has been used as a refuge from rough seas and a shing ground while waiting 
for the heavy seas to pass.”9 Due to this local sentiment, the next dra of the 
management plan separated the sanctuary boundary into zones and permitted 
commercial shing in the outside half of the bay. This adjustment to the rules 
Figure 3.03. Crown- of- thorns starsh injection. (Photo by Greg McFall — NOAA.)
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became a typical accommodation that the Office of National Marine Sanctu-
aries provided to the people of American Sāmoa throughout the history of this 
sanctuary. NOAA recognized “the importance of fishing to the Samoan way 
of life and the multi- use aspects of the sanctuary. . . . After careful evaluation 
of this potential sanctuary, NOAA has concluded that a tiered structure that 
would allow commercial fishing in the outer portions of the bay could benefit 
both the sanctuary and users of the sanctuary.”10 Indigenous fishing practices 
usually received acknowledgment and permission in federally protected waters, 
as long as the angling was not significantly detrimental to marine preservation 
and conservation efforts. In the case of Fagatele, fishing in the outer bay was 
deemed non- impactful to inner reef protection.
Other feedback to the draft management plan stated that existing local and 
federal agencies already worked to protect marine resources in the area. One 
commentator expressed how “a marine sanctuary would only add an unneces-
sary and expensive layer of Federal bureaucracy.”11 As an unincorporated ter-
ritory of the United States, the waters surrounding American Sāmoa involve 
multiple levels of jurisdiction including the local Department of Marine and 
Wildlife Resources (DMWR) and NOAA Fisheries, as discussed in chapter 1. 
The addition of a marine sanctuary would increase the amount of regulations 
and oversight for waters that already had government stewards. Others also be-
lieved traditional indigenous ocean management systems already protected and 
controlled water use sufficiently.
NOAA addressed these concerns by explaining that a national marine sanc-
tuary would provide a comprehensive supervisory structure that specifically 
focused on this important marine site. NOAA believed overarching adminis-
tration by the Office of National Marine Sanctuaries could better direct both 
research and explicit conservation efforts for the short- and long- term health of 
the bay. As historian Karl Jacoby stated, “Concentrating decision making in 
the hands of a few highly trained officials ensured that natural resources were 
administered in the most enlightened manner possible.”12 Such a belief in the 
superiority of government management was typical of U.S. federal conservation 
since the nineteenth century, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
Additional respondents worried that greater federal authority in the region 
would infringe upon traditional Sāmoan lifestyles. NOAA responded by stating 
the agency “has continually maintained that ‘Fa‘a Samoa,’ the Samoan way, will 
be of utmost consideration during the evaluation process. It is recognized that 
strong cultural ties are reflected in daily life in American Samoa. NOAA will do 
its utmost in assuring that the Samoan way of life, as it pertains to the sanctuary, 
 Devolution of Marine Sanctuary Development  89 
is maintained and incorporated into sanctuary management.”13 On their web-
site, the National Marine Sanctuary of American Samoa explains fa‘a samoa as 
placing “great importance on the dignity and achievements of the group rather 
than on individual achievements. The traditional communal lifestyle revolves 
around the aiga, or family. Aiga are headed by leading matai (chief) or Sa‘o, who 
manage the communal economy, protect and distribute family lands, are respon-
sible for the welfare of all in their aiga, and represent the family in councils.”14 
NOAA believed the best way to respect fa‘a samoa (Sāmoan customs and tradi-
tions) was to request feedback from the American Sāmoa government, village 
chiefs, and other local groups.
However, to fully include indigenous social and political structures in the 
running of the sanctuary, policies also needed to engage in the typical native 
decision- making process that involves meeting with each major segment of the 
village, presenting proposals to the village council, and allowing the high chief 
to make the final decision for the community. Thomas expressed how American 
Sāmoa was the “first sanctuary to take into account traditional management sys-
tems.”15 While Western- style public awareness and feedback- collecting meetings 
can help develop community support for federal programs based on national 
government standards, active use of indigenous communication methods and 
attention to proper vā (social relations) should be included for any government 
initiative to succeed in American Sāmoa. A lack of in- depth village participa-
tion in the planning process became an issue when sanctuary expansion was 
discussed twenty- three years later in 2009.
The revised version of the Fagatele Bay sanctuary management plan was pub-
lished on December 4, 1984, and comments were accepted until February 4, 
1985. In the final plan, published in June 1984, collaboration between local and 
federal agencies, increased research, and public information became the main 
priorities of the federally protected area. Due to feedback requesting more local 
involvement, the final report also emphasized the importance of community 
outreach through education and awareness activities like a comprehensive in-
terpretive program with exhibits and audiovisual programs. With no opposition 
from the U.S. Congress, Fagatele Bay became a national marine sanctuary of the 
United States on July 31, 1986.
Throughout the establishment of the national marine sanctuary in American 
Sāmoa in the 1980s, federal and indigenous environmental goals for protecting 
ocean resources overlapped. The ASG initiated the designation process and Gov-
ernor Coleman’s proposal provided the foundational language for the manage-
ment plan that legally shifted jurisdiction of this area from local administration 
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to federal protection. NOAA also worked closely with the indigenous landown-
ers adjacent to the body of water, allowed fishing in the outer bay, and promised 
to provide a positive and useful structure for marine education and conservation.
Most of the people I interviewed did not see the 1986 marine sanctuary des-
ignation as controversial. In fact, members of the Fuimaono family, who owns 
the land adjacent to Fagatele Bay, nostalgically remembered the positive relation-
ships previous leaders in their family had with federal and sanctuary officials. 
Even before the creation of the protected area, Paramount Chief A. U. Fuim-
aono, who was also the first elected American Sāmoa Congressional Delegate, 
was close with D.C. officials. His family recounted how Fuimaono would “bring 
them [federal leaders] to swim in Fagatele Bay.”16 The Fuimaono family also 
expressed how sanctuary staff worked well with them in the early years, coming 
together to make and maintain access trails, as well as monitor bay use, in a col-
laborative and respectful way. A. U. Fuimaono even received a volunteer achieve-
ment award from NOAA for his dedicated service to the sanctuary in 2007. 
Regular cooperation and teamwork exemplified federal and native interactions 
attuned to fa‘a Sāmoa during and soon after the establishment of the sanctuary.
Running the Sanctuary
The collaboration between NOAA and the ASG that started with the estab-
lishment of the sanctuary continued with the management of the area. While 
NOAA has the main responsibility for monitoring activity in this federally 
protected area, overseeing scientific research projects, and offering educational 
programming, the American Sāmoa Department of Commerce is tasked with 
helping NOAA, predominately through coordination of community outreach 
and local consensus building through divisions like the Coastal Management 
program. Today, the American Sāmoa Coastal Management program promotes 
“development while safeguarding the territory’s natural resources.”17 Effective 
resource management and public outreach have been the foci of this agency.
In 1995, NOAA also established a Joint Enforcement Agreement with the 
American Sāmoa Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources to empower 
local officers to enforce federal sanctuary regulations. NOAA conducted train-
ing sessions to help these territorial representatives develop their skills to ad-
minister federal rules. These workshops included interviewing practice exer-
cises, boating and safety drills, and education in the records reporting process. 
Hiring locals to enforce federal regulations occurred throughout the history of 
conservation in the United States. As Jacoby discussed, in the early 1900s the 
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Adirondack Park in New York hired “policemen of the woods” from among the 
“experienced woodsmen” of the Adirondacks.”18 Locals were also hired as guides 
to help at Yellowstone National Park.
While NOAA reported only one complaint about illegal fishing in Fagatele 
Bay from 2005 to 2011, the seclusion of this protected area does not lend itself to 
intense government monitoring. Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
officers rely on community reporting to learn about violations. Despite one 
NOAA special agent and one NOAA enforcement officer assigned to American 
Sāmoa since 2012, Peter Eves, head of the DMWR’s enforcement team, believes 
most violations are not seen and therefore remain undocumented.19 While huge 
fines can be imposed on offenders of sanctuary rules, without enough staff to 
investigative infractions in a timely manner, citations are rarely issued.
According to Eves, the individuals who are more likely to be cited are Amer-
ican Sāmoans who might breach rules from near shore practices that are often 
traditional. These rules become more of a deterrent to cultural ocean use than 
non- Sāmoan vessels disobeying dumping or fishing regulations in deep- sea wa-
ters. Fines can reach up to $140,000 per event per day, as well as related costs to 
and damages from the infraction.20 Sanctuary enforcement remained a difficult 
task in 2017. Jacoby discussed similar enforcement issues in the early U.S. con-
servation movement, echoing Eves’ ideas of native people bearing the brunt of 
federal environmental laws, as well as the difficulty of patrolling and enforcing 
rules in hard to access locations without enough staff.21
To increase contact with the public, sanctuary supervisor Gene Brighouse 
created a community- based advisory group called the Sanctuary Advisory 
Council in 2005. This council has seventeen voting members who are appointed 
by the sanctuary supervisor. These individuals come from a wide range of in-
terested parties in American Sāmoa including research, education, business/
industry, ASG divisions, fishing, ocean recreation, tourism, and diving, as well 
as community representatives from five main areas of American Sāmoa: the east 
and west side of Tutuila, the Manu‘a Islands, Swains Island, and Aunu‘u Island. 
Thirteen members are non- governmental and the other four members come 
from related territorial government environmental departments.22 There are 
also eight non- voting members that include a student member, the government 
of Sāmoa, NOAA leadership, the National Park of American Sāmoa, and the 
U.S. Coast Guard.
Overall, the Sanctuary Advisory Council includes a mix of indigenous and 
nonnative agents with specialized interests who provide the superintendent with 
recommendations and advice on policies to manage and protect the sanctuary. 
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The Sanctuary Advisory Council must meet every six months, but no more than 
once a month. Meetings are conducted in English. One main goal of this coun-
cil is to have community representatives bring direct information back to their 
constituents about the marine sanctuary. Ironically, the first major action of the 
Sanctuary Advisory Council involved comments on the draft management plan 
to extend the sanctuary in 2012.
Extension of the Sanctuary
When efforts to expand the sanctuary developed in the 2010s, sentiments to-
wards federally protected waters in American Sāmoa were much different than 
in 1986. There was more contention and opposition from different members of 
the community to the augmentation of the national marine sanctuary in the 
region. As ecology scholar Fikret Berkes has explained, “When fishers are in-
volved in the conservation and management of a fishery, they are more likely 
to take ownership of it.”23 In contrast, a lack of community involvement could 
prevent local support for an initiative, as seen in the expansion process in Amer-
ican Sāmoa.
Several environmental factors motivated the expansion of the national ma-
rine sanctuary in this region. The increase in commercial longline fishing at 
the turn of the twenty- first century, major coral bleaching incidents in 1994, 
2002, and 2004 (due to ocean changes such as higher temperatures, nutrients, or 
light), and increased pollution in the local waters encouraged American Sāmoa 
governors Tau‘ese Pita Sunia and Togiola Tulafono to support “setting aside 20% 
of the coral reef habitat within the territory for long- term protection.”24 The 
governors were also echoing the 1999 U.S. Coral Reef Task Force’s prioritization 
of protecting 20 percent of all U.S. coral reefs.25
In the years since Fagatele’s sanctuary designation, at least eighteen scientific 
studies between 2000 and 2012 also provided greater information on ocean use 
and the value of the reef surrounding American Sāmoa. For example, a 2007 
Fagatele Bay Sanctuary Condition Report described how a crown- of- thorns 
starfish outbreak, tropical cyclones, elevated ocean temperature, fishing, coral 
diseases, agriculture, and visitation placed multiple pressures on the resource 
rich marine environment in American Sāmoa.26
The turn of the twenty- first century was also a period in which the United 
States and nations across the globe started to push for the protection of water 
regions. According to Callum Roberts, “In 2000, President Bill Clinton is-
sued an executive order, later endorsed by the Bush administration, charging 
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government agencies to create a national network of marine protected areas. . . . 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, coastal nations 
of the world pledged to create national networks of marine protected areas by 
2012.”27 All of these elements inspired the Office of National Marine Sanctuaries 
to initiate efforts to expand federally protected waters in American Sāmoa.
The drive to augment the sanctuary was further supported by the first re-
view and evaluation of the Fagatele Bay National Marine Sanctuary manage-
ment plan that started in 2008. From February to March 2009, NOAA held a 
fifty- six- day public scoping period “to identify issues and gauge interest within 
American Samoa for possible sanctuary expansion and designation of additional 
sanctuary units.”28 Local sanctuary staff and the American Sāmoa Department 
of Commerce put together a list of discussion topics for three public meetings 
on February 10, 11, and 12 on the west, east, and center sections of Tutuila. The 
subjects were (a) Improved Partnerships, (b) Characterization and Monitoring, 
(c) Spill Prevention, Contingency Planning and Response, (d) Climate Change, 
(e) Ocean Literacy, (f) Marine Debris, and (g) Site Expansion.29 According to 
Lucy Jacob, an American Sāmoa Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
program leader at the time,
when the public scoping meetings were held in 2009 they were not properly 
advertised and they were very poorly attended. The staff of Fagatele Bay 
made the addition of extra sites sound like a vague but unlikely possibility 
and I am certain that the public felt that they would be fully consulted 
before any potential site could actually be proposed. However, since those 
meetings, there have been very few public meetings (evidenced by the pub-
lic outcry that is occurring) and people are now facing the possibility that 
their marine areas which are culturally ‘owned’ by the people could become 
MPAs [marine protected areas] without them having any say.30
Site expansion was only one of seven topics brought up in these sparsely attended 
meetings. Besides the owners of Swains Island, the local indigenous population 
did not request an enlargement of the sanctuary. However, after this scoping 
period, sanctuary management worked diligently on a draft management plan 
that focused on expanding federally protected waters.
The Sanctuary Advisory Council created a Site Selection Working Group 
composed of Sanctuary Advisory Council members and community representa-
tives to examine the pros and cons of incorporating additional marine locations 
into the federally protected and managed area. Sanctuary employees also helped 
in the assessment process. The Working Group used National Marine Sanctuary 
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Act guidelines “to evaluate the ecological, cultural, and economic value of the 
areas proposed” and eventually selected five sites for expansion: Muliāva (Rose 
Atoll), Larsen Bay, Aunu‘u Island, Ta‘u Island, and Swains Island.31
Of the thirty- two total community meetings held during this expansion pro-
cess, twenty- four sessions occurred between July 6, 2009, and April 18, 2011, 
before the publication of the draft management plan. No meetings were planned 
after the availability of the document for public review and before the closing of 
the comment period in January 2012. The overall timing, structure, and content 
of these sessions demonstrated the more informative nature of these meetings 
as opposed to the desire to generate specific comments to incorporate feedback 
and community- based ideas into final expansion plans. Local longline owner 
Christinna Lutu- Sanchez expressed how, during the meeting held at the Amer-
ican Sāmoa Community College, “there was maybe a 5 minute briefing about 
this proposal (in summary), and then time was made available for comments. . . . 
There was NEVER an opportunity for questions and answers for the people 
to understand more about this proposal. As a matter of fact, we were told that 
the responses would be forthcoming and that they were just there to collect 
“comments” . . . how are we to make useful comments if there are numerous 
questions about this proposal that are unanswered?”32 Holding a meeting was 
not the same as fostering community support or engaging in vā fealoa‘ i. While 
NOAA listened to and recorded community feedback, a standard mandate of 
federal government community projects, these gatherings focused on educating 
the public about the goals set forth by sanctuary management to expand federal 
protection over local waters. Information and awareness, instead of interaction 
or appropriate vā, guided these activities.
Many in the local community did not feel that the initial comment period 
provided enough time for villagers to digest and respond to the plan. Selaina 
Tuimavave stated how “Fagatele is located in the village of Futiga, during the 
first round of public meetings not one meeting was held in Futiga. With the 
expansion in review, Larson’s Bay is located in the village of Vaitogi. I live in 
the village of Vaitogi, none of the three public meetings was held in my village. 
Additionally, the village council of my village was not informed of the plans to 
expand the sanctuary into our village waters. Aunu‘u is also a proposed site, the 
village meeting was not held in Aunu‘u but rather in Utumea.”33 Poor adver-
tising and lack of information about the purpose of meetings continued along 
with inappropriate site selection and low attendance for community meetings, 
violating Sāmoan concepts of vā.
George Tusi also stated how “it was obvious that village communities close to 
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the proposed sites hadn’t even heard about the proposals or seen the maps before. 
But we are told that the Office of Samoan Affairs was told about the plans and 
that our mayors should have passed on the information.”34 At the beginning of 
this process, village mayors attended a meeting “to discuss preliminary sanctu-
ary units and solicited help of mayors to engage village stakeholders” on March 
30, 2009.35 Interacting with village mayors, holding twenty- two sessions in vil-
lages, and hosting fourteen gatherings for specific families, or ‘āiga, “who could 
provide village- specific information on fishing activities, coastal management 
concerns, and other needs of the village” are appropriate steps in a community 
education process for the region. However, these sessions alone did not result in 
wide community support for sanctuary expansion.
American Sāmoans likely expected the same level of collaboration that oc-
curred during the establishment of the initial sanctuary: an open and mea-
sured communication process where all impacted parties had an opportunity 
to express their thoughts.36 In the absence of such vā fealoa‘ i, strong negative 
community sentiment developed over the expansion that was initiated by sanc-
tuary officials in Washington, D.C., and American Sāmoa, and supported by 
the American Sāmoa governor’s office. In response to vocal concerns over the 
review process for augmentation, the Sanctuary Advisory Council, American 
Sāmoa Congressional Delegate Eni Faleomavaega, and members of the public all 
requested that NOAA extend the comment period, which occurred and ended 
two months later on March 9, 2012.
Six meetings occurred during this time frame, with the last meeting held on 
the last day of the extended comment period.37 During this extra window of op-
portunity for providing feedback, NOAA worked with the village councils and 
mātai of impacted villages to develop more native knowledge of the plans and 
purposes for the extension of the sanctuary. Unfortunately, even this flexibility 
in D.C.- based timelines did not coincide well with the traditional Sāmoan vil-
lage consensus building process that involves informing different constituents in 
each village in separate meetings and council advice to the high chief, who makes 
a decision for the whole community, as discussed in chapter 4. This slow and 
deliberate process can often take many months. As Jon Barnett and John Camp-
bell have stated about other initiatives in the South Pacific, “community- based 
approaches can take a long time — for example the three years of the project was 
considered to be barely adequate.”38 Consequently, NOAA coming to these vil-
lages with a two- month period for responses could feel like a lot of pressure and 
not enough time to make important community decisions.
Save Liuato A. Tuitele and Tofoitaufa Sandra King Young expressed how the 
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“so- called meetings within the villages with the high chiefs were poorly publi-
cized and ineffective in bringing together the right people that make the deci-
sions for the affected villages. The high chiefs and people in the affected villages 
that were necessary to the deliberations did not attend these sparsely attended 
meetings. Still the NMS felt they could proceed with the process just because 
‘they’ had the meetings.”39 Since only government employees, stay- at- home 
moms, youth, retired people, elderly folks, and the unemployed could attend 
daytime meetings, several felt the appropriate interested parties were not in-
volved in the process. Holding meetings did not equate to extensive community 
support through traditional methods.
Another anonymous commentator stated:
The process for public consultations on this proposed set of regulations is 
deeply flawed. The so- called “public hearings” were stage managed to mini-
mize public input and criticism. . . . The big no- take area is around Aunu‘u, 
but instead of holding the meeting on Aunu‘u it was held on Tutuila. That 
meeting was held as a village council meeting, in which the chiefs on the 
council are present, and in which traditionally, the villagers do not speak. 
Speakers had to sign in to be allowed to speak, and were limited to 3 min-
utes. The Fagatele [sanctuary] people did not answer any questions or re-
spond to any comments. Press was not notified and invited, and one press 
member seems to have had pressure applied not to report. . . . This whole 
process is rigged against those who disagree.40
In the context of expected extensive, transparent, and deliberate Sāmoan com-
munication and decision- making processes, as well as past cooperation during 
the establishment of the sanctuary, NOAA’s efforts fell short of fully engaging 
the community, incorporating their needs, addressing their concerns, and fol-
lowing appropriate vā and fa‘a Sāmoa. While a bureaucratically clear comment 
process was created and expanded by the U.S. federal government, the general 
sentiment among many in the community remained unsupportive of the quick 
and cursory demeanor of these meetings. These disconnects between federal 
versus indigenous priorities and protocols resulted in negative public views of 
sanctuary expansion at the time and for many years after. In a similar way, at 
Glacier National Park, “negative opinions of the park service had become a cen-
tral aspect of tribal policy and a fundamental expression of Blackfeet national 
identity.”41
In the end, during the total eight months of the expansion comment period, 
people provided 188 comments on sixteen different subject areas. Thirteen of 
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the sixteen areas involved negative concerns, with fifty- three specific posts to the 
online Federal Register opposing some aspect of sanctuary augmentation. Some 
of those posts also had multiple signatures attached to statements. In general, 
public remarks expressed concerns over the loss of local indigenous control over 
ocean resources and the takeover of authority by the federal government.
Several people believed sanctuary expansion was motivated by both the Of-
fice of National Marine Sanctuaries’ desire to increase their overall power and 
jurisdiction, as well as local territorial leaders’ desire to gain a positive reputa-
tion from supporting environmental protections. One anonymous commentator 
stated that “the main issue here is for the Governor to have a legacy before he 
goes out of office and for the National Marine Sanctuaries to have a greater area 
within their network to make more of an impact to their partners in the US 
and around the world.”42 The Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management 
Council (Wespac) also claimed that
the proposed action appears to be another example of the expansionist 
philosophy of ONMS [Office of National Marine Sanctuaries] . . . to ex-
pand its jurisdiction under a veil of protection. . . . the DMP/DEIS [Draft 
Management Plan/Draft Environmental Impact Statement] fails to pro-
vide a clear need for expansion. . . . Examples of ONMS’ expansionist re-
gime are common within this program, including Channel Island NMS, 
Monterey Bay NMS, and Hawaiian Islands Humpback Whale NMS. . . . 
once the area is designated, ONMS applies the “lock it up and toss the key” 
approach and then seeks to further expand.43
The Council believed that NOAA programs and the augmentation of the sanc-
tuary in American Sāmoa reflected the long- term imperial nature of this federal 
agency throughout U.S. jurisdiction. Wespac expressed how NOAA always has 
and always will work towards greater control of ocean use and marine resources 
throughout the U.S. and its territories. From this perspective, native needs and 
fishing priorities took backseat positions.
Wespac was also concerned with the lack of scientific rationale for the expan-
sion, the deficient enforcement for violations of sanctuary rules, and the weak 
federal fiscal situation that could prevent proposed plans from being imple-
mented.44 On- island scientists also questioned the reasons behind sanctuary ex-
pansion. According to Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources biologist 
Alice Lawrence, “it seems like the most charismatic and nationally important 
sites have been chosen rather than through any rigorous scientific process. It is 
evident from public meeting comments and online comments that suggestions 
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were made by one or two members of the public and then discussed with one or 
two high ranking village representatives.”45 Department biologist Douglas Fen-
ner also stated that “the Fagatele Bay expansion plan shows little if any signs of 
having used any science to select their expansion sites.”46 Despite these concerns, 
the final plan moved forward with the originally selected sites. NOAA firmly 
disputed the claim that science did not prove the need for sanctuary expansion, 
pointing to a biogeographic assessment and other reports that justified their 
choices.47
At least six people commented on the need to focus on improving the man-
agement of Fagatele Bay before expanding to other areas. Lima Tapua‘i asked 
NOAA to “concentrate on improving the Fagatele Bay site which hasn’t seen 
many benefits over the last 25 years fa‘amolemole [please].”48 An anonymous 
commentator also expressed how “very limited success from Fagatele Bay has 
been demonstrated after 25 years of its establishment. For 25 years the federal 
government did not provide proper access or signage to the sanctuary, did not 
effectively enforce the regulations and did not educate people about the regula-
tions.”49 Several people questioned why expansion was necessary when so much 
more could be done with the existing sanctuary area.
Another topic brought up during both the scoping and comment periods 
involved the question of whether or not NOAA would incorporate the tra-
ditional mātai and Community Marine Tenure systems in their leadership.50 
Twenty- three comments to the Federal Register critiqued the process used for 
sanctuary expansion. Tapua‘i expressed how “we should all be worried that the 
Fa‘a Samoa wasn’t properly followed even though it was boasted about in the 
plan. . . . There has been no respect for the fishermen that make a small living 
from our ocean and us people that want to feed our families. Are they really 
going to include us in future decisions about how to manage these sites?”51
To address concerns over the incorporation of indigenous social practices, 
NOAA explained how they received commendations from the former and cur-
rent Secretaries of Sāmoan Affairs for their efforts to get community feedback 
and follow Sāmoan conventions. Paramount Chief Lefiti Falelauli‘i Pese stated 
that NOAA has “clearly followed our traditional protocols and successfully 
incorporated Fa‘a Samoa into [their] process.”52 NOAA believed such support 
from local leaders demonstrated their cooperation with customary Sāmoan lead-
ership expectations and vā. 
But several comments challenged such claims. Department of Marine and 
Wildlife Resources employee Tepora Lavata‘i said:
let it be known that the Sanctuary officials here have completely disregarded 
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the cultural ways to approach a village community on issues that will affect 
their people. There is NO documentation that verifies that these commu-
nities would like to have the Sanctuary expanding in their communities! 
Let the unanimous comments from the people of these communities speak 
for themselves. They were not informed. They weren’t involved in the so- 
called ‘conversations’ that expressed any interest in the Sanctuary expan-
sion into their village communities. These ‘processes’ that the Sanctuary 
officials have continued to work on do not work well in the Sāmoan com-
munities and the Sanctuary officials here should’ve known better.53
To address this concern, NOAA stated that it would create an advisory council 
working group on Sāmoan cultural heritage to help integrate indigenous man-
agement styles into sanctuary administration. While that entity never formed, 
another committee called the Community Engagement Working Group was 
created. The only evidence found for this group’s activity involved a sanctuary 
staff member meeting one- on- one with village leadership from a federally pro-
tected area to discuss specific issues, as opposed to a consistent effort to engage 
traditional communication processes in developing sanctuary activities.54
At least five letters from villagers proclaimed that NOAA did not go through 
the appropriate channels for communicating with communities about sanctuary 
expansion on their ancestral waterfronts. Siaumau Siaumau stated, “I strongly 
oppose this proposal because your agency did not go through the proper proce-
dures of contacting my family and I about Larsen’s Bay in which is part of the 
land that belongs to our family.”55 Not following traditional Sāmoan contact 
methods and fa‘a Sāmoa were seen as deep violations of protocol and trust.
Despite all of these sentiments, NOAA proclaimed that it
has great respect for American Samoa’s right to self- governance and for 
the right of American Samoans to use their family lands in traditional 
ways without interference from the federal government. For that reason, 
NOAA has expended a significant amount of effort and resources in con-
sulting with officials of the American Samoa government, the Office of 
Samoan Affairs, Matai and local representatives, and the public. NOAA’s 
goal throughout the management plan review process has been to create a 
management structure for the sanctuary that complements and enhances 
the work of the Territory and local communities in protecting natural re-
sources while also being sensitive to and respectful of American Samoa’s 
unique and rich culture.56
NOAA did not want to be accused of cultural insensitivity, ignoring existing 
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forms of ocean management, or violating Sāmoan traditions. However, federal 
responses to community feedback were often reactionary and defensive, as op-
posed to being open to major change or vast adjustment of plans.
Several interviewed discussed how the sanctuary expansion process followed 
Office of National Marine Sanctuaries guidelines and successfully checked off 
the boxes of federal community engagement requirements. According to Section 
922.22 of the National Marine Sanctuary Program Regulations, “if a proposed 
Sanctuary includes waters within the exclusive economic zone, the Secretary 
shall notify the appropriate Regional Fishery Management Council(s) which 
shall have one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of such notification 
to make recommendations.”57 As long as these requirements were met, the Of-
fice of National Marine Sanctuaries completed their national obligations. But 
D.C.- based requirements often do not coincide with traditional Sāmoan village 
consensus building process or vā fealoa‘ i.
Another set of concerns revolved around the continued belief that marine 
resources were already being taken care of through existing agencies and his-
toric marine tenure systems. According to Representative Larry Sanitoa, “the 
American Samoa Government has a process in place with protective policies and 
the means to enforce federal regulations. The proposed expansion will impose 
and preempt ASG’s right and attempts at self- governance and at best this plan 
is also a duplication of effort and a waste of money.”58 Worry developed over the 
infringement of indigenous rights and government waste in the region.
Tuitele and Young also proclaimed that “our local people have been sound 
stewards of conserving our marine resources off the shores of our villages for 
thousands of years, because of our respect for the ocean and limited traditional 
use for subsistence living. This is why we have pristine marine areas that the 
NMS now want to have jurisdiction over. We have effectively managed and con-
served our marine resources close to our shores based on our traditional prac-
tices for future sustainability.”59 Based on several similar comments, many in 
the community believed expansion of the sanctuary would not add any value 
to existing native protection of local waters and would only complicate existing 
administrative structures.
In response to claims that protection was not needed in American Sāmoa 
waters, NOAA stated that the purpose of sanctuaries is not only to protect en-
vironments in bad condition, but also to preserve “well- functioning ecosystems 
of high biological, cultural and historic value.”60 According to the biogeographic 
assessment of the region, there are seven high- value marine sites in American 
Sāmoa containing three of four hotspots for coral cover, coral richness, fish 
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biomass or fish richness.61 NOAA believed that putting regulations in place as 
preventative measures was better than risking the future loss of such rich, di-
verse, and unique marine resources in the region. These bioregions became high 
priority for sanctuary expansion and NOAA worked hard to incorporate these 
sites into the new management plan through rule making and public education.
NOAA also stated that their regulations would complement territorial gov-
ernment efforts. The final management plan stated how “nothing in the pro-
posal affects American Samoa’s right to self- governance, DMWR’s authority 
to manage marine resources in the Territory, or the ownership rights of Amer-
ican Samoans with respect to their lands.”62 Instead, the expanded sanctuary 
was expected to “provide value- added support and collaboration to existing 
management efforts. The sanctuary will not take over DMWR’s responsibility 
within the sanctuary units, and the management regime is structured to com-
plement, not replace or be in conflict with, existing authorities.”63 In fact, more 
programs could be supported with the funding and staff that accompanies a 
larger sanctuary.
NOAA also explained that they planned to engage in activities that current 
local agencies were not covering, such as “inventorying, assessing and provid-
ing federal protection for maritime heritage resources, and providing state- of- 
the- art education facilities and technologies.”64 This statement highlighted 
Western- based approaches to environmental management.
Overall, NOAA clearly addressed comments about sanctuary expansion with 
steadfast conviction, highlighting the financial, administrative, and long- term 
benefits that an expanded sanctuary could provide the region and its people. 
However, such rhetoric did not ease most community concerns over the growth 
of federal power in American Sāmoa.
There was not total community opposition to sanctuary expansion. Accord-
ing to NOAA, the seven main reasons people supported the management plan 
included the desire to preserve ocean resources for future generations, the eco-
logical value of Fagalua/Fogama‘a, the need to protect giant corals near Ta‘u, the 
need to conserve mature fish to keep species numbers high, the ability of sanctu-
ary activities to provide jobs, funding, and tourism to the region, the benefits of 
educating youth to continue ecologically positive actions in the future, as well 
as contributions to climate change and ocean conservation research.65 Eighteen 
comments, with two posts having multiple signatures, supported the five- site 
expansion with location- specific regulations.
This pro- growth group of people included some on- island youth who likely 
participated in educational outreach programs provided by sanctuary staff, 
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demonstrating the effectiveness of environmental education programs on 
younger generations in American Sāmoa. Jessica Peters stated that “I want to 
grow up and be able to still go fishing still swimming in the clean waters and be 
able to continue this long life journey with my kids and grand kids. So therefore, 
I say yes to Fagatele Bay expansion.”66 Peters agreed with the ecological and sci-
entific reasons to augment federally protected waters in American Sāmoa, while 
also highlighting the importance of environmental protection for her ‘āiga. Pe-
ters also represented one of at least four other youth who expressed their support 
for this initiative through the Federal Register comment system.
Another community member, Tuai Auva‘a, expressed how “if the expansion is 
for promoting and protection of our coral reefs and wildlife below, let’s support 
it. We were misinformed that this expansion would stop fishermen from fishing 
in the expanded areas — it’s actually not.”67 Supporting environmental reasons 
for more sanctuary sites, Auva‘a explained how a lot of misinformation was cir-
culating in the media and public.
The other major group of supporters involved Governor Togiola Tulafono and 
several members of his cabinet, including the directors of DMWR, the American 
Sāmoa Environmental Protection Agency, and the American Sāmoa Department 
of Commerce, as well as the secretary of Sāmoan Affairs, the manager of the 
American Sāmoa Coastal Management Program, representatives of the Coral 
Reef Advisory Group, and the president of the American Sāmoa Community 
College.68 However, some doubted the strength of such support since all of these 
officials were members of the governor’s staff who were appointed to their posi-
tions. One anonymous commentator questioned, “Why did all the ASG depart-
ment directors suddenly change their votes one day after the SAC [Sanctuary 
Advisory Committee] meeting? Was it really that the representatives voted in a 
way their directors did not want?. . . . for some agencies, it is said that the DOC 
[Department of Commerce] assistant director was seen entering the agency, and 
some even say that loud voices were heard. It’s not hard to figure out what hap-
pened.”69 With a patronage- based government system grounded in high- level po-
litical appointments as rewards for loyalty during election campaigns, claiming 
full government leadership support did not equate to full community support.
While most government- related letters of support expressed basic bureau-
cratic backing for the expansion of the national marine sanctuary, American 
Sāmoa Coastal Management Program staff member Sandra Lutu stated,
I can only express my gratitude to the vision of the current administration 
of the sanctuary and their respect for our culture, our resources and the 
ability within the sanctuaries of maximizing our oceans and the support it 
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has provided our ancestors as well as us today. But even more compelling 
is the purpose of the plan to protect what we have depended on for so long 
so it will be there for our children and the future generations. I have read 
the many comments that are against this expansion and one thing we must 
remember to grow is that we can agree to disagree. . . . It is my opinion 
that the vision of this plan encompasses the benefits for all. Lets expand 
it together and work together, I am sure in the end it will benefit us all.70
Lutu’s strong enthusiasm for augmenting the sanctuary focused on protecting 
the environment for future generations, She praised NOAA for acting in a cul-
turally respectful way. Lutu encouraged opponents to work together and focus 
on the long- term benefits of protecting larger areas of the ocean. Her sentiments 
were rare among the comments, but so robust that she provided a second post to 
say, “I commented earlier but did not clearly indicate my position that we should 
be open to expansions that not only protect our natural resources but provide 
the opportunity for further development through research and development for 
growth and sustenance.”71 Lutu also wanted to emphasize the environmental 
and research importance of the proposed area for protection. Throughout the 
expansion process, different members of the indigenous and nonnative commu-
nity freely expressed a variety of strong opinions about the growth of federally 
protected zones in American Sāmoan waters.
The Final Plan: 2012
After the publication of the final management plan on July 26, 2012, no com-
ments were received from any member of the U.S. Congress. While the en-
largement of this designation involved much controversial debate in American 
Sāmoa, state politicians showed no visible interest in or concern for this proposal 
(unlike the minimum wage issue discussed in chapter 2). Consequently, the re-
vised plan for the National Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa became offi-
cial after the close of the sixty- day mandatory Congressional comment period. 
After three years of community engagement and planning, NOAA expanded 
its control and protection over vast tracts of the most diverse and vital waters 
around American Sāmoa on October 15, 2012.
In the final management plan, NOAA addressed the issues that were raised 
during the comment period. For example, the final plan did allow historical 
indigenous forms of fishing in specific areas. NOAA adjusted their recommen-
dations for allowable activities within most of the proposed sanctuary areas 
to avoid significant barriers to native forms of angling or marine sources of 
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financial gain for the indigenous community. NOAA also stated in the final 
management plan that “the focus of this action must be for the benefit of the 
American Samoan people, who have managed their ocean resources for 3,000 
years. Commenters noted the traditional land management regime, adequate 
existing management and regulations, village enforcement, a preference to work 
with local agencies, and a history of failed support from the federal government. 
These concerns are understandable . . . NOAA has made community engage-
ment the cornerstone of its management plan.”72 On paper, NOAA’s reactions 
to comments seemed sensitive and open to concerns over traditional ocean use 
and respect for Sāmoan culture.
Overall, NOAA believed allowing subsistence and nonharmful forms of fish-
ing in most sanctuary units, conducting a total of thirty- two community meet-
ings, proposing an advisory council working group on Sāmoan cultural heritage 
to incorporate indigenous management styles, extending the draft comment 
period by two months, and getting endorsements from multiple government 
agencies, including the Office of Sāmoan Affairs, provided enough respectful 
effort and time with the community to claim a successful management plan 
review. However, the ways in which NOAA addressed these concerns, in a dense 
online document written in English, did not coincide well with the needs and 
circumstances of this indigenous community.
Not everyone in American Sāmoa speaks, let alone reads English. Internet ac-
cess is hard to come by in the region. One anonymous commentator stated how 
“not everybody in American Samoa is good at using computers, or writing in 
English. Submitting on the web may be easy for people in the states, but not for 
many here.”73 NOAA even acknowledged that not everyone in American Sāmoa 
has access to the internet. Translation of all documents into the native language, 
making printed reports more widely available at public places like schools and 
the library, as well as making efforts to explain the detailed content of these ma-
terials through nonwritten forms of communication to impacted villages could 
have all assisted in getting wider positive support for sanctuary expansion.
In the future, the sanctuary management plan is supposed to be reviewed 
every five to ten years. Moving forward, an effective way to manage policy dis-
cussions with the community would be to meet directly and frequently with 
all groups living in affected villages to inform them of any proposed changes, 
provide ample time for them to develop feedback, and work diligently to ac-
knowledge and incorporate their comments into future plans. NOAA could 
also explain why changes were or were not made through face- to- face follow- up 
communication. As Barnett and Campbell have stated, projects “need to 
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negotiate local power” and “it takes time to learn, discuss and decide in ways that 
engage all the constituents within a village . . . the alternative is less widespread 
commitment.”74 Active responses, continual communication, and vā fealoa‘i are 
highly valued in American Sāmoan culture. These extra steps, as well as full 
education and awareness, could foster greater understanding, or at least avoid 
intense animosity, from members of the indigenous community.
Comparative Examples
In comparison, the first efforts to create a national marine sanctuary to pro-
tect endangered humpback whales around the Hawaiian Islands occurred in 
March 1982. With some members of the public “fearing that a marine sanctuary 
would bring additional restrictions on fishing and vessel traffic. . . . Hawai‘i’s 
then Governor George Anyoshi suspended further consideration of the site in 
early 1984.”75 After the closing of Kaho‘olawe weapons range in 1990, Congress 
once again encouraged the creation of a national marine sanctuary in Hawaiian 
waters, which became a national marine sanctuary on November 4, 1992, under 
the condition that the governor of Hawai‘i could modify the boundaries of the 
protected area.
Four years later, after “numerous public meetings and hearings were held on 
each of the main Hawaiian Islands . . . [and] despite divided support from the 
public,” Hawai‘i governor Benjamin Cayetano approved the sanctuary at the 
state- level on June 5, 1997. Like comments about the sanctuary in American 
Sāmoa, ocean users and native peoples had concerns over their ability to con-
tinue their water- based activities in the region. Local residents did not want extra 
federal government control in the area. Some felt enough regulations already ex-
isted or were not working in the first place. Just like in American Sāmoa, NOAA 
steadfastly justified the creation of the sanctuary in Hawai‘i as necessary and 
useful to supplement existing regulations and systems to protect nature from 
human intrusions. Overall, the Office of National Marine Sanctuaries claims 
they “work cooperatively with the people of Hawai‘i to protect this important 
marine ecosystem.”76 In fact, NOAA and the State of Hawai‘i, through the De-
partment of Land and Natural Resources, jointly manage the sanctuary. In 2012, 
the sanctuary held a workshop on how to incorporate traditional aloha ‘āina 
(deep love for the land and sea) into sanctuary management.77
While American Sāmoans started the original marine sanctuary in Fagatele, 
neither the expansion nor the sanctuary in Hawai‘i was initiated by native 
peoples. The protected area in American Sāmoa involved less community 
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involvement and vā fealoa‘i during the expansion process. In the Hawai‘i case, 
the public stopped the first attempt to create a sanctuary and was extensively 
involved in discussions throughout the process. The same year the sanctuary ex-
panded in American Sāmoa, NOAA held a workshop with native experts to in-
corporate indigenous practices into their management plan in Hawai‘i. In both 
cases, NOAA dispossessed native peoples of their water rights for the protection 
of nature over indigenous groups.
This belief in the authoritative and protective role of the U.S. federal govern-
ment over the environment has been a cornerstone of U.S. conservation since its 
founding in the late nineteenth century. As Jacoby has explained, the American 
conservation movement centered around the “need to use science and the state 
to protect nature.”78 The goals and actions of new laws reflected “their vision of 
a just and well- ordered society.”79 Conservation efforts involved setting bound-
aries, regulations, and enforcement, as well as dictating what you can and cannot 
do in these federally controlled spaces according to Western scientific and U.S. 
government standards and rationales. However, “these actions also left behind a 
troubling legacy of environmental quality at the expense of social justice.”80 The 
priority of carefully supervised land and waterscapes often erased the historic 
and current needs and presence of native peoples. As Spence also discussed, U.S. 
conservation involved a “great deal of management and manipulation to keep 
original wilderness condition,” or at least the idea of a pristine environment, 
intact.81 Federal monitoring and control required a lot of staff and hard work to 
maintain western standards of idealized nature.
Sasha Davis also claimed how the terms “pristine and natural are applied 
to militarized landscapes to deepen colonial relations, restrict civilian access 
to contaminated areas, and justify the continued militarization of occupied 
lands.”82 Whether in Vieques, Puerto Rico, the waters off Kaho‘olawe, or in the 
remote Pacific Islands region, the shift from intensive and destructive weapons 
testing to environmental protection of these spaces can enable the U.S. federal 
government to avoid toxic waste cleanup, land rehabilitation, as well as return 
of land to native peoples.
The National Park of American Sāmoa provides another interesting point 
of comparison for federal regulations and control over nature in the U.S. Pa-
cific. Such a protected designation was initiated by the U.S. Congress, like the 
Hawaiian Islands Humpback Whale National Marine Sanctuary, and became 
official on October 31, 1988. The goals of this national park are to “preserve and 
protect the tropical rainforest, coral reefs, archeological and cultural resources of 
American Samoa, to maintain the habitat of flying foxes, preserve the ecological 
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balance of the Samoan tropical forest, and, consistent with the preservation of 
these resources, to provide for the enjoyment of the unique resources of the Sa-
moan tropical forest by visitors from around the world.”83 Safeguarding plants, 
animals, American Sāmoan landmarks and practices, as well as recreation for 
visitors all mixed together in the justifications for this federal zone.
However, the park’s formation presented a challenge to U.S. conservation, 
because all American Sāmoa lands belong to the native people. According to the 
National Park System, “early attempts to establish a national park in American 
Samoa failed when there seemed no way for the government to acquire tradi-
tionally owned village lands for a public park. Decades later the High Court 
of American Samoa and the U.S. Congress developed a compromise allowing 
lease of the necessary lands for this park. The lease agreement covers many of the 
visitor and park management practices that can occur within the park.”84 This 
park could not be established without the direct consent of the Sāmoan people 
and the specific villages and ‘āiga involved. Consequently, the National Parks 
Service has always had to follow vā and fa‘a Sāmoa to exist, let alone succeed in 
this region.
In 1993, the National Park Service “signed a 50- year lease with the American 
Samoa Government. This unique lease initiated a partnership with the villages 
of Fagasā, Pago Pago, Āfono, Vatia, Ta‘ū, Fiti‘uta, and Faleāsao. Congress also 
authorized portions of Ofu and Olosega islands to be included in 2002.”85 The 
lease provides for fair- market value rent (adjustable every five years), the possibil-
ity of renewal, as well as the ability of either side to terminate the contract with 
one year’s notice.86 Unlike the permanence of national marine sanctuaries, this 
national park includes flexible, fluid, and changeable parameters.
Today, this location is the only national park south of the equator. This area 
includes 13,500 total acres with four thousand marine acres that are mostly coral 
reefs. The park has about five thousand visitors a year and employs an average of 
twenty- five people (thirty- seven American Conservation Experience members, 
one volunteer, and twenty- four firefighters). According to the park’s website, “all 
of the park’s resources are interwoven within the Samoan culture. In keeping 
with the meaning of the word Samoa — “sacred earth” — the park helps protect 
fa‘asamoa — the customs, beliefs, and traditions of the 3,000- year- old Samoan 
culture,” providing educational information about aspects of Sāmoan life and 
legends.87
But even as the National Parks System acknowledges the importance of Sā-
moan culture and ties to the land, as Spence has stated, federally protected areas 
are often “pleasureground[s] for the benefit and enjoyment of the people,” where 
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Americans “could go to share their national identity and an appreciation for 
natural beauty.”88 The National Park of American Sāmoa continues the historic 
pattern of U.S. nature management in indigenous spaces for Western purposes, 
which is ultimately a form of native dispossession. However, the terms of the 
limited leases in American Sāmoa also require the National Parks System to 
be respectful, accommodating, and sensitive to indigenous peoples and their 
protocols (aspects of vā) throughout all their actions and policies in this region. 
Ultimately, national park officials understand that the land and the water belong 
to the native population.
Post- Extension Thoughts
Several government staff who work on marine protection in American Sāmoa 
expressed how the negatively viewed sanctuary expansion has resulted in overall 
community hesitance to participate in federal or territorial ocean- zoning pro-
grams after 2012. Susan White, superintendent for the Pacific Reefs National 
Wildlife Refuge Complex, stated that “comments at public meetings and at reg-
ulations.gov have been overwhelmingly negative. Ultimately, the negative feel-
ings in the community in regards to the sanctuary’s proposed expansion puts 
all agencies and organizations conducting marine protection work in American 
Samoa in a bad light.”89 In particular, the National Parks Service and the local 
Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources have felt the repercussions of the 
poorly received sanctuary expansion process. To this day, some villagers act hesi-
tantly, if not suspiciously, towards government- related environmental initiatives.
However, National Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa deputy superinten-
dent Atuatasi Lelei Peau emphasized the many positive outcomes that developed 
since sanctuary expansion in 2012. He highlighted work with sanctuary com-
munities to develop and promote ecotourism as a means to “build long lasting 
protection of sanctuary management areas, and generate job opportunities for 
village elderly and youth.”90 Peau believed both environmental protection and 
income opportunities provided by the sanctuary benefited local communities.
In 2012, the Tauese P. F. Sunia Ocean Center was opened. This state- of- the- art 
gateway for the National Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa “is a learning, 
training and discovery center that celebrates the importance of cultural and 
natural ocean resources in American Samoa. The exhibits address the value of 
coral reefs, understanding the ocean ecosystems, how our culture ties into the 
management of coral reefs, as well as the natural and humanogenic threats to 
our reefs.”91 There is a small meeting room, small exhibit area/conference room, 
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and a main exhibit area. By 2015, more than twenty- eight thousand people vis-
ited this facility from all over American Sāmoa and the world.92 Twenty- two 
percent have been local residents and science students. Cruise ships that land in 
American Sāmoa for the day visit this sanctuary headquarters as part of their 
land tour. Local schools and other institutions use the meeting facilities on a 
regular basis. Peau also discussed how the national marine sanctuary highlights 
Sāmoan folklore, traditional legends, and culture in interpretation about sanc-
tuary management areas. In all these ways, the sanctuary has become a center for 
education, conference meetings, marine research, and tourism.
However, Peau also acknowledged that there is always room for improvement. 
“Of course, people always have a negative perspective of federal programs rather 
than assume these positions, we encourage individuals, communities and orga-
nizations to meet with us. By doing so, they gain understanding and awareness 
of the National Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa.”93 The deputy superin-
tendent expressed how misperceptions among the community during expansion 
efforts were centered on taking rights to land and community use of ocean areas. 
With the exception of Fagatele Bay, which is the only no- take area in the six 
sites, all other areas allow some form of fishing. Peau also stated how the pri-
mary focus of the sanctuary program involved community livelihoods through 
stewardship
Today, most people do not talk much about the sanctuary, except in regards to 
their outreach and education programs. After the expansion, the Sanctuary Ad-
visory Council continued to meet and sanctuary staff worked on several ocean 
research and awareness efforts. For example, in 2014 the sanctuary participated 
in the Office of National Marine Sanctuaries’ call to action to encourage ocean 
recreation in marine sanctuaries.94 This recommendation resulted in the “Get 
Into Your Sanctuary” project in 2015, where people were encouraged to visit fed-
erally protected areas. Students were particularly targeted through a photofish-
ing tournament. To raise awareness on the types of fishing allowed in sanctuary 
waters, National Marine Sanctuary staff hosted fishing days in different parts of 
American Sāmoa in April and June 2015. They provided gear for those without 
rod and reels and taught some how to fish. At the end of the day, photos were 
taken and posted to Facebook. The kids who submitted the pictures with the 
most likes received ocean- related prizes such as snorkel gear or rods and reels. 
This project, which has continued every year through 2018, works to raise aware-
ness of rules and regulations in the sanctuary and combat misconceptions about 
fishing bans in the region.
At the regional level, post- 2012 NOAA programming has become more 
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sensitive to indigenous processes and ways of communicating as a result of the 
blowback from the enlargement of National Marine Sanctuary of American 
Sāmoa. Bill Thomas, now the Senior Advisor for Islands, Indigenous and In-
ternational Issues at NOAA’s Office for Coastal Management, explained how 
anyone working in American Sāmoa needs “to invest in relationships. It’s about 
two people getting to know each other, creating deep relationships.”95 NOAA 
Pacific Islands regional administrator Michael Tosatto also echoed this senti-
ment, stating that partnership is key and “a little bit of engagement helps a lot. 
You need frequent connections. It’s really hard to service this territory.”96 To-
satto continued to explain how “it’s hard to connect and get things done from 
Honolulu. It’s better to be face- to- face than sending an email. At the very least 
make a phone call.”97 This regional level of federal administration is more aware 
than ever about the importance of substantial community contact, as well as 
continued and open communication.
In conclusion, the National Marine Sanctuary system was initially used by 
American Sāmoan U.S. colonials as a method to preserve their native marine 
resources. The successful federal protection of Fagatele Bay provided an example 
of overlapping local indigenous and federal imperial desires and goals. But once 
these waters were included in the sanctuary system, activities within this area 
became subject to specific U.S. government regulations and management long 
term, dispossessing natives of their ultimate sovereignty in these waters.
Through the years, native American Sāmoans have not hesitated to express 
either their support for or protest against federal policies. As long as this unin-
corporated territory remains part of the United States, NOAA should continue 
to figure out the most effective and ethical way to work with this colonized 
population. As Mitchell Thomashow urged, bioregional sensibility “requires 
multiple voices and interpretations,” and is “necessarily open- ended and flexi-
ble.”98 In addition to involving the community and recording their feedback, a 
full engagement with issues raised is important. A balance of active education, 
direct communication, community involvement, fa‘a Sāmoa, and vā fealoa‘ i are 
keys to the buy- in and support of indigenous groups for imperial policies. The 
next chapter discusses local efforts to develop ocean- use policy that acknowledge 
and integrate traditional native processes and practices with western scientific 
standards and policies.
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 Ch a pter 4
The Impact of the U.S. Imperial Grants System  
on Indigenous Marine Programs
This chapter explores two American Sāmoa Government (ASG) marine pro-
grams centered on territorial waters from the shore to three miles out: the 
Community- Based Fisheries Management Program and data collection on shing 
eorts in the region. While local sta members run and maintain these initiatives 
on a daily basis, the U.S. federal government funds and regulates most projects. 
The expectations attached to grant money has resulted in the incorporation of 
western practices and standards into traditional indigenous marine protection 
processes. This interweaving of local and U.S. procedures has resulted in greater 
ocean health. However, nonnative inuences have also shaped the priorities of 
the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources (DMWR), as well as the 
methods used to access and monitor sheries in the region. Traditional shing 
practices, as well as historic forms of indigenous marine knowledge and manage-
ment, have been regulated and subsumed through this process.
Unlike the minimum wage issue discussed in chapter 2 and the expansion 
of the marine sanctuary examined in chapter 3, DMWR has worked diligently 
to incorporate cultural traditions like vā fealoa‘ i (social respect) and fa‘a Sāmoa 
(the Sāmoan way of life) into their processes and polices throughout their pro-
gramming, enabled by the unique political- legal situation of shared native and 
federal governance over waters surrounding American Sāmoa. However, local 
territorial sta are still under the overall supervision and management of the 
U.S. federal government. Even though these initiatives acknowledge and use 
indigenous customs to deeply engage with the community, the types of projects 
that get funded by federal agencies encourage western forms of knowledge mak-
ing, management, and shing. Required applications, status reports, and strict 
deadlines also result in tight U.S. government control over their annual, but 
neither guaranteed nor permanent, contributions to approximately 30 percent 
of the Gross Domestic Product of this unincorporated territory.1 Such major 
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nonnative economic and bureaucratic influences on indigenous marine initia-
tives are rooted in American Sāmoans’ U.S. colonial status as belonging to, but 
not part of the United States. This current subjected indigenous situation, or 
bioregion, like the other cases analyzed in this book, is generally invisible to the 
U.S. public and the wider environmental movement across the globe. Ecology 
programs should be conscientious of the impacts Western- based initiatives have 
on native lives.
Historical Background
Since the formation of the ASG in 1977, there has always been a local unit dedi-
cated to the growth of fisheries. This bureaucratic entity was first recommended 
in 1961 by John C. Marr, director of the Hawai‘i area Bureau of Commercial 
Fisheries, which was the predecessor to the National Marine Fisheries Service. 
Marr encouraged “the development of a government agency at the department 
level to guide and assist fisheries development, with a priority on the introduc-
tion of a suitable small craft for nearshore fisheries.”2 This U.S. government push 
to grow fisheries in American Sāmoa through increased fishing effort, as well as 
the creation of a standardized bureaucracy occurred at the same time as Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy’s initiatives to modernize American Sāmoa through the 
creation of more infrastructure and the introduction of modern technologies in 
the 1960s discussed in the introduction.
At first, the Office of Marine Resources was a division of the Governor’s Of-
fice that also conducted ocean assessments.3 In 1985, Marine Resources director 
Ufagafa Ray Tulafono submitted a bill to the American Sāmoa legislature that 
successfully changed the status of the office to an independent department. Over 
the years, the DMWR has developed multiple projects to conserve and promote 
positive ocean use in the region.4 Overall, this agency aims “to preserve, protect, 
perpetuate and manage the marine and wildlife resources within the Territory. 
. . . [and] to implement such policy and purpose to the fullest extent.”5 One of 
the most successful programs to date has been the Community- Based Fisheries 
Management Program. This initiative created customized Village Marine Pro-
tected Areas (VMPAs) that effectively incorporated indigenous traditions with 
Western ecological priorities. A more challenging but important department 
program involved on- the- ground data collection of shore- based and offshore 
fishing activities in local waters.
Both of these projects have been largely financed by the U.S. government 
grants system. Specifically, the U.S. Federal Sport Fish Restoration Program 
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(SFR), a division of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the Department 
of the Interior, has funded most Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
initiatives. This set of federal monies is earmarked for fishery projects, boating 
access, and aquatic education run by fish and wildlife agencies in all states of the 
union, the District of Columbia, and insular areas. The Sport Fish Restoration 
Act of 1950 created the SFR “to restore and better manage America’s declin-
ing fishery resources.”6 Capital for this program comes from taxes on fishing 
equipment, motorboat and small engine fuels, import duties, and interest from 
the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund. Then “grant funds are dis-
bursed to states for approved grants up to 75% of the project costs and insular 
areas up to 100% of the project costs.”7 Overall, the Sport Fish Restoration Pro-
gram promotes the growth and long- term success of fishing and boating through 
fees of Western- style rod and reel angling, as well as motorized vessels.
The SFR started funding fishery work in American Sāmoa in 1972 with an 
initial grant of $44,783. Grants have generally increased every year reaching the 
$100,000 level in 1981, the $500,000 mark in 1988, and the $1 million amount 
in 2007, staying above that amount through today. In 2018, the program ap-
portioned a total of $351,917,483 throughout U.S. jurisdiction, with American 
Sāmoa receiving $1,091,964, the average amount that other insular territories 
received.8 Every grant lasts one fiscal year. The financial viability of native Amer-
ican Sāmoa ocean programming is highly dependent on continued access to 
these monies.
Community- Based Fisheries Management Program
In 2000, the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program (CFMP) was 
created to encourage each village in American Sāmoa to develop their own ma-
rine protection policies. Villages volunteered to participate in this initiative 
and community members decided on ocean use policies through conventional 
indigenous social and political hierarchies in the region. The overall purpose 
of the CFMP is “to assist villages in managing and conserving their inshore 
fishery resources through a voluntary co- management with the government.”9 
Allamander Amituana‘i and Fatima Sauafea also discussed how the major goals 
of the project involved the improvement of shore- based fishery resources and 
the enhancement of village stewardship over marine resources.10 Other aims of 
the program include an increase in fish population and general ocean health 
through community regulation of marine practices. Additionally, this initiative 
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strengthens enforcement capabilities of the village community through territo-
rial government involvement.
In the creation of a VMPA, proper vā (social relations) is incorporated. To 
participate in the program, a village must contact the director of the Depart-
ment of Marine and Wildlife Resources, who schedules a first meeting. The 
ASG never initiates contact for the creation of a marine protected area. After 
an initial face- to- face conversation with a village representative to examine the 
community’s potential to enforce a monitored zone, Community- Based Fisher-
ies Management Program staff members present a program on the possibilities 
for VMPAs.11
Usually three groups are involved in this introductory and educational part 
of the process. First, the village mātai, who compose the village council, are 
approached. Then a presentation is made to the women’s group, as well as the 
untitled men of the village (aumaga). Each of these sections of the community is 
provided information on the details of how to implement a marine management 
plan. The village council then picks representatives from the community to form 
a fishery advisory group. These individuals work together to develop the details 
of their specific VMPA. Each community creates their own unique regulations 
from a six- page menu of all potential rules provided by the DMWR. Once a 
plan is made, the details are presented to the village mātai for any feedback or 
changes. Afterwards, revisions are applied and approved by the village chief. 
Only after this extended and often slow process is completed will the depart-
ment start to develop official policies for a specific VMPA.
Possible restrictions for Village Marine Protected Areas include limiting the 
type of fishing methods, fishing periods, and fishing locations allowed, regulat-
ing the amount, type, and/or size of fish that can be taken, as well as banning dif-
ferent types of fishing. According to Community- Based Fisheries Management 
Program project head Saumaniafaese Uikirifi, “they pick which they want to 
apply. In some villages spear fishing is illegal. In others it’s legal but no flashlight 
allowed. Some villages only open on weekends or one Saturday throughout the 
whole year. You pick what you want. Having that menu helps a lot.”12 Ultimately, 
the high chief of the village makes the final decision to approve the parameters 
of their specific VMPA and signs an agreement with the Department of Marine 
and Wildlife Resources. Everyone in the community then usually follows the 
rules created through this process.
Once the VMPA is in place, “the village provides parallel support, voluntary 
participation in meetings, and voluntary commitment of labor for enforcement, 
monitoring, and review of activities. . . . DMWR in turn provides technical 
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assistance and advice, workshops and trainings to enhance community under-
standing of how to manage and protect the marine environment, assistance with 
development of the village Fisheries Management Plan and other forms of sup-
port to assist with proper implementation of the program.”13 This entire process 
shows how the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources and the commu-
nity work together closely to develop marine policies that reect the desires of the 
village as a whole through the traditional Sāmoan consensus- building process.
In 2016, VMPAs included “approximately 25 percent of coral reef area in 
the territory, with nearly 7 percent of coral reef area within no- take reserves.”14
Twelve villages participated in this initiative: villages on the eastern side of Tu-
tuila included Aoa, Alofau, Masausi, Amaua and Auto, Sailele, Aua, Vatia. West-
ern villages involved in the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program 
included Matuu- Faganeanea, Amanavae, Poloa, and Fagamalo. On the island of 
Manu‘a, the villages of Siufaga and Luma also had a Village Marine Protected 
Area. Additionally, the village of Alega on the eastern side had a protected area 
that was monitored and enforced by the local bar owner. However the region was 
not formally part of the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program.
Every month, program sta members try to make face- to- face contact with 
people in participating villages on Tutuila. During these community visits, two 
program members usually interview either the village mayor or someone else in 
the community they see as they drive through the village in their government 
Figure 4.01. Village Marine Protected Area sign. (Author photo.)
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vehicle. Staff members often visit on Wednesdays when many are outside for 
the weekly village cleanup day. These monthly check- ins are an opportunity to 
review the status of the VMPAs, as well as make inquiries on any violations or 
challenges to the program.
Initially these protected areas were not official law enforceable by the Amer-
ican Sāmoa Government. After a 2005 court case that questioned the ability of 
village residents in Fagamalo to enforce Community- Based Fisheries Manage-
ment Program regulations, the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
proposed legislation to give the agency the legal authority to police VMPAs.15 
This bill passed in 2008 with the intent “to ensure that the Territory and its sur-
rounding waters are safe habitats for fish, shellfish and other marine life to exist 
and propagate for the continued use and enjoyment for the people of American 
Samoa, its future generations and visitors.”16 The priority of this legislation was 
to protect and hopefully increase sea life populations for future use.
Since the enforcement division of the Department of Marine and Wildlife 
Resources was short- staffed, as discussed in chapter 3, the agency deputized two 
representatives from each participating village to keep an eye out for violations 
of VMPAs in their community. These officials are usually the village mayor and 
the village policeman. Once appointed by the director of the DMWR, these 
individuals have the ability to write citations and notify the department of any 
infractions. Unfortunately, by the time an agency representative can get to the 
location of a violation, the lawbreaker is frequently gone.17
Every year, the program holds a daylong monitoring workshop to train and 
reward volunteer VMPA officers from each village. Deputies are either initiated 
or renewed for the year at this session. Deputies can change after every two- year 
term. According to Uikirifi, this event is a “way to acknowledge village mayors, 
acknowledge them for their hard work. Those active with us, we give them rod 
and reels. They are not being paid. They spend a lot of time helping us.”18 While 
the DMWR does not pay village mayors, the individuals do get a general stipend 
from the American Sāmoa Government that encourages them to cooperate with 
government projects like the Community- Based Fisheries Management Pro-
gram. There are also awards for best VMPA officers. Additionally, this gathering 
gives the agency an opportunity to share their findings on local fishing statistics, 
a valued gesture in the community. Past presentations have included topics such 
as “The Coral Reefs of American Samoa” and the “Creation of a No- Take MPA 
in Fagamalo’s Marine Managed Area.”19
According to Uikirifi, at the beginning of the program villages wanted to close 
all access to water resources.20 At the time, this policy was positively received by 
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communities due to a sense of marine scarcity that was occurring throughout 
the region. According to a 2000 report by Peter Craig, “Harvested species such 
as giant clams and parrotfish are overfished, and there is heavy fishing pressure 
on surgeonfish. Fewer and/or smaller groupers, snappers, and jacks are seen. Most 
village fishers and elders believe that numbers of fish and shellfish have also de-
clined. Also, in some areas, fish are now toxic with heavy metals.”21 Five years after 
the start of the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program, a NOAA re-
port stated that “the biomass status of the American Samoa bottomfish complex 
in 2005 was healthy.”22 Such growth is a major goal of this program.
According to Mark Mitsuyasu, the Fisheries Program Officer for the West-
ern Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council (Wespac), traditional marine 
management in Sāmoa would conserve during scarcity and use during abun-
dance.23 More fish in the water led some communities to end angling restric-
tions. In 2016, the villages of Amaua and Auto decided to change their policies 
and open up their VMPA to fishing. But any fisher was still expected to get 
permission from the village mayor to angle in community waters.
That same year, the village of Aoa started discussing the possibility of re-
closing their marine protected area after being open for four years. Proponents 
believed overfishing was having an impact again and wanted to reinstate restric-
tions so the ocean could continue to grow to feed future generations. Opponents 
to a closed marine area wanted the opportunity to angle every day to provide 
for their families. The proposed compromise between these two sides involved 
a zoning proposal which would allow “one area to fish. . . . Even if whole area is 
closed, some methods could be used. No spearfishing, just rod and reel.”24 How-
ever, the proposal had to be approved by the village council and was predicted to 
take a long time to change because of competing views in the community. Due 
to the historically fluid and changeable nature of indigenous marine policies, the 
implementation of VMPAs also shifted depending on circumstances.
Tuipagai and Talouavu‘u was another area that removed fishing restrictions 
after a period of ocean recovery time under a Village Protected Area. Sakaio 
Misifoa, chief of Tuipagai and Talouavu‘u, believed this region had other pro-
tections to maintain the progress in marine health that occurred through the 
Community- Based Fisheries Management Program. He claimed that only two 
people in the village fished. Misifoa further explained how there was “only one 
way through [to the ocean] and there’s a gate.”25 One has to contact the village 
mayor to enter that area and access the shoreline. Such detailed knowledge of 
ground- level realities in the community justified opening the waters at that par-
ticular point in time.
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Uikirifi explained how sometimes “everything going on in village is stopped 
by one issue. When something like that happens, we leave them alone. They are 
still part of our program, we’ll still work with them. It’s not an issue between 
the program and village” but politics among the village leadership.26 One time, 
a group of chiefs told program staff “to be patient and give us time” to sort out 
other village issues before moving forward.27 Because vā fealoa‘ i and the use of a 
measured and deliberate traditional decision- making process are highly valued 
in Sāmoan culture, Community- Based Fisheries Management Program staff 
abide by such requests, in turn gaining trust and respect from village members 
for following fa‘a Sāmoa.
When a serious issue develops that impedes the program, Community- Based 
Fisheries Management Program staff members inform the department’s director 
who talks to the high chiefs. If no agreement can be reached, the agency steps 
down from working directly with the village. For example, relations with Vatia 
deteriorated in 2016 and the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
stopped actively working with the village. According to Uikirifi, “Our program 
can’t provide enforcement right now, but that does not stop us from outreach, 
conducting awareness through media and youth groups” in that particular com-
munity.28 Community- Based Fisheries Management Program staff members try 
to maintain some form of contact with any village they have had historic as-
sociations with, as long as that communication does not overstep appropriate 
informal interactions after official relations have stopped. But that outcome is 
the least desirable and the last resort for the department.
While Village Marine Protected Areas confer territorial government admin-
istrative control over local waters in participating villages, communities have the 
ability to remove restrictions or end the program at any point. As already de-
scribed, a few villages have already exercised this right. Such fundamental native 
control of near- shore marine policies significantly differs from the overall federal 
authority over waters in the national marine sanctuary discussed in chapter 3.
In addition to the ability to end participation in VMPAs, communities can 
also choose not to participate at all. Of the seventy villages with a coastline in 
American Sāmoa, only twelve took part in the Community- Based Fisheries 
Management Program at the time of this study. The majority of villages have 
chosen not to get involved in the first fifteen years of the project’s existence.
Many scholars have discussed the importance of using traditional ecological 
knowledge (TEK) for successful native conservation programs. Coined by schol-
ars Fikret Berkes, Johan Colding, and Carl Folke, the concept of TEK is known 
as “a cumulative body of knowledge, practice, and belief, evolving by adaptive 
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processes and handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about 
the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and with 
their environment.”29 Scholars of traditional ecological knowledge believe in-
digenous wisdom, particularly in relation to the local environment, can enlarge 
and enhance Western forms of scientific understanding, research processes, and 
ecological programs.
Bill Thomas, the Senior Advisor for Islands, Indigenous and International Is-
sues at NOAA’s Office for Coastal Management, also discussed how indigenous 
science involves “inter- generational longitudinal studies at the speed of nature 
and life. Indigenous management practices have their own checks and balances 
through village councils that go through a peer- review process. Indigenous sci-
ence explains how native people came to be here today.”30 The Community- Based 
Fisheries Management Program in American Sāmoa acknowledges each village’s 
historic right to make decisions on the use of their waters. In this way, traditional 
ecological knowledge is incorporated into federally funded initiatives to protect 
local marine resources for future use.
In Sāmoan culture, “ownership of the reefs and their resources was tradition-
ally vested in the chiefs of each village in a like manner to land ownership. Seldom 
did a member of one village fish on the reefs or within sight of another village.”31 
Historically, village boundaries extended into the ocean bordering communal 
land and out as far as the eye could see. Outsiders needed to ask permission from 
a leader in the village before fishing in the area.
Ocean- use regulations and conservation policies were also an integral part of 
ancient Sāmoan fishing and community customs, making contemporary marine 
protected areas a somewhat familiar concept. According to researcher Richard 
Wass, “Marine resources were controlled by a council of village chiefs who could 
institute any management measure they desired or felt necessary. A complex sys-
tem of taboos reserving certain species and size of fish for the chiefs and restrict-
ing effort to certain seasons and locations arose which served to protect the reefs 
from over- exploitation.”32 American Sāmoans have a long tradition of marine 
monitoring, connected to their native decision- making structure, which could 
react to an environmental issue when necessary. Regular customs developed for 
fishing during specific times and places to avoid overfishing. Michael Tosatto, 
NOAA Pacific Islands Regional Office director discussed how “tapu (or prohi-
bitions) was a sound process. There was a time and place for closed areas. Areas 
would open and close and there would be a penalty when someone went fishing 
during the closed period.”33 Through this native system, specific rules could also 
be implemented quickly and on a temporary basis.
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However, traditional ocean- management systems are not the same as western- 
based marine protected areas. For example, political status and social hierarchies 
were reinforced by the designation of certain sea life for the exclusive use of vil-
lage leaders. Peter Eves of the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources’ 
enforcement division explained how “sea turtles are for the high chief. If one gets 
caught, it automatically goes to the chief. Now a days, regulations protect them, 
even their eggs. [However,] Parts of shells are used for ornamental purposes. 
They [villagers] are still doing it now a days, but we are trying to stop it.”34 Tra-
ditional indigenous practices sometimes directly conflict with federal wildlife 
protection regulations.
Nevertheless, some members of the indigenous community continue to en-
gage in these historical practices of gifting precious sea life to chiefs. According 
to Tui Atua, some “fish are honorifically referred to as tamasoaalii (meaning, 
the companion of the chief). . . . The use of honorifics denotes status and re-
spect.”35 Offering certain animals to chiefs is part of sacred and central aspects of 
traditional Sāmoan practices. American Sāmoan U.S. colonials must negotiate 
between ancient native practices that are still revered today and the possibility 
of severe punishment based on western ecological standards.
Consequently, Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources enforce-
ment staff members have to balance respect for their indigenous culture and 
implementing federal laws. Ultimately, Eves stated “no one is above the law” 
and government regulations work for the greater good.36 This prioritization of 
U.S.- based laws shifts the standards of what types of marine practices are ac-
ceptable away from traditional indigenous uses towards Western perspectives 
on sea life preservation. Villagers are also subject to federal endangered species 
and U.S. wildlife protection laws for marine mammals and coral.37 Penalties 
for violations can include fines up to $500 per violation and up to six months in 
jail.38 The application of the strictest active law positions nonnative U.S. federal 
government environmental policies above native practices.
Another difference between indigenous and western marine protection pro-
grams involves ultimate authority over marine resources being vested in the 
territorial government. Instead of rules made and enforced by village chiefs, as 
well as community self- compliance, the Department of Marine and Wildlife 
Resources has had the power to enforce regulations in restricted ocean zones 
since 2008. While the village has to initiate the process to start an official Vil-
lage Marine Protected Area, overall parameters, management, monitoring are 
verified and enacted through the American Sāmoan government that is over-
seen by the U.S. federal government. The DMWR implements a western- style 
 Impact of the U.S. Imperial Grants System 121 
bureaucratic system of rule, logging any activity related to VMPAs in written 
reports, requiring villages to document restricted zone – related bylaws, approv-
ing possible fishing methods from a six- page menu, as well as applying monetary 
fines and/or prison sentences for violations. This administration creates much 
written documentation, often in English, as well as Western cash and incarcer-
ation methods of punishment.
According to two DMWR staff members, despite the creation of marine pro-
tected areas with clear regulations and an enforcement system in place, there was 
still a lot of illegal fishing. These poachers “park their alia boats, then swim to 
protected areas” that are two hundred yards off the reef slope. Villagers always 
confront outsiders to find out what they are doing in their waters, as is tradition. 
Because each community has their own set of village bylaws, they also have their 
own justice process. For example, if someone from outside the village fishes at 
Amanave, it will take about a month to go through the village court.”39 Unsanc-
tioned fishing in village waters has always occurred. However, the methods and 
authority to deter such activity have shifted with the Community- Based Fish-
eries Management Program. Some villages joined VMPAs because they did not 
want outsiders fishing in their waters. When one area closed, people sometimes 
moved to the next closest unprotected area to fish. This domino effect motivated 
other villages to join the program to safeguard their oceanfront as well. Village 
mātai set the initial rules and the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
works in conjunction with village deputies to enforce the written rules of the 
protected area.
Mātai politics also complicate the creation, implementation, and mainte-
nance of government programs. If one mātai does not like another mātai, he or 
she might oppose a project that her or his rival supports, like a Village Marine 
Protected Area. If the village council does not agree with the protected area, 
they might not enforce the regulations or punish rule violators. The DMWR 
has requested the Secretary of Sāmoan Affairs to talk to village mayors, “ask-
ing them to look out for us.”40 When an issue surfaces, the department director 
tries to contact the village’s high chief. But if he or she is not responsive, this 
territorial government official approaches other chiefs. While ultimate legal en-
forcement lies with the territorial department, the village chiefs oversee both 
community cooperation and participation. The centrality of proper vā in the 
Sāmoan community adjudication process is why full village support for official 
marine protected areas is so important.
Another cultural challenge for the Community- Based Fisheries Management 
Program involves the fact that program staff consists mostly of younger men and 
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women. In Sāmoan culture, it is not appropriate for younger untitled individuals 
to approach mātai. Uikirifi discussed how one key to the CFMP success involved 
contacting the right person in the correct way for the Sāmoan social- political 
hierarchy. This native structure led the program to target village mayors to serve 
as VMPA deputies. Without the buy- in of villagers through proper vā fealoa‘ i 
and fa‘a Sāmoa, the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources would not 
have the community support to protect marine areas. DMWR staff members 
would also barely know about, let alone have a fighting chance to catch quickly 
mobile lawbreakers.
In 1978, R. E. Johannes, a leading scholar of community- based marine re-
source management (CBMRM) in the Pacific, believed indigenous- based ocean 
policies were in decline. The shift to canned and frozen food, as opposed to 
self- sufficient fishing resulted in less traditional forms of ocean use that he feared 
would be lost in the future.41 But in 2012, he admitted that his earlier prediction 
was incorrect and that CBMRM was rebounding. According to Johannes, “fac-
tors contributing to the upsurge include a growing perception of scarcity, the 
re- strengthening of traditional village- based authority, and marine tenure by 
means of legal recognition and government support, better conservation edu-
cation, increasingly effective assistance, and advice from regional and national 
governments and NGOs. Today’s CBMRM is thus a form of cooperative man-
agement, but one in which the community still makes and acts upon most of the 
management decisions.”42 In American Sāmoa, local government support for an 
indigenous- based community approach to marine protected areas, local fears 
over fish scarcity, federal funding, as well as extensive education and outreach 
programs, have resulted in a successful Community- Based Fisheries Manage-
ment Program in the region. The shared western and native authority created 
through the 1900 Deeds of Cession was exemplified by this DMWR initiative.
In fact, it seems as if Johannes’s 1978 warning stimulated ocean policies 
administrators to focus on integrating traditional indigenous practices with 
modern management regulations. In 1982, Wass stated that “historically, the 
Samoans were very much aware of the need to conserve and protect their ma-
rine resources. . . . The acquisition of Western culture and its attendant legal 
system, however, has caused the disappearance of many of the traditional man-
agement methods in the more populated and developed areas. Modern fisheries 
management requires the resurrection and reinforcement of selected traditional 
practices and the blending of these with methods and regulations based on 
comprehensive resource inventories and scientific study.”43 While official village 
collaboration with government ocean programs did not occur consistently until 
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the creation of the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program in 2000, 
the current success of the program demonstrates the importance of integrating 
traditional ecological knowledge- based marine management and appropriate vā 
into government projects in American Sāmoa.
Overall, many scholars have found that “community support for conservation 
plans consistently emerges as one of the most important factors in maintaining 
the plans’ long- term efficacy, and programs that incorporate customary ecolog-
ical management practices in their design draw more support from local peo-
ples.”44 Greater native participation and compliance can develop from policies 
that coincide with established indigenous practices.
Jon Barnett and John Campbell also found that “a careful approach to commu-
nity engagement is required, and that such approaches cannot be rushed, need to 
fully respect but not necessarily unquestioningly idealize local knowledges, and 
are best implemented by people from within the region who understand what 
it means to live and work in local communities.”45 Patient Community- Based 
Fisheries Management Program native staff members have been key to bridging 
indigenous and western approaches to marine management.
In general, the community responded positively to ocean policy management 
programs when they were actively involved in the process through traditional 
and familiar indigenous decision- making processes, demonstrating vā fealoa‘ i 
and fa‘a Sāmoa. The village deputy for Aoa, La‘aloa Taulaga wanted “to thank 
DMWR and the program for giving him the opportunity to work together.”46 
He recalled how after the Village Marine Protected Area started in his commu-
nity, the area’s waters “saw a lot of fish, seasonal fish, mullet not seen before” the 
creation of a restricted fishing area.47 Several villages found much value in partic-
ipating in the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program. Misifoa also 
recounted how the VMPA was “a good tool to protect our resources, protect for 
the future. . . . The program was really helpful for the village. . . . more fish, more 
sharks seen in the area. Turtles are indicators of good and healthy reef, a lot of 
fish.”48 He also discussed the increase in seasonal fish.
Barnett and Campbell believed “both local and formal technical knowledge 
is required, as local knowledge may not always be technically correct; technical 
assessments are greatly enhanced by local input; and decision making based on 
either, rather than both, is less likely to be effective and locally legitimate.”49 In 
their research on climate change, a balance of native and Western knowledges 
and approaches has yielded more success for environmental programs through-
out the South Pacific.
When Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources employees conducted 
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biological water sampling and monitoring as part of their grant parameters, staff 
members gave community members masks and fins to assist in the process. Pro-
gram members “try to seal a bond with the village. Every time they see us, they 
already know it’s us. . . . when they see that we are trying to take more productive 
outreach. . . . They really supported us when we’re going to the community. They 
call us because they think they see something.”50 Including villagers in scien-
tific research efforts, as well as enforcement, increases goodwill and support for 
the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program. Many researchers have 
corroborated the idea that “because VMPAs are managed by local communities 
that have a direct interest in their success, compliance with bans on fishing is 
high within the village.”51 However, Western styles of fishing, data collection, 
and monitoring were also encouraged through the program’s provision of non-
native equipment like rods and reels, as well as masks and fins. Such procedures 
and materials overshadow traditional native fishing practices and management 
processes.
The success of the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program can 
also be hampered by dependence on federal monies. One DMWR employee 
explained how “all water activities are on hold... Maybe by next month money 
will come in again. That’s the problem. 90% of the department is funded by the 
federal government. That money goes to the American Sāmoa government, then 
the government to us. So if folks in government doesn’t comply,” we lose our 
funding.52 That specific grant did not come through until 2017. Incorrectly fill-
ing out an application or filing a report late could immediately and indefinitely 
halt projects in the middle of activity.
Fulfilling all government grant requirements takes a lot of staff time. Each 
annual application for the Sport Fish Restoration Program requires ten different 
documents, including a project statement with fifteen subsections. Once monies 
are awarded, there are six areas of administrative requirements with 520 specific 
rules. In 2018, there were fourteen terms and conditions that had to be followed 
to maintain funding. All applications had to be written in English and sub-
mitted online.53 The constant need to reapply for grants on a yearly basis and 
follow the many complicated, detailed, and frequently changing rules put most 
DMWR initiatives in a precarious position of never truly knowing how long 
grants will last, how much money they will receive, or how long a project can 
be sustained. A lack of U.S. federal funding could also impact the continued 
participation of local leaders who receive much- appreciated awards and equip-
ment from the program. Such liminal status, which is typical for most U.S. gov-
ernment grant programs, compounded the already variable and unstable U.S. 
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colonial experiences of American Sāmoans that have been discussed throughout 
this book.
While the potentially intermittent nature of federal funding could hinder 
long- term scientific research projects, local management of marine protected 
areas based on traditional Sāmoan village structures and proper vā has contin-
ued in this bioregion, or totality of ecological and cultural relationships. The 
inconsistency of grant money was highly inconvenient but not detrimental to 
the effectiveness of the program. More funding could result in better program 
implementation, as shown in the next case study about data collection. However, 
because the Community- Based Fisheries Management Program is grounded in 
traditional marine protection and management processes, this initiative has 
been one of the most successful projects for the DMWR to date.
Data Collection
The topic of data collection and statistics often seems dry and boring. However, 
the numbers developed from these efforts are extremely critical to successfully 
accessing U.S. federal grant money. The stronger one’s statistics are, the more 
convincing one’s case can be when applying for government funding. American 
Sāmoa has generally suffered from either a lack of marine data or inconsistencies 
in the collection of that information. From a western empirical evidence- based 
perspective, this state of affairs negatively impacts the territorial government’s 
ability to advocate and gain protection for specific access to their ancestral water 
resources.
After the Office of Marine Resources transitioned into an independent gov-
ernment department in 1985, Director Tulafono made data collection of con-
temporary local fishing practices in American Sāmoa a major goal.54 There have 
been two main types of marine information gathered in the region: shore- based 
and offshore, or boat- based. The Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
website explained how “the term ‘Shore based’ covers all fishing activities from 
shore regardless of where the fishing occurred, inside or outside the reef or la-
goon.”55 Any type of angling from a vessel is counted as offshore statistics. The 
agency’s first data collection efforts occurred in 1972.56 According to Craig Sev-
erance, Kitty Simonds, and Robert Franco, “the shoreline subsistence fishery 
on Tutuila Island was first examined in the late 1970’s by Hill (1978) and Wass 
(1980).”57 Catch data was first recorded along the south shore of Tutuila, where 
35 percent of the people lived. Then, on a per capita basis, data collection was 
expanded to produce territorial catch statistics. The National Marine Fisheries 
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Service has monitored the distant- water fleet, or “fishing vessels operating out-
side the waters surrounding their own territories,” that delivers tuna to canneries 
in American Sāmoa, either directly or by contract through the Department of 
Marine and Wildlife Resources since 1963.58
By gathering fishery data, Tulafono hoped to provide “baseline data for deci-
sion makers to help them with decision- making” on marine policies.59 This sta-
tistical foundation made the region’s ocean activity legible to western scientists 
and grantors, but more detached from indigenous Sāmoan views of water man-
agement. Starting off with no federal funding for this project and only eleven 
staff, most of who were administrative, Tulafono “hired two guys, put them 
on bus and gave them 50 cents. 25 cents to get in, catch the bus, and walk from 
village to village. Whatever village they were at by 3pm, they would stop and 
take the bus back. That’s how we did data collection.”60 While staff members 
traveled by government vehicle in 2016, this catch and grab sampling process 
remained relatively similar for shore- based fishing data collected in the twenty- 
first century. However, scholars such as Raymond Buckley, David Itano, and 
Troy Buckley believed that “the data from 1975 to 1984 can only be used for 
qualitative comparisons within and between years due to the irregular sampling 
periods and the lack of standardization in fishing effort and data recording pro-
cedures.”61 Data collection and survey information were not consistently done 
during this period, a problem for Western forms of data analysis.
According to Craig and his co- researchers, “With assistance from WPac-
FIN [Western Pacific Fisheries Information Network] in the 1980s, the data 
collection program was significantly upgraded and expanded to provide bet-
ter coverage and statistics for all local boat- based fisheries.”62 Once again, the 
Western emphasis on the importance of numbers drove the development of the 
data- collection process in American Sāmoa. WPacFIN is “a partnership be-
tween NMFS [National Marine Fisheries Service] and fisheries management 
agencies in American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
Guam and Hawaii with the primary objective to monitor U.S. fisheries in the 
western and central Pacific Ocean. This group collects data on fishing activity 
and catch in local fisheries and issues reports of fisheries statistics to meet the 
needs of local and federal fisheries management organizations.”63 This entity 
supported the collection and dissemination of statistics on marine practices 
throughout the U.S. Pacific to help government agencies form regional policies. 
More specifically, WPacFIN provided funding to hire data transcribers, pur-
chase data- related equipment like computers, and develop information summa-
ries and reports. With such support, the type of marine data obtained for the 
 Impact of the U.S. Imperial Grants System 127 
area became more detailed, specific, and wide- ranging, including vessel- based 
activities. However, the written documentation of facts was again a foreign pro-
cess for ocean management in American Sāmoa.
In 1990, the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources received money 
from NOAA Fisheries to hire more people for data collection of shore- based 
fisheries. Researcher Bonnie Ponwith stated that “beginning in 1991, the fishery 
was again being monitored by a creel and participation survey, conducted 3 days 
a week, stratified by time of day and type of day (weekday/weekend).”64 More 
staff meant more frequent data collection in more areas of the region at different 
times of day. By the mid- 1990s, the DMWR acquired additional funding from 
NOAA Fisheries, through the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management 
Council, for a vehicle and more staff to collect data and interview fishers. No lon-
ger relying on the local bus system, staff members could cover more ground in a 
day’s work. In the early 2000s, the department had a “really good data collection 
system” that surveyed both offshore (boat) and shore- based fishing practices.65 
Through the years, the amount of dedicated employees, type of transportation 
used, and survey content all increased through growth in federal funding from 
the United States, solidifying the main purpose of data collection to provide 
statistics for federal policymaking, including the allotment of grant monies.
In 2015, the DMWR website stated that “collecting fishing method and effort 
data from roadside observation is an important monitoring system that will help 
us manage and preserve our marine resources.”66 In 2016, there were three main 
areas for information gathering on Tutuila. Surveyors visited each section once a 
day, Monday through Friday. The eastern section spanned from Lauli‘i to Tula. 
The central portion ran from Aua to Nu‘uuli. The western section went from 
Vaiola to Amanave. The survey team randomly picked a side in the morning and 
drove along the roads, stopping when they saw anyone fishing. Overall, shore- 
based data collectors tried to interview anglers after they got back from fishing. 
Surveyors wanted to “estimate catch and effort information and to monitor fish-
ing activity of the shore- based fishery.”67 Staff members interviewed any fisher 
that was willing to speak with them by the side of road. Questions asked of these 
individuals included how long they have been fishing, what methods they used, 
what they caught, and how much of which species and which size they caught. 
Surveyors also kept count of how many fishers they saw in general. These kinds 
of data points helped to monitor potential overfishing of U.S.- designated endan-
gered or vulnerable species.
Fishers were familiar with data collectors and could tell when government 
128  chapter 4 
vehicles were approaching on the road from a distance. Many anglers would in-
formally speak with staff. Priti E. Smith, a surveyor in 2015, stated how “we don’t 
want to interrupt. If they are standing with a rod, we can just talk to them.”68 But 
some did not want to converse with survey staff. Sometimes fishers did not want 
to expose their fishing locations. Others wanted to hide illegal catch from sur-
veyors, so left the shore and avoided staff as quickly as possible. Some anglers did 
not want to talk after returning from the water simply because they were tired.
According to the annual stock assessment of 2017, “the shore- based fishery is 
mostly gleaning for shellfish and octopus, rod and reel for groupers and jacks and 
spearfishing for surgeon and parrotfishes.”69 Smith provided more details, esti-
mating that most shore- based fishers were between eighteen and twenty- eight 
years old, with the oldest fisher being around sixty years old. The majority of 
anglers were Sāmoan, but some were of other nonnative nationalities, like Ko-
rean. These fishers, mostly male, used rods, with a significant number also using 
spearfishing (mostly at night). Others used netting or sand mining to catch sea 
life. Women and children engaged in the traditional practice of hand mining, or 
gleaning of the reef. A few used indigenous woven fish traps called ‘enu.70 Most 
of the anglers interviewed were fishing for whatever they could get. Some gave 
their catch to families in their villages, but most sold their catch on the side of 
the road. Some fished in their spare time while others fished for entertainment. 
Most people angled in the central area of the island, like Utulei, Faga‘alu, and 
Lions Park, with smaller numbers on the east and west sides of Tutuila.71 Most 
fishers also worked by themselves. Surveyors usually saw no more than thirty 
anglers during the course of one shift.
Due to lack of funding for additional vehicles, auto repairs, and more staff, 
there were not enough resources on- island to survey all locations at once or on 
other islands of American Sāmoa. Instead, the shore- based survey team worked 
under the assumption that if fishing was happening on one side of the island, 
it was happening at the same frequency in other parts of the island, known as 
a stratified, randomized data collection program. While data collection has oc-
curred in Manu‘a and random information has been recorded for Ofu- Olosega 
and Tau, no long- term statistics have been gathered for these and other islands 
of the territory.
According to Marlowe Sabater, Wespac Fishery Analyst and former DMWR 
employee, the catch and grab sampling process “is the most fitting for the small 
island setting. The problem is the actual implementation is not good. There is no 
overtime pay, compensation time, hazard pay. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Sportfish-
ing doesn’t require high quality data.”72 Fishers often go out or return to shore 
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very late at night or very early in the morning. Department of Marine and Wild-
life Resources staff members adjust their work schedules according to that of the 
anglers. Sometimes staff members get calls late at night or early in the morning 
to survey an incoming boat. In addition to working out in the field in variable 
weather conditions and different times of day or night, surveyors also spend a lot 
of time converting the information they collected outside in handwritten notes 
into computerized data. It is difficult for employees to get additional compensa-
tion for working off- hours or providing extended time to complete their work, 
which could lead to inconsistent or insufficient reporting practices.
Another obstacle to strong data that Sabater identified involved maintaining 
a sufficient number of interviews on a weekly basis. If a staff member got sick or 
weather was not favorable, a survey trip could be canceled. If a vehicle got a flat 
tire, it could be out of commission for several weeks. Sabater also explained how 
there was “inconsistent implementation of the data standards and lack of follow 
up on the protocol established to ensure quality data comes out of the [Sport 
Fish Restoration] program.”73 In contrast to the detailed requirements for grant 
applications to obtain and maintain federal funding, SFR annual performance 
reports were only descriptive and did not require any technical information 
about data collected or the fishery. There was no obligation to record or provide 
comprehensive information. All of these factors contributed to less reliable data 
sets for the region, which were priorities for U.S. funding agencies.
NOAA acknowledged that scientific reports on American Sāmoa fisheries 
were “extremely limited” and reconstructions were “based on a number of un-
confirmed critical assumptions and may not accurately reflect changes in fish 
catch over time.”74 Sabater and Carroll believed “there has been a good estimate 
of effort since it was easy to detect fishermen from the shore and determine 
what fishing gear they were using. However, catch data has only been sparse, as 
very few interviews have been conducted due to low participation in the fishery. 
Thus, only effort data (expressed in annual fisher hours) were used.”75 While 
fishing practices could be determined over time from existing data collection, 
catch information was still problematic. Others involved in American Sāmoa 
fisheries also acknowledged that many records have been lost or destroyed due 
to computer failures or storm damage over the years.76 Despite these drawbacks, 
this data provided the best available information about shore- based fisheries in 
American Sāmoa.
Boat- based data collection about local small-scale indigenous commercial 
alia boats, while not 100 percent complete, did not face as many challenges as 
shore- based surveys. The Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources staff 
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always knew how many alias were active because they could check the docks 
on a daily basis to see which boats were missing. These alia owners also had to 
apply for licenses. In 2015, the department reported twenty local commercial 
fishers. All boat owners were informed about catch regulations. Through the 
administration of these Western policies, DMWR staff had close contact with 
each boat owner.
Both shore- based and offshore methods to collect data use Western- made 
models and standards. While data collectors were respectful of fishers’ time, 
this program did not include any specific Sāmoan cultural protocols, like vā 
fealoa‘ i or fa‘a Sāmoa fostered in the Community- Based Fisheries Manage-
ment Program. Information was gathered for Western purposes of bureaucratic 
cash- based grant funding for U.S. government programs. As Barnett and Camp-
bell found in the Climate Witness project in Kabara, Fiji, “extensive use of par-
ticipatory tools to elicit local knowledge and to engage communities in decision 
making” was key to this program’s success.77 In a similar way, open communica-
tion and integration of the community’s conventional practices could enhance 
or increase the effectiveness of data collection in American Sāmoa.
From 2013 to 2015, alia owners frequently participated in a DMWR subsidy 
program. Every time an alia boat went out, the captain could voluntarily provide 
a float plan, which included what time they went out, how long they were out 
for, what type of fishing they used, specific catch times and locations, as well as 
the size of their catch and the species caught. In return, alia owners received a 
large discount on fuel for their next trip. In the summer of 2014, gas was about 
$4.28 a gallon. Through the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources 
subsidy program, fishers only paid $1.75 a gallon for up to fifty gallons.78 Local 
fisherman Alvin Mokoma confirmed that the subsidy provided fifty gallons of 
gas for $87.50.79 The DMWR also gave alia owners safety equipment such as 
life jackets and ropes. This initiative offered Western materials and economic 
incentives for small artisanal fishers to provide fishing data. Mokoma stated that 
the gas subsidy and free safety gear was “very good. But it did not continue.”80 In 
2016, this fisherman hoped the program would restart soon.
Two years after this program started, a DMWR employee questioned the ef-
fectiveness of the subsidy project. This individual stated that the discounted fuel 
“manipulates fishermen to go out more often. If they go more often, it doesn’t 
change fish [data]. There is more fishing now, lesser catch.”81 A high number 
of boat launchings did not result in greater fish capture. This staff person also 
expressed how the subsidy program was supposed to be for commercial fishers. 
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Due to the high benefit of the gas subsidy, some casual boaters claimed to be 
alias. These vessels would go out for a few days but when they returned, the boat 
only brought in three fish. Such abuse of this program skewed the data on local 
commercial fishing.
While increases in grant money helped shore- based information collection by 
funding more employees and providing better transportation around Tutuila, 
subsidies for boat- based fishers incentivized the distortion of statistics collected. 
As evidenced by Mokoma, the financial assistance was a huge help. Monetary 
compensation could also encourage other alias to fish more frequently. However, 
to obtain reliable data on local alia commercial fishing efforts, DMWR staff 
might have benefited from differentiating the mostly subsistence and personal 
anglers from consistently commercial boat crews. Clear definitions from both 
territorial officials and federal fishery agencies could improve data collection 
moving forward. Consideration of ways to incorporate Sāmoan cultural pro-
tocols could also result in more ethical use, or at least more general community 
policing and pressure, for subsidy programs.
Scholar Damon Salesa recounted another failed government subsidy pro-
gram in Western Sāmoa during New Zealand rule that tried to control a 
crop- destroying rhinoceros beetle. He explained how “the government put a 
bounty on the beetles, paying Samoans for each one they brought in. Samo-
ans soon learned that it was more efficient to farm these beetles than to labori-
ously hunt for them, so began breeding them. New Zealand officials eventually 
learned what was going on, and so ended the bounty; having lost their value, 
the beetles were let go, making the problem worse.”82 While the colonial gov-
ernment thought cash incentives would motivate the native population to assist 
in combatting this pest, Sāmoans creatively figured out how extract the most 
benefit from the program in the most efficient manner possible. Native peoples 
completely ignored the underlying governmental reason for this environmental 
initiative to eliminate a pest. Salesa concluded that “many government efforts are 
not the best fit for” Sāmoan communities,” especially if the goals do not coincide 
with or resonate with this indigenous group.83 Cash incentives can encourage 
targeted groups to figure out how to best take advantage of a particular program, 
regardless of the government motives, goals, or purposes for a project.
However, such creative native misalignment with Western programs can also 
have negative impacts on the local community and bioregion. Having reliable 
data on fishing in American Sāmoa became extremely important in the Large 
Vessel Prohibited Area (LVPA) reduction discussed in chapter 1, with the ASG 
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lawsuit claiming that the new regulation was based on inaccurate marine use 
information. Unable to provide solid fishing statistics, alia efforts and their 
voices were minimized in the discussions and decision- making process to re-
duce the LVPA.
Now that the consequences of questionable or insufficient data has been 
demonstrated with the LVPA exemption, fishers might be more motivated work 
with the Department of Marine and Wildlife Resources to improve this process. 
Perhaps making data collection a requirement to obtain a commercial fishing 
license could be a solution to strengthening future data sets. Subsidies could still 
be provided to encourage the development of local fisheries, but data should not 
be tied to that program. Providing strong information for policy development 
should not be seen as something voluntary. To improve statistical information 
and Western- based policy development in the future, commercial alias need to 
provide consistent and verifiable data to the DMWR, with or without subsidies.
However, this approach also needs to take into consideration the fact that the 
desire to quantify commercial fishing involved the initially nonnative desire to 
bolster Western- based for- profit angling practices that natives have adapted to 
and incorporated into their contemporary lives, not historic forms of fishing in 
American Sāmoa. The protection of alia fishing stems from the ultimate goals 
of U.S. colonization to bolster the tuna industry and make Sāmoans profitable 
through Western ideals of economic success. As scholar Allen Stayman has 
claimed, the federal government creates policies for U.S. territories with a focus 
on “targeted economic supports for the Islands.”84 Financial profitability has 
guided many programs supported by stateside bureaucrats, including the LVPA 
and alia program examined in chapter 1 and the labor exemptions discussed in 
chapter 2.
Ironically, more government money could result in better information gath-
ering on fishing efforts in American Sāmoa. But without a good base of data, 
it is difficult to convince the government to provide additional funding to a 
seemingly insignificant or unknown population of fishers. Angling was not a 
tradition that most families on island engaged in significantly in the twenty- first 
century, as discussed in the introduction. Recently, local and federal entities have 
tried to reinvigorate fishing in American Sāmoa. Since 2012, the Western Pacific 
Regional Fisheries Management Council has funded an annual summer fishery 
management course for high school students. The National Marine Sanctuary 
of American Sāmoa has sponsored fishing lessons and angling trips, as well as 
provided youth with rod and reels. The Department of Marine and Wildlife 
Resources has also held fishing camps for youth.
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Despite the hard work and energy put into each of these programs, fishing 
statistics have not gone up significantly. Government programs are judged for 
success on a yearly basis. But sometimes, programs take several years to show 
positive results. So far, federally funded local ocean- use programs have worked 
to protect fish species and ocean health, but have not dramatically increased the 
number of people fishing, especially by traditional methods.
Using information gathered from Department of Marine and Wildlife Re-
sources employees, Wespac staff stated in the 2017 Annual Stock Assessment 
and Fishery Evaluation Report that “bottomfish fishery performance in Amer-
ican Samoa appeared to show a slight decrease... [while] Coral reef fishery per-
formance appeared to have mixed trends.”85 While past research has shown a 
decrease in fishing effort in American Sāmoa, recent studies have shown either 
steady or mixed data on the amount of angling occurring in local waters. Incon-
sistent results in fishing effort amounts in American Sāmoa do not help the case 
of local agencies requesting new or continued funding for ocean- use programs.
A 2016 report by Levine and co- researchers found that 47 percent of the 
448 people surveyed in fifteen villages on Tutuila, mostly in the central region, 
never went fishing. Fifty- six percent never gathered marine resources.86 The rest 
of those surveyed engaged in these activities in the range of once or less in a 
month to four or more times a month. While about half of those surveyed en-
gaged in some form of fishing, only 15 percent went out four times or more in 
a month. Levine and her colleagues found that “most American Samoans pur-
chase seafood from stores or restaurants, with 65% of survey respondents listing 
this method as their first or second choice for obtaining seafood. Markets and 
roadside vendors (45%) and fish caught by household members (37%) are also 
common means for obtaining fish.”87 Fish consumption was generally high, but 
seafood self- sufficiency was relatively low. All of this data contributes to U.S. 
federal government decisions on funding for locally initiated marine programs.
Administratively and statistically successful programs regularly receive 
money, while projects deemed to have a lower impact due to small numbers often 
get supported in minor or temporary financial ways, if at all. Providing grants 
based on Western standards and statistics can subsume indigenous practices that 
cannot be solely justified through numbers. Even if only a handful of people en-
gage in traditional fishing practices, that indigenous group still has a native right 
to continue their efforts. Such complicated issues of prioritization and support 
based on local versus federal ideals are the result of the unique shared governance 
established by the Deeds of Cession.
In conclusion, territorial government staff is constantly applying for federal 
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grants to fund their community marine- related initiatives for this bioregion. 
However, this money tethers American Sāmoa staff to the guidelines and pre-
rogatives of federal agencies that privilege increased western forms of fishing, 
boating, and commercialization, as well as overall national environmental pri-
orities. Dependence on U.S. funding shapes the type, knowledge, and manage-
ment of fishing in American Sāmoa, further distancing the colonized indige-
nous population from traditional native forms of angling and marine control.
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 Conclusion
Balancing the Tides highlights the oen invisible and unique experiences that 
typify U.S. colonial status in American Sāmoa. This book shows the inuence 
of U.S. involvement in this Pacic region in the contemporary period and pro-
vides a historical understanding of colonial relations between the U.S. federal 
government and American Sāmoans since the Second World War. While tra-
ditional indigenous culture and practices were able to continue aer U.S. rule 
in 1900, as an unincorporated territory of the United States, the region remains 
under the ultimate control and authority of Washington, D.C. To be viable 
in the long term and gain community support, local as well as federal policies 
and regulations must abide by U.S. laws and acknowledge American Sāmoan 
customs. This work demonstrates both moments of feasible programming and 
less generative federal and territorial initiatives, as well as the diversity of ideas 
about marine practices among the indigenous group in the specic bioregion of 
American Sāmoa.
All four chapters explain how since World War II, the U.S. government has 
increased involvement and command over economic and environmental policies 
in American Sāmoa, promoting Western standards, ideals, and processes. The 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, the Department of U.S. Fish and Wildlife as a division of 
the U.S. Department of Interior, and the U.S. Congress form the basis of the 
modern administrative colonial state in American Sāmoa. In this setting, state 
simplication encourages ocials to standardize and rationalize “local practices 
to make them more comprehensible — and ultimately more controllable — by 
government agencies.”1 Angling practices in American Sāmoa were standardized 
according to Western forms of shing technology and a cash- based wage labor 
commercial shing industry in chapters 1 and 2. Nonnative scientic princi-
ples and bureaucratic government priorities greatly shaped marine practices in 
chapters 3 and 4. Into the twenty- rst century, the U.S. federal government has 
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continued and expanded colonial regulation and authority over the waters of 
their multiple territories in the U.S. Pacific through the expansion of National 
Marine Sanctuary of American Sāmoa in 2012 and the development of National 
Marine Monuments in Hawai‘i in 2006. Marine monuments were also created 
in American Sāmoa and the Marianas Trench, as well as the U.S.- controlled 
central Pacific islands and atolls of Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Wake, Johnston 
Atoll, Palmyra Atolls, and Kingman Reef in 2009. The Central Pacific Marine 
National Monuments were also expanded in 2014.
Another key aspect to the success of marine programs in American Sāmoa 
revolves around understanding and incorporating aspects of fa‘a Sāmoa (the Sā-
moan way of life). The inclusion of Sāmoan traditions and beliefs, such as vā 
(social relations) and vā fealoa‘ i (social respect), in the process of creating rules 
and procedures have enabled the successful implementation of American- style 
industry, government, and environmental expectations and policies in the re-
gion. Acknowledging and accommodating fa‘a Sāmoa practices of attending 
major ‘āiga events during the workweek, such as funerals, deterred cannery 
workers from protesting against low wages in chapter 2. Engagement of native 
groups in the decision- making process increased support for projects such as the 
establishment of the nation marine sanctuary in chapter 3 and the creation of 
Village Marine Protected Areas (VMPAs) in chapter 4. In addition to integrat-
ing aspects of indigenous customs into initiatives, more effective arrangements 
incorporated community feedback, like the Community- Based Fisheries Man-
agement Program in chapter 4. Sustainable policies also developed when the 
interests of the federal government and native peoples coincided, such as those of 
American Sāmoa large- vessel longline owners and the Western Pacific Regional 
Fishery Management Council (Wespac) in chapter 1. When both sides agreed 
on a need, like the creation of the Fagatele Bay National Marine Sanctuary in 
chapter 3, high support was provided. However, this balance was not always easy 
to achieve due to multiple viewpoints and goals among indigenous groups and 
government agencies.
As all four chapters reveal, sometimes the priorities and desires of one group 
of American Sāmoans conflicted with the needs and realities of another. In mul-
tiple cases of U.S. conservation projects taking control of native lands, “wage 
labor pitted residents against not only outside conservationists but also against 
members of their own communities.”2 Such disagreements over who should ben-
efit from the western cash- based economy and how surfaced in the divide among 
alia versus large- vessel longliner owners in chapter 1, the debates over minimum 
wage in chapter 2, and territorial government employees who work closely with 
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U.S. federal government agencies and their western priorities versus the expec-
tations of village communities in chapters 3 and 4. A multitude of strong and 
differential positions have developed in the U.S. colonial American Sāmoan 
community in regards to marine policies.
Into the twenty- first century, the U.S. federal government has been less 
accommodating of native requests, subsuming indigenous practices and ap-
proaches to continental U.S. priorities and agendas, as seen in all four chap-
ters. The reduction of the Large Vessel Prohibited Area (LVPA) in chapter 1, 
minimum wage increases in chapter 2, the expansion of the marine sanctuary 
in chapter 3, and the focus on bureaucratic goals for federal funding in chapter 
4 demonstrate just a handful of examples where U.S. government motivations 
overrode native interests in water- related issues.
Many of the regulations over Sāmoan waters were also created to prevent 
outsiders from spoiling the local environment, particularly through overfishing. 
However, blanket rules disproportionately impact native peoples, because this 
group is more likely to be caught in minor, casual, and/or traditional practices 
that breach federal laws and garner major fines and punishments, such as the 
LVPA as well as National Marine Sanctuary and VMPA rules. Outside fishers 
who violate rules often avoid getting caught because this group angles in the 
region temporarily and can leave quickly with high- speed vessels and technology 
to spot monitors well ahead of time.
American Sāmoans frequently raise concerns over encroachments on indige-
nous control over land and water, especially by the U.S. government. Chapters 
1, 2, and 3 reveal how ignoring the claims of community members resulted in 
native protests, justified by the cultural protection guarantees provided in the 
Deeds of Cession. When American Sāmoans felt the ancestral rights of their 
‘āiga were being infringed upon, or they were being forced into certain unac-
ceptable situations, members of the group often took offense to such actions and 
any related projects. American Sāmoans did not hesitate to speak out against 
federal agencies like the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council 
in chapter 1, the U.S. Congress in chapter 2, and the Office of National Marine 
Sanctuaries in chapter 3. And like with the Cherokee diaspora that historian 
Gregory Smithers studied, this variety of native American Sāmoan protests and 
resistances demonstrated an “understanding of how colonialism had affected, 
and continued to affect” their lives.3 This Pacific group, like other indigenous 
peoples, has responded in creative, active, and critical ways to colonial govern-
ment programs.
In fact, scholar Damon Salesa emphasized the internal and external benefits 
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of Sāmoan creativity in western contexts. He explained how “Pacific people have 
crafted vibrant and dynamic communities, effectively at lower cost, with less cap-
ital, and with limited government assistance.4 This type of Pacific placemaking 
identified by Salesa centers around family.5 As he explained, “Pacific people pri-
oritise investing their social, political and cultural energy, as well as their money 
and capital, into their families.”6 As a result of such a focus, “fully a quarter of 
Pacific people rated themselves at the highest level of life satisfaction. . . . Life 
is tough, but for Pacific people life is also good.”7 Despite occupying the lowest 
economic and social rungs of colonized societies, Pacific Islanders express high 
levels of personal comfort and fulfillment. What lessons can we all learn from 
fa‘a Sāmoa and vā that can lead to more community- oriented fulfillment and 
move us beyond Western- based standards of achievement through individual 
materialism? How does one’s outlook on life change when a balance in all rela-
tionships is the highest priority?
Salesa also discussed how “Pacific people live highly connected and mobile 
lives, lives that are able to shift people, resources, capital and labour across na-
tional boundaries: whether to find capital to build a village church or school, 
to finance a relative’s small business, to participate in the new programmes of 
seasonal labour migration, or to utilise dual citizenship to realise advantages in 
the transnational or even global labour markets.”8 While out- migration has its 
negative consequences on villages in terms of depopulation and absences from 
important ‘āiga events, continued connectedness across the globe can also aug-
ment the social, economic, cultural, and political power of individuals as part of 
a larger family diaspora. Regardless of where they are physically located across 
the globe and despite living in lower economic and political scales created and 
used by Westerners, extended family members can and do rally together and 
support someone financially and emotionally, almost instantly through internet 
money- sharing applications and social media.
Another way Sāmoans have melded fa‘a Sāmoa with contemporary life is to 
leverage the internet and social media to strengthen their extended family con-
nections across the world. For Salesa, “a key advantage of the internet for Pacific 
people and communities was that it seemed to obliterate distance, allowing po-
tent Pacific abilities and values of family and relationships to be newly empow-
ered.”9 While some in American Sāmoa have bemoaned the high influence of 
the internet and social media over the youth population, this technology also 
has great potential for organizing within the Sāmoan community, as well as 
building coalitions across similarly subjected groups.
Even without the help of today’s communications technology, the formation 
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of the Pacific Panthers in New Zealand in the 1970s showed how strong desires 
and motivations have existed to connect colonized groups. This organization 
expanded the definition of Pacific people to include Maori, Sāmoans, Tongans, 
and South Asians (to name a few) to fight for social justice programs and pol-
icies.10 Despite (or perhaps due to) Americanization and diasporic migration 
dispersal for economic purposes, different U.S. colonial groups from various lo-
cations can draw from their cultural and social values of community to creatively 
survive, connect, resist, and even thrive in colonial circumstances.
In contrast, American notions of protecting the environment involve 
Western- based ideas of federal government control, efficiency, appropriate use, 
and sometimes profitability. Such central elements of the environmental bureau-
cratic administrations across U.S. jurisdiction can be seen in the reduction of 
the LVPA in chapter 1, the imposition of minimum wage increases in chapter 
2, the expansion of the marine sanctuary in chapter 3, and priorities for federal 
funding and data collection in chapter 4. In contrast, fa‘a Sāmoa has always 
focused on the support and augmentation of the family and the community. 
Stewardship of the people and the environment, or total bioregion, go hand in 
hand in American Sāmoan traditional ecological knowledge and indigenous 
marine management systems, as discussed in chapters 1, 3, and 4.
This contrast in approach has resulted in native peoples being historically 
frustrated with simplistic government regulatory regimes that do not take their 
wants and needs into account. Such frustration is shared across communities 
taken over by federal conservation programs. As an Adirondack resident stated, 
“The laws were made by men who don’t know what we need here. Give us some 
laws we can take care of and we’ll put them through.”11 In a similar way, Amer-
ican Sāmoans have expressed throughout this book their desires to manage and 
control policies and regulations over the use of their ancestral native waters. 
The local indigenous population wanted a say in the reduction of the LVPA in 
chapter 1, minimum wage increases in chapter 2, the expansion of the marine 
sanctuary in chapter 3, and VMPAs in chapter 4.
The negative reception of indigenous American Sāmoans to Western- based 
environmental ocean- use and economic policies in the late twentieth century 
and the early twenty- first century requires an uncomfortable self- confrontation 
for contemporary Americans. Perhaps the labor and green movement, as well 
as pro- ecology programs, are not universally helpful, ethical, or just. Maybe a 
blanket application of scientifically based environmental and labor policies, such 
as marine protection and minimum wage, are not always appropriate or needed, 
especially in the context of indigenous rights.
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Unfortunately, the voices of American Sāmoans have increasingly not been 
validated by the policies and actions of U.S. government officials. Twenty- 
first- century labor and environmental guidelines established in Washington, 
D.C., often ignore the ground- level reality and daily needs of this indigenous 
group. This work connects this little known but multidimensional and historic 
U.S. colonial relationship to familiar continental U.S. issues, like minimum 
wage and environmental protections, to make visible the significant implica-
tions that national ocean- use policies have on both native American Sāmoans 
and those living in states of the union. To borrow another phrase from Smithers, 
the story of American Sāmoan experiences is both uniquely American Sāmoan 
and commonly human.12
Balancing the Tides also uses the past to help understand larger contemporary 
economic and social changes throughout the U.S. Pacific. Other island territo-
ries in the region, such as the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
and Guam, face issues that are similar in American Sāmoa, where U.S. federal 
funding and presence is also strong and highly influential in their political, fi-
nancial, environmental, and military structures. Ultimately, the United States 
wields control over marine practices in all of these areas. American Sāmoans, 
other Pacific Islanders, and the U.S. federal government need to continue to find 
more ways to work together in developing collaborative ocean- use programs that 
also take indigenous rights into serious consideration.
As Jon Barnett and John Campbell found in their research on the South 
Pacific, ecology programs and policies could benefit from making four specific 
shifts “in scale — from regional to local; in focus — from impact assessments to 
adaptation; in nature — from processes driven by experts from outside of the 
region, to processes driven by people within the region; and in cost — from ex-
pensive big projects to relatively cheaper smaller ones.”13 Recentering initiatives 
around the needs of the ground- level community, figuring out realistic actions 
for these people to take, empowering native groups to develop their own plans, 
and focusing on more manageable and attainable projects could all be positive 
steps moving forward.
Overall, this work places the histories of island territories and possessions at 
the center of U.S. history narratives. While physically on the periphery of the 
U.S. empire, the often- invisible experiences of U.S. colonials are critical to un-
derstanding U.S. government expansion, development, and policies beyond its 
official borders over the course of this nation’s history. This work contributes to 
an examination of the in- between, or liminal, encounters of these U.S. colonials, 
who are neither full- fledged citizens nor foreigners. Subject to U.S. federal laws 
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on a variable basis, U.S. colonials sometimes gain access to unique situations. 
Other times these imperial wards are disadvantaged by their vague political- legal 
status, having no independent mechanism to protect their native interests. The 
combination of U.S. colonial status and indigenous rights complicates marine 
management throughout the U.S. Pacific.
As Sāmoan scholar Albert Wendt has encouraged, “Our quest should not be 
for a revival of our past cultures but for the creation of new cultures which are 
free of the taint of colonialism and based firmly on our own pasts. The quest 
should be for a new Oceania.”14 Sometimes Western ideas and policies towards 
marine management coincide with indigenous Sāmoan practices and principles. 
Other times these two systems conflict. Since “sustainability is a mutual enter-
prise that pertains as much to human social well- being as to the health of the 
physical world,” figuring out an appropriate balance between the two sides of an 
indefinite colonial relationship remains the question facing American Sāmoans 
and the U.S. federal government today.15 Can new balances in relationships 
be created?
Such a quandary will continue to be an important issue that the general U.S. 
public must become aware of and form opinions about for as long as Amer-
ican Sāmoa is an unincorporated territory of the United States. As Byron 
Caminero- Santangelo discussed, “Any final representation of reality will be im-
possible, more narrative and dialogue will always be needed” for marine prac-
tices and policies in the bioregion of American Sāmoa and beyond.16 Western- 
based environmental and labor movements must also acknowledge the impact 
that their rational and scientific- based initiatives have on indigenous rights and 
the daily lives of native peoples. Ecological and economic projects should al-
ways consider indigenous issues in the development and implementation of both 
short- term and long- term programs. Native customs, such as fa‘a Sāmoa and vā, 
can also provide valuable lessons for all inhabitants of the world to learn how 
to be a more connected and more considerate family of concerned and active 
global citizens.
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